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 Relying on moral testimony has been widely considered to be problematic in a 
way that relying on testimony about nonmoral matters is not. One explanation for this 
difference is the problem associated with identifying trustworthy sources of moral 
testimony. Moral knowledge involves knowledge of appropriate ends; as such, those who 
do not have moral expertise have no way of checking on the results of the testimony of 
purported moral experts in order to verify their expertise. As a result of this problem, the 
“credentials problem,” those who would benefit most from moral testimony (i.e., non-
experts) have no way of identifying reliable testifiers. 
 I argue that a view of moral knowledge and cultivation like that found in the 
Xunzi is a plausible alternative that has advantages over the view that informs the modern 
discussion of moral testimony. In particular, Xunzi’s system of “politically sanctioned 
moral expertise” provides a way for those without moral expertise to recognize 
appropriate sources of moral testimony on the basis of their sanctioned authority; trust in 
the institution which accredits and sanctions moral experts functions as a shortcut to 
identifying reliable sources of moral testimony. I conclude that, despite the potential 
problems for such a system, having an institution which accredits moral experts, 
functioning much like the scientific and medical institutions we already rely on, is better 
than the alternative of distrusting moral testimony and depending on individual effort to 
acquire moral understanding or to identify trustworthy sources of moral guidance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is an accepted fact of life that we often depend on the testimony of others; we 
do so when we stop to ask directions or when we inquire as to the time. Furthermore, we 
frequently rely on and defer to the advice and guidance of people whom we consider to 
be experts. If I am trying to fix a leaky faucet, it makes good sense for me to ask a 
plumber what I should do and follow his directions for repairs. Similarly, if I am ill, I 
might seek out a physician and act according to her diagnosis and prescription in order to 
get well. However, there is a debate in ethics over whether or not this sort of dependence 
on expertise and testimony is acceptable when it comes to issues of morality. Some have 
questioned whether it is possible for a nonexpert recipient of moral testimony to identify 
a genuine moral expert, and whether it is morally worthy to act solely on the direction of 
a purported expert without one’s own understanding of what makes that direction moral. 
An important factor giving rise to the debate is a general consensus among 
philosophers that moral testimony and expertise are importantly different from testimony 
and expertise in other domains.1
                                                 
1See, for example: Julia Driver, “Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise,” 
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition Vol. 128 No. 3 
(April 2006), 619-44; Alison Hills, “Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology,” Ethics 120 (October 
2009), 94–127; Robert Hopkins, “What is Wrong with Moral Testimony?” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research Vol. LXXIV No. 3 (May 2007), 611-34; Sarah McGrath, “The Puzzle of Pure 
Moral Deference,” Philosophical Perspectives 23, Ethics (2009), 321-44; Philip Nickel, “Moral Testimony 
and Its Authority,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Vol. 4 No. 3, Cultivating Emotions (September 
2001), 253-66. 
 Deferring to someone else’s moral judgment has seemed 




physician – or even an art critic – regarding their field of expertise is not. Current 
philosophical discussion of the subject has focused on describing what it is that sets 
moral testimony and expertise apart, and what follows from it. 
In addition to the concern about relying on moral testimony, an even more 
fundamental worry has been raised: It is widely accepted that although anyone may 
provide or receive testimony, deferring to testimony about anything which is not a matter 
of common knowledge is justifiable only if its source is a person who is, and is 
recognized by the agent seeking guidance as being, genuinely “trustworthy, experienced, 
and knowledgeable” with regards to the subject about which they are testifying.2 In other 
words, the only case in which it is legitimate to defer to another person’s testimony is 
when that person is a recognizably reliable “expert.” Experts on a subject are “those one 
might hold to be deserving of trust with respect to their [judgments regarding that 
subject]”; they “have greater claim to [knowledge of that subject].”3
This problem comes down to metaethics and moral epistemology: is the nature of 
morality such that it makes sense to consider some people moral experts and others not? 
There are some views of moral knowledge where the idea of moral expertise presents 
problems,
 One problem this 
view presents for moral testimony is the issue of whether or not it is acceptable to 
consider anyone a “moral expert.” 
4
                                                 
2 Hills, “Moral Testimony,” 95. 
 but there are others which do not see any difficulty in the existence of moral 
3 Driver, “Autonomy,” 625. 
4 Various philosophers have suggested that moral expertise is problematic on either moral or 
metaphysical/epistemological grounds. Moral expertise is particularly problematic for views according to 
which every person has equal moral capability (the idea being that “there can be no experts where capacity 
is equal” – see Karen Jones, “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge,” The Journal of Philosophy Vol. 96 No. 2 
(February 1999), 63-64). For an overview of the arguments against moral expertise, see: McGrath, “Moral 




experts.5 For the purposes of this thesis, I will not be addressing the metaethical question 
of the existence of moral experts. Instead, I will begin with the assumption that there are 
or can be moral experts and proceed to deal with the remaining problem of accurate 
identification of moral experts.6
An examination of the extant literature on the subject reveals that once we accept 
the possibility of moral expertise, there are two main problems associated with accepting 
and relying on moral testimony. The first deals with the need for recipients of moral 
testimony to be able to recognize the testifier as a reliable source of moral guidance. As 
Karen Jones has pointed out, the “wise receiver” of moral testimony must be selective 
when choosing whose testimony to heed.
 
7
                                                                                                                                                 
Moral Practice Vol. 10 No. 4, Papers presented at the Annual Conference of the British Society for Ethical 
Theory, Southampton, July 2006 (August 2007), 323-324. 
 Yet, even if there are moral experts and we can 
define what would qualify an individual as such, it may not be possible for those who are 
not experts to recognize them. The second main problem concerns the acceptability of 
relying on moral testimony. The worry is that the requirements of morality are such that 
certain forms of reliance on or deferment to moral testimony are not morally worthy. 
Although there is some overlap between these two problems, for the purposes of this 
paper, I will be focusing on the problem of identification of reliable sources of moral 
testimony. I will argue that Xunzi, a classical Chinese philosopher, presents a view of 
5 For examples of defenses of moral expertise, see: G. E. M. Anscombe, “Authority in Morals,” in Faith in 
a Hard Ground: Essays on Religion, Philosophy and Ethics, eds. M. Geach and L. Gormally (Imprint 
Academic, 2008), 92-100; Peter Singer, “Moral Experts,” Analysis Vol. 32 No. 4 (March 1972) and 
“Ethical Experts in a Democracy,” in Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, eds. David Rosenthal and Fadlou 
Sehadi (University of Utah Press, 1988), 149-161. 
6 Although I use the term “moral knowledge” as I talk about moral testimony and expertise, this need not 
limit the discussion to the realm of moral realism. As Karen Jones points out, “Quasi-realists and norm 
expressivists can each offer nonrealist reconstructions of this sort of talk” (Jones, “Second-Hand Moral 
Knowledge,” 56, fn. 5). Further, my use of “moral knowledge” does not presuppose or necessitate any sort 
of universal moral truth, and so should present no real problems for relativist accounts of morality either. 




moral testimony and moral expertise that provides unique insights into this issue – 
insights that can help resolve this problem, even within the context of modern society.8
In discussing the problem of the identification of moral experts and how Xunzi’s 
view of moral testimony can provide a possible solution for it, I will begin by 
establishing the place of trust in accepting moral testimony. In doing so, I will explore 
Jones’ discussion of “the problem of how to be a wise receiver of moral testimony.”
 
9 I 
will then continue to take a more in-depth look at what is required of a “trustworthy” 
source of moral testimony. In order to be considered acceptable sources of moral 
guidance, moral experts must be recognized as meeting certain criteria, and philosophers 
such as Scott LaBarge and Michael Cholbi argue that the criteria required are such that it 
is difficult (or even impossible) for those without moral expertise to recognize truly 
reliable moral experts over frauds. If those who would benefit from moral testimony (i.e., 
those who are not already moral experts) cannot recognize trustworthy moral experts, 
then relying on moral testimony is problematic, as one could not determine whether or 
not a testifier is a reliable source of moral knowledge, and so would have no basis on 
which to choose whom to trust for moral guidance.10




                                                 
8 Xunzi is now considered one of the most important classical Confucian scholars, and his collected works, 
the Xunzi, is arguably the most developed and sophisticated surviving early Confucian text, characterized 
by its focus on the importance of teaching and ritual for morality. For Xunzi, knowledge of ritual is moral 
knowledge, and is acquired through testimony. 
 – I will proceed to argue that Xunzi’s philosophy offers a solution 
9 Jones, “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge,” 67. 
10 The reliability requirement does not necessitate that an expert is infallible, but just that her judgment is 
accurate enough of the time to warrant trust. Further, it remains possible that an expert may have local 
rather than global moral expertise. 
11 Scott LaBarge, “Socrates and Moral Expertise,” in Ethics Expertise: History, Contemporary Perspectives, 




for it. Xunzi’s moral and political theory includes the idea of what Justin Tiwald terms 
“politically sanctioned moral experts.”12
I argue further that, beyond political reasons to accept moral testimony, an 
institutionalized view of moral expertise also provides an epistemic reason to accept 
moral testimony; it makes it easier for even nonexperts to recognize that a proposed 
moral expert is a reliable source of moral knowledge. It can be difficult and time-
consuming for a nonexpert to determine who qualifies as a moral expert. The system of 
politically sanctioned moral expertise provides a short-cut for the process of such 
determination. 
 The Xunzi advocates that certain moral leaders 
have political authority, and the moral testimony of such politically sanctioned moral 
experts is to be followed (in some cases) because of their political position rather than 
due to their moral expertise. Emphasis, then, is put on establishing good political systems 
such that those who are politically sanctioned moral experts will, indeed, have high levels 
of moral understanding and so serve as reliable sources of moral guidance. I will further 
develop and expand on this idea of institutionalized moral expertise in order to argue that 
the role of politically sanctioned moral experts in Xunzi’s philosophy provides a way for 
people who do not yet have full moral understanding to recognize reliable moral experts 
to follow. 
Of course, this does not entirely resolve the problem of whether nonexperts will 
have an epistemic reason to accept politically sanctioned moral experts as reliable sources 
of moral knowledge. Instead, the issue of recognizing moral expertise has been pushed 
back a level, and the question becomes one of how it is that we are able to trust the 
                                                 




political system to promote trustworthy moral experts into positions of authority. As 
Jones points out, “Having a socially sanctioned role of moral expert is going to raise 
issues of credentialing – Who are the moral experts and who gets to decide?” She further 
expresses the related concern that those in authority might use their power “to advance 
self-serving and morally dubious views.”13
                                                 
13 Jones, “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge,” 64. 
 In response, I will examine several ways that 
Xunzi’s philosophy attempts to mitigate these problems and explore how we can adapt 
Xunzi’s ideas for an institutionalized form of moral expertise into a modern society. Even 
if we choose to abandon the explicit political connection, Xunzi’s philosophy can provide 
valuable insights for the discussion of what might be an acceptable role for institutionally 
sanctioned moral experts. I conclude that there are no more risks with an institutional 
view of moral expertise than there are with other nonmoral institutions we trust, and such 
a view is more beneficial than either leaving it to individuals to attempt to identify moral 
experts or giving up on reliance on moral testimony altogether.
SECTION 1 
 
TRUST AND TESTIMONY 
 
As I mentioned in the Introduction, I will be focusing on the question of whether, 
assuming that there are moral experts, it is acceptable for nonexperts to defer to their 
moral testimony. Further, I will be approaching the issue of the suitability of depending 
on moral testimony from the perspective of the recipient of moral testimony.14 The 
question that concerns me is that of “how to be a wise receiver of moral testimony.”15
I will begin by summarizing Karen Jones’ position, as given in “Second-Hand 
Moral Knowledge.” Jones’ view serves as a good springboard into the discussion of the 
problem of identifying moral experts, since it shares similarities with Xunzi's view of 
moral testimony. However, I will argue that there are several assumptions underlying 
Jones’ position that are not justified, and that Xunzi would disagree with. A closer look at 
these places of disagreement begins to show how Xunzi’s view of moral expertise and 
testimony provides a system within which nonexperts can easily recognize trustworthy
 
                                                 
14 Here, I am taking a similar approach as Philip Nickel, who says: 
I am only looking at moral testimony from the perspective of the person who is 
trying to figure out what to believe or to do, i.e., the listener. I will not discuss 
moral testimony from the standpoint of the person who is making various moral 
claims, i.e., the testifier. This is not to say that it is not sometimes an important 
and difficult moral question when to make a moral utterance, or more 
specifically when to try to advise someone morally. . . . [T]hese are difficulties 
of giving moral advice or uttering moral claims, not difficulties of relying or 
being dependent on someone's moral testimony. (“Moral Testimony,” 255) 




moral experts. Once I have explained Jones’ position, I will discuss how Xunzi’s view 
compares, and the implications of the similarities and differences between the two. 
 
Jones argues that moral testimony plays a significant role, even in the lives of 
“morally mature” adults. She supports the position that relying on others’ moral 
testimony can be not only acceptable but useful, saying, “Often, we cannot do as well on 
our own as we could do if we accepted the moral testimony of others.”
1.1 Summarizing Jones’ Position 
16 This is not to 
say that accepting moral testimony is easily or lightly done; she further argues that “[t]he 
wise truster of moral testimony begins from a stance of distrust.”17 Implicit in this idea of 
the “wise truster” is the premise that a recipient of moral testimony – whom Jones refers 
to as a “borrower of moral knowledge” – has a responsibility to “borrow” wisely.18 When 
Jones speaks of “borrowing” knowledge, she is referring to the idea that when we accept 
something based on testimony, we do so not on the basis of an understanding of the 
reasons for it, but because the testifier says it is the case. At least for Jones, “borrowing” 
knowledge based on testimony contrasts with coming to a conclusion based on an 
argument. At its most basic, “testifying that p contrasts with arguing that p insofar as it is 
the testifier herself who vouches for the truth of p; someone who argues that p lets the 
arguments vouch for themselves.”19
                                                 
16 Jones, “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge,” 56. 
 
17 Ibid. 
18 Exploring the basis and extent of this responsibility is beyond the scope of this paper, falling more into 
the question of the moral worthiness of relying on moral testimony. Instead, my focus will be on whether it 
is even possible for anyone to meet the requirements for “wise trust” of moral testimony. Even if we do not 
have a responsibility to be a “wise truster” of testimony, it may be desirable to be wise in choosing the 
testimony we follow. 




According to Jones, “the problem of how to be a wise receiver of moral testimony 
is a special case of the problem of how to be a wise receiver of testimony more generally, 
and this in turn is a special case of the problem of how to be wise in one’s trust.”20 This 
claim is based on the idea that there is an important connection between trust and 
testimony – whether or not such a connection is plausible depends on what account of 
trust one accepts. Jones describes two types of accounts of trust: risk-assessment accounts 
and will-based accounts. Risk-assessment accounts of trust hold that trust is just a matter 
of relying on others; what matters is the degree of probability of an agent’s performing an 
action. So, in the case of testimony, a recipient will not accept someone’s testimony 
unless she has determined that it is sufficiently probable that the testifier is telling the 
truth – the question of why it is likely that the testifier is telling the truth does not 
matter.21 Will-based accounts are more restrictive in that they place more limitation on 
what counts as a good enough reason to warrant trust. A will-based account of trust will 
“find trust only where there is reliance on the goodwill of another.”22
A typical will-based account of trust might describe trust as: 
 Since will-based 
accounts are more restrictive, Jones argues, if it can be shown that there is a connection 
between trust and testimony according to a will-based account of trust, then that will 
suffice to establish the connection for all accounts of trust. 
(a) an attitude of optimism that the goodwill and competence of another 
will extend to cover the domain of your interaction, together with 
 
(b) the confident expectation that the one trusted will be directly and 
favorably moved by the thought that you are counting on her.23
                                                 
20 Jones, “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge,” 67. 
 






Given this view of trust, in order to show that (wise) acceptance of testimony requires 
trust in the testifier, what needs to be shown is that: (1) we typically need an attitude of 
optimism that the goodwill of another will extend to cover the domain of their testimony 
to us in order to accept that testimony, (2) optimism about the competence of a giver of 
testimony requires trust, and (3) accepting testimony “will require the confident 
expectation that the one trusted will be directly and favorably moved by the thought that 
one who trusts is counting on them.”24
 First, she argues that only in rare, nonstandard cases are we able to accept 
testimony without having optimism in the goodwill of the testifier. We can think of cases 
that would not require such optimism. For example, if someone knows he has 
successfully threatened another person into forced honesty, then he might accept the 
testimony of that person without feeling any need to depend on goodwill. Or perhaps the 
recipient of testimony might be in a situation where she has knowledge that the testimony 
she is receiving is truthful, although her testifier would not generally be trustworthy. 
However, Jones argues, such cases are the exception. The conditions required in order to 
accept testimony without relying on the testifier’s goodwill are rarely met. As Jones 
points out, “Usually…we have no threat advantage sufficient to guarantee performance 
without also relying on goodwill, and we do not have the kind of information that would 
let us know when those who are generally untrustworthy are in fact telling the truth.”
 Jones addresses each of these conditions in turn. 
25
                                                 
24 Jones, “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge,” 69. 
 
So, in most cases, the first criterion for a connection between trust and moral testimony is 





 Similarly, we need to be able to trust in the competence of the giver of testimony. 
There are two reasons we might turn to the testimony of others rather than trying to come 
to our own conclusions: we might accept testimony simply because we do not have the 
time or inclination to find out what the truth is for ourselves – accepting testimony may 
be “merely a matter of convenience”; or, we might seek out testimony because our lack 
of expertise or ability renders us incapable of finding the truth on our own. Speaking of 
this, Jones says, “Even if I attempted to check up on your [the testifier’s] word by trying 
to prove it on my own, I, novice that I am, shall often have fewer grounds for confidence 
in my judgment than I have for confidence in yours.”26 If I trust in a testifier’s 
competence and am aware of my own lack of expertise, then that is the time that 
testimony is most useful to me – if I can easily check for myself what the truth is instead 
of relying on trust in a testifier’s competence, then depending on his or her testimony 
loses its usefulness. Jones notes that the objection could be made that this account of 
testimony and trust fails to distinguish between checking up on the content of a person’s 
testimony and checking up on the testifier. However, even if I were to turn to others’ 
assessment of a testifier’s competence and goodwill before accepting his or her testimony, 
then, in such a case, rather than eliminating the need for trust, I am shifting that trust to 
another place. Trust is still an important part of the equation: “this move does not 
eliminate trust; rather, it grounds my trust in you in my trust in others. It may disperse 
trust, but it does not make it redundant.”27
                                                 
26 Jones, “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge,” 69. 
 So, it remains true that if I cannot check up on 
what a testifier says, then I depend on trusting (being optimistic in) his or her competence 
in the domain about which he or she is testifying. 




 With respect to the third requirement – that accepting testimony requires the 
confident expectation that the testifier “will be directly and favorably moved by the 
thought that one who trusts is counting on him” – Jones points to the opaque nature of 
human interaction. When we converse, there are no direct signposts informing us of the 
nature of our conversation. One person could think that she is making a joke, while 
another takes what is being said quite seriously. In the case of testimony, there is the 
danger that someone might think that she is receiving serious testimony about a matter, 
when the “testifier” is really being sarcastic or humorous. Before a person accepts 
testimony, then, she needs to be certain that what she is receiving is, indeed, the 
testimony that she thinks it is. As Jones says, “Before I can accept what you say in 
response to my request or need for information, I must first assume that what you are 
doing is in fact responding to my request or need.”28
  If we accept Jones’ arguments for these three conditions, and her depiction of 
accounts of trust, then it follows that a wise recipient of testimony must trust the source 
of that testimony.
 Part of what a person needs when 
she seeks out testimony is an impartial, reliable, serious response. So, accepting 
testimony does require a confidence that the testifier is directly and positively motivated 
to fulfill one’s need for testimony. 
29
                                                 
28 Jones, “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge,” 76. 
 If we must trust a testifier before we can accept his or her testimony, 
then “the question of what it is to be a wise and responsible recipient of moral testimony 
29 Even if we do not fully agree with Jones’ account of trust (perhaps thinking that there is a plausible 
account of trust that is more restrictive than the will-based account she describes), so long as whatever 
account of trust we do accept is sufficiently similar such that we would agree with the conclusion that trust 
is important for testimony, then this would suffice. What is important is the idea that trust is a prerequisite 




just will be the question of what it takes to trust wisely in these [moral] domains.”30
 Jones gives four conditions for determining “whether trust, distrust, or neutrality 
is the appropriate default stance”: (1) climate, (2) domain, (3) consequences, and (4) 
metastance.
 
Given this, Jones discusses the justification conditions for trust and how they apply to 
moral testimony – concluding that the default stance towards moral testimony should be 
one of distrust. 
31
“Domain” is a factor when determining the default stance for trust because 
trustworthiness in different domains both requires and signals different things. According 
to Jones, “Domain is generally more important than the consequences of misplaced 
trust…because domain signals likelihood of performance.” She uses a comparison 
between trusting someone to keep a personal secret and trusting someone not to attack 
someone else in public as an example. Although it may seem that being attacked is more 
serious than having a personal secret revealed, “if I am to trust you with a secret of mine, 
then I shall want to have quite a bit of evidence about your character. If, though, I am to 
 By “climate” Jones means the environmental influences that might make it 
easier or more difficult to trust. In some climates, there might be good reason to give trust 
less readily. For example, consider the case of a society where secret police are 
widespread and informants are well-rewarded – people in such a society would have 
strong motivation to be untrustworthy, and so have good reason to have default stance of 
distrust. In order to move from distrust to trust, more evidence of trustworthiness is 
required than would seem appropriate in an environment more favorable to trusting. 
                                                 
30 Jones, “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge,” 70. 
31 Ibid., 71. As Jones notes (71, fn. 27), she gives further justification for and elaboration of these 




trust you not to attack me in the street, I may need no particular evidence about your 
character at all.” It is common knowledge that secret-keeping is difficult; there are many 
temptations to betray a secret. So, distrust may be the appropriate default stance for trust 
in the domain of personal confidences. In contrast, it does not seem generally difficult to 
refrain from attacking strangers in the streets: “that just takes basic decency, a trait that 
we can assume is widely shared, unless the climate is sufficiently bad.”32
Once we are aware of the appropriate default position for trust given the climate 
and domain, we should consider the consequences of a decision to trust. The more severe 
the consequences of a misplaced trust, the greater the requirement of evidence before 
trusting. The fourth, and final, condition to be considered when determining the 
appropriate default stance for trust is one’s “metastance” of trust. This condition is agent 
specific. Some people may be prone to give trust even when it is not justified – in which 
case, their awareness of this metastance towards trust should caution them towards being 
less willing to trust. Others may have problematic tendencies to distrust in particular 
domains – to use Jones’ example, someone may have “racist tendencies to distrust young 
African-American men.” Jones states, “Such agents should be suspicious of their own 
default stances, and that, in turn, should lead them to be more willing to abandon them 
than those who can trust their trust and distrust.”
 
33
 Given these four conditions, Jones argues that, although in many cases we can 
trust people with little to no evidence (for example, I might trust a stranger to tell me the 
correct time), “when it comes to matters where there are reasons for not being 
straightforward…or to matters where competence cannot be assumed, we should not 
 
                                                 
32 Jones, “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge,” 71. 




adopt a default stance of trust in testimony.”34 According to Jones, moral knowledge – at 
least, moral knowledge of the type that might be shared by moral testimony – is rare; it is 
at least not so easy to come by that it is commonly shared. Further, having moral 
expertise “requires a good character, as well as the right sorts of experiences.”35 Another 
important aspect of moral knowledge is its significance and motivational power: “Since 
the best way to convince others to go along with your interests is to convince them that 
morality requires them to do so, we can expect tendencies toward untrustworthiness – 
perhaps deliberate, perhaps as the result of self-deception.” Jones concludes that, “[i]f all 
this is right, then the appropriate default stance toward testifiers about morality is one of 
distrust.”36
Beginning from a default stance of distrust entails that before we can move to a 
position of trusting a testifier: 
 We may still come to trust in the moral testimony of others, but should 
initially either reject that testimony or withhold judgment of it until we have sufficient 
proof that the testifier is trustworthy. 
[W]e shall want to have good evidence about the person’s character, about 
possible hidden agendas, and about whether she has the sort of 
experiences that contribute to the kind of competence we are counting on 
her to have. We should also want to know that our witnesses have 
appropriate epistemic self-assessment, and are not given to asserting with 
confidence claims that they are in a position to assert only tentatively if at 
all. Perhaps the most trustworthy testifiers about moral matters are those 
who are least inclined to offer such testimony.37
 
 
Even agreement between testifiers is not a good indicator of trustworthiness – instead, it 
might indicate a conspiracy to influence or deceive, or a shared attitude or 
                                                 
34 Jones, “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge,” 72. 
35 Ibid.; I discuss this idea and the reasoning behind it in detail in Section 2. 
36 Ibid. 




misunderstanding that has led to misjudgment. Thus, “[t]he evidential standards that must 
be met before trust in someone else’s moral testimony is justified are high.”38
 
 
 Although it seems that Jones is correct about the importance of trust in testimony, 
including moral testimony, certain assumptions she relies on as support for her 
conclusion that the appropriate default stance for accepting moral testimony is one of 
distrust are not warranted. In particular, I will examine in depth Jones’ use of these two 
premises: (1) that moral knowledge is not commonly shared, and (2) that moral 
knowledge motivates in a way that other knowledge does not. I will show how, even 
where the premises are justified, the conclusion Jones draws from them is unjustified, and 
is indicative of further underlying assumptions about moral knowledge and testimony 
that are not warranted. Jones’ argument for a default stance of distrust towards moral 
testimony is evidence of a commitment to a particular view of moral knowledge, and this 
view seems to be shared in the majority of the contemporary literature on moral 
testimony. Looking at a different, at least equally plausible, view of morality – 
specifically, the one found in Xunzi’s philosophy – will allow us to see alternatives to the 
assumptions underlying the discussion of moral testimony that can make the problems 
appearing to plague moral testimony easier to resolve. 
1.2 Points of Disagreement 
I will begin, in Section 1.2.1, by discussing in greater detail the two main 
premises about moral knowledge that lead Jones to advocate a default stance of distrust 
                                                 
38 Jones takes this as proof that “the morally indolent can take no particular comfort from a defense of the 
possibility of borrowing other people’s moral knowledge” (74). One consequence of this argument is that 
any view which maintains that the requirements for trusting moral testimony are not so stringent will have 
to provide an explanation for how it is that moral indolence is not a necessary result. I briefly touch on the 




towards moral testimony. I will argue that Jones seems to be relying on three underlying 
assumptions: (1) that there is a strict division between moral knowledge and other 
knowledge, (2) that moral knowledge is especially significant – with more severe 
consequences for misplaced trust than other types of knowledge, and (3) that individual 
deliberation is the most effective way to come to moral knowledge. In Section 1.2.2, I 
will show how each of these assumptions is not warranted. Comparing Jones’ view of 
morality and society with that of Xunzi indicates that there are other plausible starting 
points for justifying trust in moral testimony. More significantly, I will argue that the 
Xunzi can provide a plausible justification of trust in moral testimony based on how 
societies function and institutions are constructed. 
 
1.2.1 Reasons for Distrust 
First, I will examine the premise (1) that moral knowledge is not commonly 
shared. As I mentioned in my description of Jones’ argument, she states: “Moral 
knowledge regarding the sorts of matters for which we might need moral testimony 
cannot be easy to come by. If it were easy to come by, then we would expect it to be in 
the commonly shared stock of moral expertise.”
1.2.1.1 Moral knowledge is not commonly shared 
39
                                                 
39 Jones, “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge,” 72. 
 I will argue that there is moral 
knowledge that is easy to come by and commonly shared and, further, that testimony 
about such knowledge is useful and even necessary. The Xunzi provides a plausible view 
of morality in which this is the case and a comparison of Xunzi’s view with the one 




that moral testimony about commonly shared moral knowledge is not useful appears to 
stem from assumptions about moral knowledge which are not justified. I will conclude 
that this premise does not give reason enough to think that the appropriate default stance 
towards moral testimony is necessarily one of distrust. 
In arguing this, I want first to clarify that I am not claiming that all moral 
knowledge is easy to come by and commonly shared. Indeed, it seems obvious that some 
moral knowledge is neither commonly shared nor readily accessible; otherwise, we 
would expect moral consensus rather than the moral disagreement that is frequently 
observed. Instead, I am arguing against the assumption that all moral knowledge – or all 
moral knowledge that would be the subject of useful or needed moral testimony – is 
rare/difficult to come by. In other words, the extent of my claim is that there are gradients 
of moral knowledge; some may be difficult to come by and rare, but there is also some 
knowledge which qualifies as moral knowledge and is easily acquired commonly-shared 
knowledge, and this knowledge, too, can be the subject of useful moral testimony. 
In making this argument, I will be assuming that moral knowledge has a practical 
component. This is to say that in addition to knowledge of moral principles, one can also 
have knowledge of particular moral judgments to be made. For example, I can know the 
basic principle of respect for others, but I can also know how that principle should be 
applied – what actions are morally prescribed in order to effectively demonstrate that 
respect. There is evidence that such a view is not uncommon, even within the 
contemporary literature on moral testimony. Michael Cholbi and Philip Nickel both argue 
that moral knowledge has to have a component that prescribes (and motivates) correct 




excellence, and arguing that it is practical excellence we look for in moral experts.40 
Jones also agrees with this point, saying, “moral knowledge is supposed to be practical 
knowledge. It is not enough simply to know, for example, that sexism is wrong. One 
must be able to put that knowledge into practice.”41
Upon reading the Xunzi, it is clear that in Xunzi’s view: (1) knowledge of ritual is 
practical moral knowledge; (2) this moral knowledge is significant, not just trivial 
knowledge; (3) this moral knowledge is (or can be) widely shared; and (4) moral 
knowledge can be acquired through testimony. I will argue that, given these premises, it 
follows that there is commonly shared moral knowledge that can be the subject of useful 
moral testimony. I will begin by arguing for the existence of common moral knowledge 
that can be acquired through testimony (Section 1.2.1.1.1), addressing each of these four 
points. In doing so, I will assess – and reject – five possible objections to this view. Then, 
I will argue that such moral testimony is useful and even necessary (Section 1.2.1.1.2). 
 It would seem odd to insist that 
someone who consistently brings about bad results while knowing just the principles of 
what is good can really be said to have moral knowledge – at least, not the sort of moral 
knowledge which is required for moral expertise. Instead, it seems that moral knowledge 
involves both theoretical and practical knowledge; a person needs to know both the moral 
principles on which to act and how to implement those principles. 
 
 
                                                 
40 See Cholbi, “Moral Expertise,” 327 and Nickel, “Moral Testimony,” 257-58. This issue is discussed in 
more detail in Section 2. 
41 Jones, “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge,” 58. Jones makes this point in the context of explaining one of 
the reasons we might think that there is a problem with relying on moral testimony. However, as will 
hopefully be made clear shortly, one need not think that the practical component of moral knowledge poses 




1.2.1.1.1 Commonly shared moral knowledge 
First, it will be helpful to explain Xunzi’s concept of ritual – in particular, that (1) 
knowledge of ritual is practical moral knowledge. In discussing the Xunzi, Tiwald states, 
“For Xunzi, the kind of moral knowledge most susceptible of expert advice is knowledge 
of good or righteous acts, especially ritual courtesies or protocols (li禮) and right or 
righteous acts (yi 義).”42
For Xunzi, ritual is a set of rules and practices which serve to bring about right 
ends. Furthermore, Xunzi takes ritual to be broad in scope. Ritual (li) refers to more than 
just religious rites or traditional ceremonies (although it certainly encompasses those); it 
governs every aspect of a person’s life. In the second chapter of the Xunzi (“Cultivating 
Oneself”), we read: 
 According to the Xunzi, it is clear that knowledge of ritual is 
accurately characterized as both moral and practical. 
If your exertions of blood, qi, intention, and thought accord with ritual, 
they will be ordered and effective. . . . If your meals, clothing, dwelling, 
and activities accord with ritual, they will be congenial and well-
regulated. . . . If your countenance, bearing, movements, and stride accord 
with ritual, they will be graceful.43
 
 
Now, one might wonder why ritual would include prescriptions dictating even what a 
person should wear – and, even if it does, what relevance ancient Chinese ritual might 
have for contemporary philosophy. However, this sort of social norm is present even in 
modern societies. Consider, for example, if someone were to show up to a funeral 
wearing a clown suit. Even if his intention is to convey grief or offer condolence – 
                                                 
42 Tiwald, “Xunzi on Moral Expertise,” 3.  
43 Xunzi 2.36-41; note that I am using a manuscript version of Eric Hutton’s forthcoming translation of the 





appropriate sentiments for a funeral – his manner of dress is likely to convey a very 
different, inappropriate, message. 
Evidence of particular, practical moral prescriptions is also seen in social norms 
that dictate whether we should shake hands, how we should treat guests (offering 
refreshments etc.), and how to behave in specific settings (e.g., we dress formally for the 
opera but casually for a rock concert, we turn off our cell phones when we attend the 
theater). When someone violates these prescriptions, she is seen as discourteous and rude, 
or worse, even if her intentions are good. Even if we do not think that these (modern) 
prescriptions are rightly thought of as part of what Xunzi terms ritual (and this is 
debatable), it is clear that this kind of prescription parallels the sort Xunzi is referring to 
when he speaks of ritual. What is important is not whether or not Xunzi is correct with 
regards to ancient Confucian ritual, but the general thought that there are many particular 
matters about which there are prescriptions on how to act, and knowledge of these 
prescriptions counts as moral knowledge. Thus, what the Xunzi says about ritual can be 
usefully applied to similar modern social norms. 
Objection: Knowledge of ritual is not moral knowledge. The objection may be 
raised that much, if not all, of ritual44 is a matter of etiquette and, as such, is not a moral 
concern. However, the idea that etiquette is a moral concern is not foreign within modern 
Western philosophy. For example, Sarah Buss and Karen Stohr have each argued in 
defense of just such a connection between etiquette and morality.45
                                                 
44 I will use the term “ritual” in a sense which covers not just the specific prescriptions Xunzi was aware of 
and explicitly addresses, but also similar modern prescriptions. 
 Buss argues that 
“[s]ystems of manners play an essential role in our moral life,” serving as the way that we 
45 Sarah Buss, “Appearing Respectful: The Moral Significance of Manners,” Ethics 109 (July 1999), 795-
826; Karen Stohr, “Manners, Morals and Practical Wisdom,” in Values and Virtues: Aristotelianism in 




acknowledge the intrinsic value of others – demonstrating the “respect” and “dignity” 
which are important to moral philosophy.46 Similarly, Stohr asserts, “Genuinely good 
manners contribute to, and are expressive of, morally important ends . . . They thus form 
an essential component of virtuous conduct.” More specifically, “Good manners are 
central to moral life because they serve as the vehicle through which moral commitments 
are expressed and moral ends are accomplished. Thus, good manners in this sense are tied 
directly to an agent’s grasp of moral concepts.”47 If Buss and Stohr are correct, then 
knowledge of etiquette forms an important part of practical moral knowledge.48
Objection: Knowledge of ritual is not significant moral knowledge. Still, it may 
seem that knowledge of etiquette is not an important part of moral knowledge given how 
trivial much of etiquette (and ritual) appears to be – after all, it can be difficult to see how 
things such as table settings could have anything to do with morality. This seems 
especially true when we consider how what is considered good manners differs from 
place to place and time to time. It might be odd to consider something a moral concern 
when whether or not it is correct depends on when or where it is done.
 
49
                                                 
46 Buss, “Appearing Respectful,” 795-97. 
 Even if we 
accept that knowledge of ritual is moral knowledge, we may object to Xunzi’s view that 
such moral knowledge is an important enough part of moral knowledge to matter. For, 
how could knowledge that differs from culture to culture and time to time be a significant 
part of morality? 
47 Stohr, “Manners,” 189-90. 
48 Even if one does not find their arguments entirely convincing, they indicate a move within Western 
philosophy towards thinking that etiquette or ritual is moral. My aim in mentioning Buss and Stohr is to 
establish that this view – held by Xunzi – is plausible, and is one which certain Western scholars are now 
exploring and willing to accept. 
49 Such a view is not unheard of, however. Consider, for example, virtue ethics, according to which 
appropriate actions may differ with time and place and a virtuous person (or moral expert) will recognize 




This brings us to the second point of Xunzi’s view of ritual; not only is 
knowledge of ritual practical moral knowledge, (2) it is significant – not trivial – moral 
knowledge. Those things that we think of as etiquette or manners are considered an 
important part of morality within the Confucian tradition – particularly in the Xunzi. 
Ritual is seen as the proper way to give expression to underlying moral standards and 
commitments, as without ritual even the best of intentions can bring about morally 
undesirable results.50 Some have argued for an interpretation of ritual as being like 
language and grammar.51 Just as there are rules in language for how to properly express 
our meaning such that others will understand us, so does ritual provide a way for us to 
properly express moral knowledge and commitments such that we bring about the right 
results.52 In providing rules and expectations with which everyone within a society may 
be familiar, ritual can be considered a shared language of moral understanding. We use 
ritual to communicate and share moral meaning with each other.53
                                                 
50 See, for example, Xunzi 19.1-8 and 19.215-226. 
 The particulars of 
rituals are simply the means by which we express the moral standards on which they are 
built. The details of the rules may differ according to the norms and customs of a given 
culture, but the underlying moral principles often remain the same. 
51 See Chris Fraser, “The Limitations of Ritual Propriety: Ritual and Language in Xúnzǐ and Zhuāngzǐ,” 
Sophia: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysical Theology and Ethics Vol. 51 No. 2 
(2012), 257-82; Chenyang Li, “Li as Cultural Grammar: On the Relation between Li and Ren in Confucius’ 
‘Analects’,” Philosophy East and West Vol. 57 No. 3, Ninth East-West Philosophers’ Conference (July 
2007), 311-29; and Chad Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1992). 
52 Fraser, Li and Hansen draw further parallels between language and ritual than what I mention here. For 
example, they discuss how both are systems which are developed over time with the capacity to gradually 
adapt while still remaining largely the same, the meaning of which comes from tradition and custom. I 
return to the analogy of ritual and language later. 
53 Buss expresses this idea in her discussion of how manners convey respect and an acknowledgement of 
the worth of others (“Appearing Respectful,” 801-02). Stohr argues that “the rules of etiquette serve as a 
primary vehicle for expressing moral commitments in social life,” concluding, “Practical wisdom is 
incomplete when it cannot be exercised effectively, and effective exercise requires knowledge of how to 




 To those who would still maintain that knowledge of ritual is not significant 
moral knowledge, the response is three-fold. First, even if ritual practices and 
expectations could be different, that does not diminish the importance of adhering to 
them within a given society. For example, it is not uncommon in the West to leave one’s 
shoes on even when at home. However, in some East Asian countries (such as Japan and 
South Korea) it would be seen as insulting and disrespectful to enter a person’s home 
without removing one’s shoes. The fact that I can wear my shoes inside someone’s house 
without causing offense in one place does not excuse me from adhering to the expectation 
to remove them when in another. If I were not to follow a society’s ritual prescription to 
remove my shoes, then I would be considered a belligerent, disrespectful, and even 
immoral person in that society. As aforementioned, the importance of ritual comes from 
allowing us to communicate moral sentiments and bring about good ends as efficaciously 
as possible. Just as one must use the language of a place in order to communicate 
effectively with the people who live there, one needs to adhere to the normative 
expectations of the society one is in, whatever they may be, in order to give right 
impressions and bring about right results. Ultimately, to convey the proper morals in a 
given society, one needs to adhere to the “rituals” of that society; this makes all rituals an 
important part of morality and knowledge of ritual an important part of moral knowledge. 
 Second, what makes ritual morally important is its intent and consequences. 
Ritual is important in that what is conveyed has moral significance and the consequences 
it brings about are for morally good ends. If all I have is theoretical moral knowledge, 
then I may not be able to bring about right results, no matter my intentions. Someone who 




demonstrate respect is missing an important part of moral knowledge. Knowing moral 
principles is important, but the particulars of how we apply those principles are important 
as well; ritual is the way that we convey our moral standards to each other. So, to 
continue with the above example, however much I may want to show someone that I 
respect him, if I enter his house and do not remove my shoes – when doing so is expected 
– the consequences will be the opposite of my intent. If we cannot convey moral 
principles to each other such that we are understood and the results of our actions are 
good, then a significant part of moral knowledge is missing. It seems that, rather than 
being unimportant, knowledge of ritual is necessary for full moral understanding. 
 Finally, I will point to the idea that the practice of ritual is a learning process. 
Xunzi describes ritual as nurturing and cultivating moral dispositions and 
understanding.54
                                                 
54 See, for example, Xunzi 19.28-34, 82-85, 227-233. I discuss this more on pages 30-31. 
 While it may be true that a lot of matters of ritual have less significant 
moral consequences, and so knowledge of such ritual seems less important, some rituals 
do have important consequences and the simple ritual with lesser consequences can be 
thought of as training and practice for being able to understand and implement more 
significant ritual. Consider someone whose goal is to perform complicated bicycle jumps 
and tricks, and who maintains that mastery of bike-riding requires that a person be able to 
do so. Now, imagine that he insists that knowing how to pedal and to ride in a straight 
line are so insignificant in comparison to the advanced stunts and acrobatic maneuvers 
required for bicycle mastery as to not even count as knowledge of bike-riding at all. Such 
an insistence would seem very odd – surely pedaling and riding in a straight line are 




first knowing such basics. Indeed, these simple abilities are an integral part of any 
complex tricks. Similarly, with ritual, the simple, seemingly-inconsequential practices are 
significant in that they are a required part of greater moral issues. Consider a skillful 
politician defusing situations of conflict and running a country; all of the minor points of 
etiquette come into play and are needed, not mere prelude. If, for example, a diplomat to 
another country fails to learn about the etiquette of that country, then a faux pas or gaffe 
could cause serious offense.55
Objection: Knowledge of ritual is not moral knowledge if said ritual is lacking. 
The concern may still be raised that we cannot be certain enough that ritual is doing what 
it should (effectively communicating correct moral principles and bringing about good 
moral ends) to be said to have moral knowledge. The response to this concern is two-fold: 
 As such, it would be odd to insist that knowledge of ritual 
is not significant enough to truly count as moral knowledge in an important sense. 
First, there is no other way to get to full moral understanding except through a 
process that begins with ignorance, improves with knowledge (both theoretical and 
practical), and then goes through a (possibly lengthy) process of learning and practice. 
Xunzi’s view of morality includes the idea that there are different levels of moral 
knowledge and understanding – ranging from a basic knowledge of ritual to a full 
understanding of the rituals and standards for righteousness and how they all fit together 
and are efficaciously applied.56
                                                 
55 This might be true even if the diplomat was perfectly eloquent and convincing in his or her own way and 
was insightful and accurate. Further, not knowing to tailor his or her responses to particular needs is a 
shortcoming that may be morally blameworthy if it causes morally bad ends. 
 Thus, what we take to be common moral knowledge of 
56 Xunzi 2.135-140. At a basic level, knowledge of ritual would allow the practitioner to attain the proper 
consequences through its practice in most cases, but one might adhere to ritual too rigidly (not 
understanding when best to apply or dispense with certain rituals). A higher level of understanding allows 
for a “comfortable mastery” where rituals can be tailored for specific circumstances based on a complete 




ritual may not be the highest form of moral knowledge, but it may still qualify as moral 
knowledge. 
Second, ritual need not be perfect in order for knowledge of ritual to qualify as 
moral knowledge. Although Xunzi indicates that ritual was perfected during the Zhou 
dynasty, there is also evidence that ritual was not invented all at once or in a perfect form, 
but was instead improved upon over time by a series of sage kings until it finally reached 
perfection.57 Further, as mentioned before, we need not agree that the ritual of the Zhou 
dynasty is perfect (at least, not for our time and circumstances) in order to think that what 
Xunzi has to say about ritual is both pertinent and significant for modern philosophy.58
For one thing, ritual is not appropriately thought of as a monolithic entity – 
knowledge, including moral knowledge of ritual, deals with domains. One need not say 
all of ritual is perfect in order to say a particular ritual has been perfected. For instance, 
one could know that walking up to a random stranger and hitting him is not appropriate, 
and be certain that refraining from doing so is a ritual expectation that need not be 
improved upon, without committing oneself to the claim that all of ritual is perfect. For 
another thing, and particularly with a view of ritual as being developed over time, one 
might think of moral knowledge of ritual in the same way we think of scientific 
knowledge. Within the institution of science, even though we acknowledge that we might 
 
Particularly given a rapidly-developing and increasingly-connected world, it is reasonable 
to doubt that ritual has been perfected. However, it is not unreasonable to think that 
knowledge of imperfect ritual qualifies as moral knowledge. 
                                                 
57 As Tiwald notes, “Xunzi does allow that some people, historically speaking, have justifiably revised the 
models that guided people, as when ancient kings created (and then probably refined over generations) 
rituals to help people cope with material scarcity” (“Xunzi on Moral Expertise,” 9). 




never really attain perfect knowledge of the subject matter, what one is reasonably sure of 
at a certain time is still thought of as knowledge. If absolute certainty of perfection and 
no room for any doubt as to truth is not required in order to have scientific knowledge, 
then the same should be true for moral knowledge. Given this, it seems that we could say 
that as long as ritual seems to be doing what we think it should, and we have confidence 
that it is working towards the appropriate end goal (much like science), then that is good 
enough – it may have to be, if we want to insist that anyone ever has moral knowledge. 
Thus, it seems that as long as a ritual practice brings about results that are or are 
very close to what morality requires, then knowledge of that ritual qualifies as moral 
knowledge just as much as knowing currently-held scientific beliefs counts as knowledge. 
We are comfortable with saying that we know the explanation for how we are held to the 
earth (i.e., the theory of gravity), although we are aware that Newtonian physics may not 
truly be the best description of the world. Similarly, we can say that we know that 
wearing black to a funeral (in the West) expresses respect and condolences – it might not 
be the best way to express those moral sentiments, but we can still know that it does 
express them. Just as in science we can know the explanation for a phenomenon while 
still acknowledging that it is not the final word on it (there may be better explanations), 
so can we still have moral knowledge when we know a moral prescription, even 
accepting that there may be a better one. 
Objection:  We do not have the knowledge of ritual requisite for moral knowledge. 
The objection may be raised that evidence of familiarity with or following of a ritual is 
not necessarily evidence of knowledge of that ritual. We may act in accordance with 




wakes up in the morning and drowsily goes through the motions of bathing and brushing 
her teeth. Does she do so because she knows that this is the right thing to do and wishes 
to do what is right? Maybe, but – the objection would go – it is also possible that she acts 
out of routine conditioning rather than knowledge. As another example, consider the 
Western ritual of shaking hands when greeting someone. It may be argued that we shake 
hands not because we know that it is appropriate to do so but simply because we have 
done it all of our lives and it is a matter of ingrained habit. Or, consider the child who 
goes to a funeral. He may not know that he is supposed to wear black – just that “I was 
made to wear this (and it happens to be black).” As an adult, it may not occur to him that 
he should do something else, but that does not mean that he knows that wearing black is 
the right thing to do, let alone that he knows that doing so is a sign of respect. Simply 
doing things as a matter of conditioning or habit might not count as having moral 
knowledge. 
In response to this objection, I would begin by pointing out that it seems that 
violators of ritual expectations stand out in a way that would not be explained by just 
adhering to ritual as a matter of mindless habit. For instance, if someone were to show up 
at a funeral in a bright pink bunny suit, it seems like he would still stand out and others 
would recognize that something is off, even if no one would be able to state clearly and 
conclusively what it is, exactly, that is wrong and why. Even if it seems that no one could 
confidently say, “It is (morally) wrong for you to have shown up to a funeral in a pink 
bunny suit,” breaking from the ritual expectations for funeral attire nonetheless would rub 
people the wrong way – doing so at least would not be seen as common or average. 




Even if the rest of the funeral guests were not explicitly aware of what is appropriate (i.e., 
of what ritual dictates regarding funerals), they would be able to recognize that something 
inappropriate had happened. Further, it seems very likely that, if asked, they would be 
able pinpoint what it is that is wrong; they would probably point out the guest in the pink 
bunny suit as someone behaving inappropriately and realize that it is his attire that 
offends. Indeed, it seems quite probable that if pressed to explain what they felt was off 
about the person’s choice of attire, they could offer an explanation for why it is not 
proper and most likely give some sort of justification to back it (e.g., “you’re not 
supposed to dress that way for a funeral – it’s rude”). 
The discussion of moral testimony and moral knowledge thus far has assumed a 
view of knowledge as involving justified, true belief.59
                                                 
59 When we get knowledge from testimony, we acquire a true belief from the testifier and our justification 
for it is based on the testifier’s asserting it (i.e., our belief is justified by our trust in the testifier). (See page 
8.) 
 Given such a view, even if a 
person’s only justification for belief in a ritual prescription is “that is what is expected” or 
“it is impolite not to,” this can still suffice for knowledge. This seems particularly true if 
we consider testimony as capable of directly transmitting knowledge – if “so-and-so told 
me so (and I trust her)” qualifies as sufficient justification for knowledge, then it seems 
that reasons based on a sense of etiquette and social norms would as well. One does not 
need to begin with a full knowledge or understanding; what might be considered a lower 
level of knowledge can still qualify as moral knowledge, and provides a way to work 
towards greater understanding. When first beginning to follow ritual, a person does not 




following ritual provides a way of cultivating and nurturing the appropriate 
understanding and dispositions.60
We see this idea within Jones’ discussion of moral testimony, as well. She 
presents a case where two Chinese men who are long-time friends consider whether or 
not to join a movement for democratic freedom. One, who has studied in Europe and has 
knowledge of the value of democratic freedom, joins the movement and tries to persuade 
his friend to join as well. Although his friend is initially reluctant, he eventually decides 
to join the movement – ultimately trusting his friend and acting based on his testimony. 
Jones writes: “But that choice does not leave everything as it was before. Having made 
the choice, he is thrown into different circumstances and comes to see things 
differently. . . . He now knows first-hand what he initially knew only second-hand, and 
his belief, originally grounded in testimony, comes to have rich alternative sources of 
support.”
 
61 The man’s knowledge of the value of democratic freedom was not initially as 
complete as it could be, but it still counted as knowledge.62
                                                 
60 See, for example, Xunzi 19.9, 28-29: “[R]itual is a means of nurture. . . . Know well that ritual, yi, good 
form and proper order are the way to nurture one’s dispositions.” The chapter “Cultivating Oneself” 
(Chapter 2) also references the idea that adherence to ritual is a means of cultivating and improving one’s 
moral understanding and worthiness. Compare this to Buss, who argues that habitual good manners 
condition one “to regard people as having as having a special dignity that imposes limitations on what it is 
reasonable for other people to do” (“Appearing Respectful,” 800). 
 Similarly, a person’s 
61 Jones, “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge,” 76. 
62 The objection could be made that the person whose belief is justified only by an acceptance of moral 
testimony does not have knowledge; moral testimony might, at most, help towards knowledge, since the 
justification “because so-and-so says so” is not sufficient for knowledge. However, this would be a problem 
for all of testimony, not just moral testimony. My goal in this paper is to focus on the two problems 
distinctive to moral testimony – addressing the possibility that no testimony can convey knowledge is 
beyond the scope of this paper. As such, I will only briefly indicate that there is a way to mitigate even this 
objection. Even if testimony cannot directly convey knowledge, there are still cases where testimony is 
useful or even necessary for acquiring knowledge. Even if it does not give knowledge in the direct sense, it 
is providing the route by which one can get to knowledge (much like how reading a recipe may be the best 
or only way to learn how to cook a particular dish, yet does not directly give the know-how to cook it – one 
must also practice following the recipe, learn about cooking techniques and ingredients, etc.). An argument 
making this point would have to support the premise that there are some sorts of knowledge that a person 




justification for and depth of knowledge of a ritual practice may seem shallow, but this 
does not mean that he does not have moral knowledge. 
Given this understanding of ritual as practical moral knowledge, and given the 
broad scope of ritual, we can begin to see how (3) knowledge of ritual is moral 
knowledge that is (or can be) widely shared. Having established that, for Xunzi, ritual 
encompasses prescriptions regarding everyday things, and that ritual is a necessary part 
of moral knowledge, I will argue that some everyday prescriptions are matters of 
common knowledge with the intent of demonstrating that some moral knowledge is 
common knowledge as well.63
Let us start by returning to the example of ritual dictating appropriate funeral 
practices, specifically funeral attire. Within Western society, etiquette prescribes that 
those who attend a funeral wear black. It seems that the idea that black is the suitable 
color for expressing mourning and attending funeral ceremonies – and that wearing a 
different color (particularly a bright one) is inappropriate – is common knowledge. If 
someone were to show up to a funeral in, say, pink instead, that person would at least be 
 Even if it is not the case that everyone follows the 
prescriptions of etiquette, there are nonetheless many prescriptions that most everyone (at 
least, most everyone within a given culture) knows about. I will begin by giving some 
examples that serve to demonstrate that many instances of ritual are matters of common 
knowledge. 
                                                                                                                                                 
would have to be moral knowledge that is like this). If this can be proven, then it should be apparent that 
testimony is useful and necessary, even if it does not directly convey knowledge (one result of this being 
that what is said in this paper would be of value even to someone who does not think that testimony can 
directly convey knowledge). 
63 In arguing for this, I do not intend to indicate that practical moral knowledge – knowledge of ritual – is 
the only moral knowledge which is or can be a matter of common knowledge. To the contrary, it seems that 
many basic moral principles can fall into this category – for example, the standard of respect for the lives of 




considered odd and probably be seen as discourteous and be met with disapproval and 
condemnation. Even someone who has never attended a funeral is likely to know that one 
should wear black – it would certainly be difficult to find anyone within Western society 
who knows of the existence of funerals but has led so sheltered an existence as to not be 
aware of this stipulation of proper etiquette. 
Nonetheless, funerals are not everyday occurrences. One might wonder if there 
are examples of everyday ritual which are common knowledge. Even brief consideration 
can reveal many such rituals. For instance, consider dining etiquette. This may be as 
simple as the oft-repeated prescription (at least within Anglophone countries) to “chew 
with your mouth closed.” Although many people may not follow this particular 
prescription, most will admit that it is considered bad manners to chew with one’s mouth 
open or to speak with food in one’s mouth. It seems that even those who assert that it is 
alright to do so will acknowledge that their position goes against what is typically 
expected. 
Another case of ritual around dining which seems even more obviously to be 
common knowledge is the distinction between when it is acceptable to eat with one’s 
hands versus when one should use utensils. It seems that almost everyone knows that it is 
acceptable to eat pizza or a hotdog without the use of utensils. However, we nearly never 
see adults in restaurants eating spaghetti with only their hands. Experience seems to show 
that it is common knowledge that one can pick up a dinner roll with one’s hands to eat it, 
but one should use utensils to eat steak and potatoes. The distinction between when it is 
appropriate to use only one’s hands to eat and when one should use utensils is a matter of 




wrong is a source of comedy or humiliation (consider books and film where a socially-
backward person does not understand the use of utensils, or where a person is forced to 
eat ‘like an animal’ without the use of utensils). 
A similar example of a ritual prescription that affects us every day and which 
seems clearly to be common knowledge is the stipulation that it is wrong to appear nude 
in public – one should always wear clothing when going out. It seems that only the very 
young do not have some sense that etiquette and modesty requires that one remain 
clothed in the presence of others. It is always considered an odd, stand-out experience if 
someone is out in public naked. 
Having established how it is that, for Xunzi, knowledge of ritual is (1) practical 
moral knowledge, (2) significant knowledge, and (3) commonly shared, I will now turn to 
the point that (4) moral knowledge can be transmitted via moral testimony. Indeed, 
knowledge of ritual depends on testimony. Especially for Xunzi, ritual is learned from 
others – it is generally not the sort of thing we would just figure out by ourselves. It 
seems that moral knowledge (at least of ritual) is something that needs to be learned a 
posteriori, rather than something available a priori. In the Xunzi we read, “The children 
of Han, Yue, Yi and Mo peoples all cry with the same sound at birth, but when grown 
they have different customs, because teaching makes them thus.”64 Xunzi repeatedly 
stresses the importance of learning – for example, the Xunzi begins with “An Exhortation 
to Learning,” in which Xunzi says, “I once spent the whole day pondering, but it was not 
as good as a moment’s worth of learning.”65
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 Even if one can attain moral knowledge 
from individual, rational contemplation, moral knowledge (at least practical moral 




knowledge) is more easily – and more commonly – acquired from testimony. The 
mythical sage kings who established ritual did not do so on the basis of others’ moral 
testimony; however, much like Einstein was a scientific genius, such people are the 
‘geniuses’ of the moral realm, and are the exception rather than the rule. 
For example, consider a child who is taught ritual by his parents – he is told not to 
go outside naked, when to use utensils, not to chew with his mouth open, etc. The child 
accepts the testimony of his parents because he trusts them. If left to discover what is or 
is not appropriate on his own, how could he do so? Even if observing others and their 
reactions might lead him to the same conclusions (e.g., he might think, “People get upset 
and I get in trouble when I run outside without clothes,” and conclude, “I should wear 
clothes when I’m outside”), the people he is interacting with only act in that way and give 
those reactions because they have been taught the ritual expectations via testimony. 
Proper ritual is not an a priori fact of the world. Instead, it is a matter of custom and 
tradition that is the result of historical development within a culture. We see evidence for 
this in the differences in ritual expectations between cultures and over time. Evidence 
also comes from the fact that certain groups and individuals who maintain that they 
adhere to the same moral standards do not agree with or follow the same rituals. For 
example, compare the different manifestations of respect for animals between certain 
modern-day animal rights groups and traditional Native American groups. Both share a 
standard of respect for the lives of animals, but they express this through different rituals; 
one refrains from eating  or wearing animal products, whereas the other kills animals 




revering their sacrifice. So, knowledge of ritual is dependent on testimony, even when 
said knowledge is also widely shared. 
The example of how laws function within states is useful for illustrating how 
certain types of moral knowledge can be commonly available in society, yet still be 
acquired through testimony and still rely on experts who have a fuller understanding than 
the average person. Most people know the basics of what sorts of laws exist. For example, 
in the United States, we know that our civil liberties should be protected, that we should 
not murder or steal as those are crimes, etc. – that is common knowledge. However, just 
because such knowledge of laws is common does not mean that there are not experts 
whose advice we should seek in legal matters. For example, understanding the precise 
details of the interplay of laws with each other, the specific language of laws, their 
precedents, and how all this works together to impact the actual implementation of laws 
requires a level of knowledge that most people do not have the time (or the inclination) to 
gain, although it is, in principle, available to everyone. Instead, we rely on experts to 
guide us and tell us what to do in particular circumstances even though we know the 
general laws. We turn to lawyers for legal counsel; we rely on judges to determine the 
particulars of how a law should be carried out. Similarly, we can depend on moral 
testimony and expertise regarding rituals even when the rituals are a matter of common, 
readily-accessible moral knowledge. 
Objection: Moral testimony cannot reliably transmit moral knowledge. The 
objection could be made that the claim that shared knowledge of ritual is shared moral 





In responding to this objection, I will first point out that it is based on two of the 
underlying assumptions which I will be discussing in Section 1.2.2. Primarily, it relies on 
the idea that we can all acquire moral knowledge through individual, rational 
contemplation, or, at least, that such contemplation is the best or most appropriate way to 
get to moral knowledge. To a lesser extent, this objection also relies on the assumption 
that there is a strict division between moral knowledge and other types of knowledge. If 
such a division is not assumed, then this objection would pose a problem for all kinds of 
knowledge and testimony, not just moral. If moral knowledge is not strictly different and 
distinct from other knowledge and it is problematic to call what we gain from moral 
 It is only if testimony about ritual is, on the whole, reliably 
accurate that shared knowledge of ritual would qualify as moral knowledge. We might all 
know that we should wear black to a funeral (in Western societies), and this might be an 
accurate knowledge of established custom. However, if that custom is not based on 
correct moral standards, or does not bring about the requisite good results of true, 
morally-relevant ritual, then it does not qualify as moral knowledge. After all, knowledge 
requires not just belief and justification, but also truth. “Knowledge” that is dependent on 
testimony – that is the result of custom and tradition – may come from misunderstanding 
or deception and not be based on objective moral truth. Thus, the objection would 
conclude, in order to be sure that what seems to be commonly shared moral knowledge is, 
indeed, moral knowledge, we need to be able to acquire said knowledge without relying 
on testimony. Even if as children we require testimony to acquire it, it should be 
knowledge that as adults we can figure out for ourselves. 
                                                 
66 This is assuming that any testimony can convey knowledge. See footnote 62 for an explanation for why I 




testimony “moral knowledge,” then this would indicate that it is (at least to some 
comparable extent) problematic to call what we gain from any testimony “knowledge.” 
For now, I will just note that we see more evidence here that these assumptions are 
informing the contemporary discussion of moral testimony. Further discussion of the 
assumptions and of how they are not warranted will come in the following section (1.2.2). 
To get to the details of a response to this objection, however, I will begin by 
noting that reliance on testimony in order to acquire knowledge of ritual is not limited to 
children. There are some rituals which we only encounter as adults and are not taught as 
children. For example, consider the expectations for appropriate business attire, and for 
what should be worn to a job interview. What qualifies as professional attire, and how we 
should dress for an interview, are not just matters of practicality or habit – they are 
matters of ritual, in that what we wear conveys important moral sentiments (e.g., respect 
for others and appropriate moral and social divisions). We are not taught these things as 
children (at least, not typically), yet how would we know what is expected without 
testimony? It is worth mentioning that this sort of ritual expectation is common 
knowledge among adults – most people know that a business professional should wear a 
particular sort of suit; there are rituals that are common knowledge which we do not learn 
about until we are adults, the transmission of which depends on testimony. Given this, it 
seems that at least the portion of the objection that indicates that as adults we should 
come to moral knowledge of ritual through individual contemplation rather than 





Nonetheless, a proponent of the objection under consideration might insist that the 
main problem lies in the unreliability of moral testimony, both in terms of the correctness 
of the testifier’s belief and the accuracy of the transmission of that belief through 
testimony. With regards to the former, if we cannot be certain that the rituals we take part 
in every day really map on to moral standards in the appropriate fashion, then we cannot 
be said to have moral knowledge in knowing them. As for the latter, even if the testifier 
does have (true) moral knowledge, his or her testimony may not convey that knowledge, 
perhaps due to ineptness or poor communication, or even due to deliberate deceit on the 
part of the testifier. One way of dealing with this objection involves the idea that if there 
is anything which is common, certain knowledge, that can be used to figure out, test and 
build up to further knowledge. In the case of moral knowledge, if there is something that 
we can be certain is truly moral knowledge and which is commonly shared, then we can 
judge ritual based on that knowledge and so determine which ritual is really in keeping 
with moral standards and expectations.67 For example, all things being equal, there are 
certain things that have always been seen as wrong – if a person goes out and kills or 
tortures someone indiscriminately, then it is obvious that is bad.68
 
 Given this common 
ground, it seems that we could determine that knowledge of those rituals which clearly 
serve to uphold a moral standard according to which we do not kill or torture others 
without sufficient reason is correctly called moral knowledge. 
 
                                                 
67 This idea comes up again in Section 2, where it is discussed in more detail. 
68 In particular instances where this does not seem to be the case, it is either because of an existing 
justification (e.g., slave owners not considering those with darker skin as persons) or extenuating 




1.2.1.1.2 Moral testimony about common, easily acquired moral knowledge 
 Above, I have established that there is some (practical) moral knowledge which is 
easy to come by and commonly shared – or, at least, that this is the view found in the 
Xunzi and that this view is plausible. Of course, even having established this, Jones’ 
further concern that such knowledge would not be the subject of needed or useful moral 
testimony still stands. After all, Jones’ argument is that if moral knowledge is easy to 
come by then “we would expect it to be in the commonly shared stock of moral 
expertise” – the assumption appears to be that there is no use or need for testimony when 
the knowledge conveyed is commonly shared. We typically think of testimony as useful 
only in situations where the testifier has knowledge which the recipient does not have. 
What use could testimony be if it is about something which the recipient knows just as 
well as the testifier, as it seems would be the case with moral knowledge that is easily 
acquired? In response to this, I will offer several arguments and examples for how 
testimony regarding moral knowledge that is easy to come by or common can be both 
useful and necessary. 
 First, underlying Jones’ claim that there is no commonly shared moral knowledge 
that would be the subject of needed testimony is the assumption that if knowledge were 
easy to come by, it would be commonly shared. This assumption is problematic. The ease 
with which something can be acquired does not necessarily say something about how 
many people acquire it. It is possible for there to be something which, were it sought out, 
would be readily obtained, but which is not generally sought out, and so not common. It 
may be the case that some piece of moral knowledge could be acquired by anyone with 




such a case, moral testimony may be useful – or even necessary – as a way of directing 
attention to the knowledge and motivating people to accept it. A related point is that even 
knowledge that is easy to come by some other way may be even more easily acquired 
through testimony. Consider a person who wants to know what time it is – it seems that 
knowledge of the time is easy to come by (watches, cell phones, clocks, etc. are 
abundant), yet it is nonetheless easy to imagine a case where the easiest way to get it is 
via testimony (for example, a person who is not wearing a watch asking someone who is). 
Similarly, there may be some moral knowledge which is easy to come by, yet is 
sometimes (or even most often) most easily acquired by seeking out the testimony of one 
who already knows. If such is the case, then just as Jones indicates that “[m]ost people 
can be trusted to give an honest and informed answer to certain questions . . . such as 
what time it is,”69
 Even if we do accept the premise that knowledge that is easy to come by is also 
commonly shared, it may be the case that moral testimony about commonly shared moral 
knowledge is necessary. Whether something is commonly available says nothing about 
how much we need testimony to get it. It may be testimony which makes it easy to come 
by, and so leads to it being commonly shared. For example, in modern developed 
societies, knowledge of how to drive a car is both common and easy to come by. 
However, just because knowing how to drive is common knowledge does not mean that 
we do not need to take driving lessons and learn from others how to drive. When we learn 
 so can most people be trusted to give an honest and informed answer to 
certain moral questions. Thus, the appropriate default stance to at least some portion of 
moral testimony would be trust rather than distrust. 
                                                 




how to drive, there are directions that tell us how to drive and what the expectations for 
drivers are that we can best (or only) get from testimony. Consider things like road signs, 
speed limits, parking rules, rules for passing or yielding, signaling, etc.: These rely on 
established convention, and understanding them is necessary in order to know how to 
drive in typical traffic – without knowing them, a person (arguably) does not truly know 
how to drive. A person could try to observe what others do in order to gain knowledge of 
such driving conventions or to teach herself how to drive by trial and error, but it is safer 
and more efficacious to be told what the expectations are instead. This is particularly true 
given that these conventions differ according to location and situation (for example, a 
person who knows how to drive in the United States may not know how to drive in 
China), so even if the vehicle being driven is the same, a person would need different 
knowledge of expectations in order to truly know how to drive in different circumstances, 
at least in the certain sense of “knowing how to drive” that encompasses following rules, 
laws, etc. We might need something in addition to testimony to learn how to drive (e.g., 
hands-on experience behind the wheel of a car), but we do need testimony to give us 
knowledge that is an important part of knowing how to drive.70
                                                 
70 I thank Cynthia Stark for bringing a possible objection to this point to my attention: even if we do learn 
from others how to drive, we do not learn via testimony if testimony only conveys propositional knowledge 
(knowledge-that), not knowledge-how. This is a typical view of testimony. However, there are several 
points to be considered in response to such a concern. First, although testimony is often conceived of as 
verbal, propositional communication, this is not necessarily the case. The sort of nonverbal instruction we 
might associate with learning how to drive (e.g., driving manuals, demonstrations, and gestures from 
instructors that tell us when to slow down or accelerate, etc.) may qualify as testimony. As Katherine 
Hawley points out, “Testimony can of course involve writing, sign language or gestures as well as speech, 
and gestures or demonstrations may be especially important for transmitting knowledge how” (see 
“Testimony and Knowing How,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A Vol. 41 Issue 4 
(December 2010), 397). Second, some have argued that knowledge-how consists of propositional 
knowledge (i.e., knowledge-how is reducible to knowledge-that; see, for example, Jason Stanley and 
Timothy Williamson, “Knowing How,” Journal of Philosophy 98.8 (2001), 411-444). If this is the case, 
then even if testimony transmits only propositional knowledge, it may still convey knowledge-how. Third, 
even if we assume that testimony only conveys knowledge-that, and that knowledge-how is not reducible to 




that testimony gives us (such as how to follow road signs or when and how to signal our 
intent to turn) is common knowledge. 
This holds true for moral knowledge, as well. I have previously worked to 
establish that there is some knowledge of ritual which is commonly shared moral 
knowledge, and within the discussion of that claim, there were already indications that 
testimony is required in order to acquire knowledge of ritual. Given a view of moral 
knowledge as something that is (best) acquired from learning from others and observation 
of the world, rather than something discoverable from individual contemplation, it seems 
likely that commonly shared moral knowledge is so precisely because of moral testimony. 
In the case of moral knowledge (of ritual), testimony tells us what we should do (what 
ritual expectations are and directions on how/when to meet which expectations). As such, 
testimony is the best (or only)71 way to get to knowledge of ritual.72
                                                                                                                                                 
knowledge-that, it still may be the case that testimony plays an important role in attaining knowledge-how. 
For example, the testimony of others may point our attention to relevant facets of driving, confirm 
conclusions about driving we have made based on our perceptions, and correct our behavior when we do 
something wrong. The epistemological question of whether or not testimony can transmit knowledge-how 
(or, indeed, whether it can directly convey knowledge at all) is not one that I will be addressing. For the 
purposes of the argument here, it suffices to say that it is plausible that testimony plays an important (and 
possibly necessary) role in gaining many sorts of knowledge-how, including those in morally-relevant 
domains. 
 This idea is more 
clearly understood when we consider what Xunzi says about the importance of teachers 
and learning. He indicates that we require teachers in order to know what rituals to 
practice and how to practice them correctly. He says, “In learning, nothing is more 
expedient than to draw near to the right person,” explaining that it is only in doing so that 
71 As aforementioned, except in the case of those with extraordinary ability (genius), testimony may be the 
only way, not just the most practical and efficacious way, to get to knowledge of ritual. Further, even if a 
moral genius were to discover ritual through a process of individual contemplation, this would likely 
consist of inventing a new system of ritual that still serves the ritual functions rather than coming to a 
knowledge of the exact same ritual that already exists. Given this, he would still not be understood without 
first learning existing ritual – even implementing the new system of ritual he invented would only be 
feasibly done with an understanding of the system that it would be replacing. 
72 Recall that knowledge of ritual is practical moral knowledge; at least some (and perhaps all) knowledge 




we can come to a comprehensive understanding of what is required for right action.73
Ritual is that by which to correct your person. The teacher is that by which 
to correct your practice of ritual. If you are without ritual, then how will 
you correct your person? If you are without a teacher, then how will you 
know that your practice of ritual is right? . . . And so, to contradict ritual is 
to be without a proper model, and to contradict your teacher is to be 
without a teacher. If you do not concur with your teacher and the proper 
model but instead use your own judgment, then this is like relying on a 
blind person to distinguish colors, or like relying on a deaf person to 
distinguish sounds. You will accomplish nothing but chaos and 
recklessness. And so in learning, ritual is your proper model, and the 
teacher is one whom you take as the correct standard and whom you aspire 
to accord with.
 In 




When correct ritual is common knowledge, this is because people are learning ritual 
through moral testimony from teachers who serve as trustworthy moral experts. 
 This element of Xunzi’s philosophy also indicates that, not only is testimony the 
best way to acquire moral knowledge of ritual, it is dangerously arrogant to think that we 
can do without such testimony. Depending on our own judgment is akin to ignoring the 
moral wisdom that has been accumulated and improved upon over a long period of time, 
and this is dangerous for two reasons: 1) we are likely to end up with a lesser, or even 
incorrect, understanding of morality, and 2) we will not know how to effectively convey 
our moral convictions and bring about good results. Previously, I brought up the idea that 
ritual is much like language; just as a person would not be understood if he decided to 
begin using words and grammatical rules that he came up with on his own rather than the 
ones that are an established part of a language, so would a person who determines on his 
own what is appropriate be unable to bring about his desired moral ends. Stohr speaks of 
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this when she remarks that “when it comes to the rules of etiquette, originality is not 
usually a virtue.”75
The point of having standard locutions at all is to enable us to convey the 
meaning that one is supposed to convey on the occasion. It is through 
saying, ‘I’m so terribly sorry’ that one expresses sympathy in a way that 
will be understood by the one to whom it is offered. The person who says 
instead, ‘you’re better off this way’ may indeed be feeling very 
sympathetic, but if her goal is to offer comfort, she will very likely miss 
her target. Not all remarks or actions offered with sympathy manage to 
convey sympathy to the other party.




Even if we all have shared moral commitments, because of our differences, we may find 
vastly different ways of expressing them, and what seems appropriate to one person or 
one community may seem entirely inappropriate and have different meanings to another. 
So, we necessarily rely on testimony to learn the appropriate rituals for communicating 
those shared commitments in a way that can be understood. It seems arrogant to say from 
one’s own limited perspective one could somehow rationally deduce what effect all of 
one’s actions will have, and what they will mean to everyone with whom one interacts. 
Moral testimony is a necessary part of acquiring moral knowledge; we rely on moral 
testimony for moral knowledge, even when that moral knowledge is commonly shared.  
 It may be helpful to consider the case of children. We teach (via testimony) things 
that are readily accessible, common knowledge to children. For example, even when 
everyone within a society speaks a common language, parents and teachers explain 
grammatical rules and conventions to children (or at least correct them through a process 
of trial-and-error, even if the instruction is not explicit). We also teach children basic 
skills like walking and explain things such as the meanings of road signs; these are all 
                                                 





matters of common, easy-to-come-by knowledge, yet teaching them to children is 
considered an important, necessary part of their education. As has been mentioned, Jones 
herself introduces the idea that children depend on moral testimony in order to learn what 
it is to be good. She argues that it is possible that we can be considered “moral beginners” 
in some sense even into adulthood.77 This sentiment can be taken further than Jones 
seems to think. Jones limits the usefulness of moral testimony for adults to situations 
where people are insensitive or lacking in some way that makes it more difficult for them 
to gain the knowledge on their own;78
Similarly, such testimony can be useful for cultural outsiders. Consider a person 
who visits a foreign country and is unfamiliar with what qualifies as proper ritual within 
that country. She could try to figure out whether it is appropriate to shake hands when 
greeting someone on her own, but it is easier (and arguably better) for her to find out 
from someone who knows instead.
 as we can see from the Xunzi, adults can benefit 
from – and need – moral testimony even if it is about commonly-shared knowledge of 
matters that are part of everyday life (e.g., what to wear, how and when to eat, etc.). 
79
                                                 
77 Jones, “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge,” 55-56. 
 The objection may be raised that if one thinks 
morality is universal, then no one will be an outsider. However, since ritual is developed 
over time and can differ according to different cultures and time periods, the principles of 
morality may be universal, while ritual is not. It is important to keep in mind that, for 
Xunzi, ritual is not just what commitments we should hold – it is also how to put those 
78 See Jones’ example of Peter lacking the capacity to sense when a person is being sexist (“Second-Hand 
Moral Knowledge,” 59-63). 
79 It is doubtful that a person could even acquire knowledge of a society’s ritual practices without any 
dependence on testimony – if testimony is understood broadly to include things like teaching by example, 
then even observing the actions and responses of those within the society may count as learning from 
testimony.  A person forms a belief about a society's ritual based on what members of that society do and 




commitments into practice in a way that actually brings about the right results. So in the 
case of moral principles that are commonly shared among humanity, while we might not 
need people to tell us what they should be (everyone holds them), the problem is that 
moral knowledge (given that it has a practical component) is not just holding 
commitments but knowing how to act in accordance with those commitments, and being 
able to do so successfully. We need testimony to help us get to the point where we can 
best bring about the results of our commitments. So, commonly-shared moral knowledge 
cannot be explained just by those elements that people can acquire on their own; it also 
involves complicated ways of instantiating them (i.e., ritual) that rely on testimony. 
Even setting this idea aside, it is still the case that those things which are 
commonly shared and entrenched within society may need to be taught. Again, return to 
the driving example: a person does not automatically know how to drive because he is 
born into a society where driving is common knowledge. There will always be 
newcomers to a knowledge group, whether those newcomers are children, immigrants, or 
those who have entered a new stage of life or new social station with its own ritual 
expectations. Thus, even if some moral knowledge of ritual is commonly known and 
easily learned, there will always be a need for moral testimony of those rituals. 
 Finally, I argue that even in cases where both the testifier and the recipient share 
knowledge of the subject, testimony can be both useful and necessary. First, testimony 
regarding commonly-shared knowledge can be used as a way of finding or testing for 
common ground, from which we can infer whether a person is right about other, more 
significant, moral testimony.80
                                                 
80 This idea was mentioned previously (see page 39) and I go into it in more detail in Section 2. 




can be a way of establishing trust and camaraderie. So, testimony regarding commonly-
shared moral knowledge can actually help to mitigate the supposed need for a default 
stance of distrust towards testimony; by providing a simple way to test a testifier’s 
trustworthiness (at least in the sense of whether or not the testifier has the appropriate 
knowledge), it is a significant step towards at least a stance of neutrality rather than 
distrust. Second, those with moral knowledge might have an obligation to testify and 
share that knowledge with others. If this is the case, it would seem to be an odd theory 
that would expect that it is good for those with moral knowledge to try to share it, but 
also think that the moral testimony they may be able to give is not necessary, or at least 
useful.81
 Here, again, we can begin to see how those who have contributed to the 
contemporary literature on moral testimony, including Jones, seem to be relying on 
underlying assumptions that are problematic. It seems that Jones is relying on moral 
knowledge being strictly different and importantly significant in comparison to other 
knowledge; she begins by stating that there is no single appropriate stance for trust 
towards testimony – the factors of climate, domain, consequences, and metastance all 
play a part. However, she treats all of moral knowledge as being alike in such a way that 
a default stance of distrust is always correct in the case of moral testimony. Given 
different variations in significance of moral knowledge (ranging from seemingly-trivial 
matters of daily etiquette to matters of the highest importance), it would instead make 
sense to conclude that, even if distrust is the appropriate stance towards some moral 
 
                                                 
81 I mention this to help establish the usefulness of moral testimony about commonly-shared moral 
knowledge, but will not be exploring the specifics of the responsibilities of the testifier, as the focus of this 




testimony, a stance of neutrality or even trust may be appropriate towards other moral 
testimony. 
 Having attempted to demonstrate the problems with the first premise for Jones’ 
argument that the correct default stance towards moral testimony is one of distrust, I will 
now discuss her second premise, and how, even if it is true, it does not justify a stance of 
distrust. 
 
 The second premise Jones relies on in establishing that distrust is the correct 
default stance towards moral testimony is that moral knowledge motivates in a way that 
other knowledge does not and, because of this, people tend to use and rely on it more, 
increasing the probability that moral testimony is used to manipulate others rather than 
honestly convey moral truth. She says: “Since the best way to convince others to go along 
with your interests is to convince them that morality requires them to do so, we can 
expect tendencies toward untrustworthiness – perhaps deliberate, perhaps as the result of 
self-deception.”
1.2.1.2 Moral knowledge motivates in a way that other knowledge does not 
82
                                                 
82 Jones, “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge,” 72. 
 There are two concerns being expressed in this premise: 1) If one is 
already motivated to act in a particular way, one might try to find moral justification to 
do so, and so we have reason to be suspicious of any ‘moral’ thoughts we have because 
we could just be trying to justify our own actions. Thus, receivers of moral testimony 
should have reason to doubt the accuracy of givers of testimony because the testifiers, 
despite their confidence in their own accuracy, might be subject to this self-deceiving 
phenomenon. 2) Because people are aware that moral knowledge is motivating, more 




issues or certain actions are morally correct in order to motivate others to act in particular 
ways. The idea behind both of these concerns is that the motivational power of moral 
knowledge is such that there is a tendency to turn to moral reasons in order to manipulate 
others, whether intentional or not. Given these two concerns, Jones concludes that we 
should be more hesitant to trust moral testimony – supporting her conclusion that the 
correct default stance towards such testimony is distrust. 
 The basic idea that drives this premise is that moral knowledge is motivating or 
influential. When I say that moral knowledge motivates, I do not necessarily intend to 
indicate a strong claim that the knowledge is itself intrinsically motivating. Instead, the 
issue at hand is not whether the knowledge (alone) motivates, but whether having the 
knowledge leads to our being motivated to act on that knowledge in a significant way. 
This motivating power of moral knowledge could be interpreted in two different ways: 1) 
moral beliefs motivate because people (perhaps inherently) want to do what is moral, so 
if something is purportedly the morally right thing to do, they will be motivated to do 
that;83 or 2) moral knowledge motivates because when we learn, understand and practice 
it we come to understand why it should be done and to appreciate and desire the results of 
morally good actions.84
                                                 
83 What matters for this is not whether the moral principles we have knowledge of are intrinsically 
motivating or we are motivated by a desire to do what is morally required – in either case, having the moral 
knowledge “I should do x” leads to our being motivated to do x because we know it is morally good to do 
so. 
 From what Jones says, it seems that she has the first 
interpretation in mind. This is not an uncommon position to hold. Philip Nickel brings up 
this idea in his discussion of the different outlooks on moral testimony coming from 
cognitivist versus noncognitivist perspectives. He speaks of accounts of moral influence, 
84 The distinction here is that, rather than being motivated to do something because we know it is the right 




saying, “One of the most important reasons people make moral claims involves the 
influence they hope to have on the behavior and moral attitudes of others,” and noting 
that this is “a central insight of non-cognitivism.” He adds that cognitivists “may 
acknowledge that humans are highly susceptible to being influenced by moral judgments 
and moral rhetoric.”85
In analyzing Jones’ use of this premise, my responses will aim to be convincing 
no matter which of these two interpretations one takes. However, it is clear that Xunzi’s 
view includes a system of moral development that is built around the second 
interpretation. As I will further explain, for Xunzi, we are motivated to act in accordance 
with moral knowledge because we come to understand that adherence to right standards 
brings about desirable results (e.g., order and prosperity).
 It seems that both Jones and Nickel take it to be a commonly and 
intuitively understood fact that moral claims are highly, and significantly, influential. 
86
                                                 
85 Nickel, “Moral Testimony,” 254. 
 I hope that if the rest of the 
arguments in this paper are plausible, then by the end, it will be easy to see how Xunzi’s 
view may be more convincing. Further, since the second interpretation differs in that it is 
more specific about how moral knowledge motivates, not in whether it does, even a 
response that is targeted towards one interpretation would work for both of them – for the 
purposes of this portion of the paper, it does not matter at what point moral knowledge 
motivates, just that it does motivate in a way other knowledge does not. For now it is my 
intention to pursue a further analysis of the latter interpretation – the question is: if we 
86 Here Xunzi’s philosophy differs from that of another Confucian thinker, Mencius, who thinks that 
humans are born with an innate, incipient inclination towards good. Instead, Xunzi thinks that humans are 
born with desires that when followed without constraint will inevitably lead to bad results. It is only with 
learning and cultivation that we come to be able to regulate our desires and thereby bring about good ends 
that more successfully fulfill those desires. There is an indication in the Xunzi that the person who fully 
understands ritual and yi (righteousness) will cultivate and develop a desire for goodness in itself. However, 




hold the second interpretation of moral knowledge’s motivating power, then does this 
give us reason to think that the appropriate default stance towards moral testimony is one 
of distrust? 
According to Xunzi, humans are not naturally good nor are we naturally inclined 
to good. This is not to say that Xunzi thinks that humans are, by nature, evil, or 
deliberately bad. Instead, it is more that “Their goodness is a matter of deliberate 
effort.”87
[I]f people follow along with their inborn natures and dispositions, they 
are  sure to come to struggle and contention, turn to disrupting social 
divisions and order, and end up in violence. So, it is necessary to await the 
transforming influence of teachers and models and the guidance or ritual 
and yi, and only then will they come to yielding and deference, turn to 
culture and order, and end up under control.
 People are born with particular desires and dispositions that, while not 
necessarily evil in and of themselves, will lead to bad results if not properly channeled 
and regulated. This is why the sage kings established ritual – it provides directions for 




Without ritual, people’s natural tendencies and desires will cause conflict, but when there 
is a moral system that people are taught to follow, they can begin to recognize and 
appreciate that adherence to expectations of that system will lead to better lives. The idea 
is that human nature is such that we need to be reformed, like metal being honed to 
sharpness or wood being steamed and straightened;89
                                                 
87 Xunzi 23.1. 
 the sage kings recognized this need, 
and set up ritual “in order to straighten out and beautify people’s nature and inborn 
88 Xunzi 23.7-11. 




dispositions and thereby correct them, and in order to train and transform people’s nature 
and inborn dispositions and thereby guide them.”90
Given that we are not naturally inclined towards goodness, it is only when one has, 
through practice and learning, come to understand ritual (morality) that one is motivated 
to act a particular way simply because it is good to do so, i.e., because it is what morality 
requires. Before such a point, even when a person seems to be motivated to do something 
on the basis of thinking it morally good or motivated to avoid doing something because it 
is morally bad, there are other reasons that could drive this decision. For example, a 
person may choose to act in accordance with what they take to be moral requirements 
because they see doing so as a way to achieve certain selfish desires, such as higher 
social standing and esteem. We see this is the case in Xunzi’s warnings against those who 
only have the appearance of good, and his emphasis on pairing appropriate action with 
the proper heart and dispositions.
 
91 Xunzi explains, “By birth, people are originally petty 
people. Without a teacher or the proper model, they will seek only benefit.”92
                                                 
90 Xunzi 23.21-23. Here, we can see that Xunzi’s philosophy bears certain similarities with that of Hobbes. 
The comparison between Xunzi’s “Xing’e” (性惡, “Human Nature is Bad”) and the Hobbesian “state of 
nature” has been made by a number of recent scholars: see, for example, Eric Hutton’s introduction to 
Xunzi in Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy (ed. P.J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden, Hackett 
Publishing Company, 2006: 256), and Eric Schwitzgebel’s article “Human Nature and Moral Education in 
Mencius, Xunzi, Hobbes, and Rousseau,” History of Philosophy Quarterly Vol. 24 No. 2 (April 2007), 159. 
 It is only 
upon moral cultivation that a person comes to evaluate the world and her actions in terms 
of more than harm or benefit. 
91 See Xunzi 1.129-138, 1.181-190, 3.89-114, and 19.227-233. This was also mentioned in the previous 
discussion of ritual: practicing it regulates our emotions, builds our understanding, and helps us to cultivate 
the appropriate disposition; it is only when we pair appropriate action with appropriate disposition that the 
practice of ritual is at its best. 




When writing about Xunzi in his book Confucian Moral Self Cultivation, Philip J. 
Ivanhoe explains this idea. He compares an appreciation of the Way (Dao 道)93 to an 
appreciation of literature: both are “an acquired taste.”94
One might appeal to the difficulty of getting around in society without 
knowing how to read. . . . One could point out that literacy will increase 
their earning power . . . But one could not effectively appeal to the 
inherent value of literature. This is something one has to see from the 
inside of a life that includes such goods. On Xunzi’s view, morality is like 
this, something the uninitiated can only understand in terms of its 
immediate usefulness in the quest to avoid harm and satisfy their basic 
desires; they have no innate taste for it, no real appreciation of it. 
 He explains that illiterate people 
cannot appreciate literature: “they see no meaning and find no satisfaction in the written 
word.” This is why, Ivanhoe continues, “it is impossible to make a direct, compelling 
case to such individuals about the inherent value” of pursuits such as poetry. He writes: 
 But, if people acquire enough knowledge about themselves and the 
world they inhabit, they will discover that there are new sources of 
profound satisfaction, beyond simply avoiding harm and fulfilling basic 
desires. . . . The longer one studies, the more one understands, the deeper 
one’s appreciation of the Way will be.95
 
 
Given this, although it may be the case that people who do not yet have the appropriate 
level of moral understanding are motivated to do something because they take it to be 
morally required, it is not on the basis of an appreciation of its being morally good.96
                                                 
93 The Confucian conception of the highest standard, according to which we should all act. Following the 
Way, for Xunzi, necessarily involves appreciation for and adherence to ritual. 
 
Further, being in a society which, as a whole, expects and respects adherence to moral 
requirements (e.g., a society which follows ritual) is a large part of what encourages 
people who lack moral understanding to be motivated even in this sense – otherwise, it is 
94 Philip J. Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self Cultivation: Second Edition (Hackett Publishing Company, 
2000), 32; emphasis his. 
95 Ibid., 34-35. 
96 This is akin to refraining from stealing because one knows it is prohibited (e.g., by law) rather than 




less likely that they would see acting in accordance with moral requirements as suitably 
rewarding.97
Nonetheless, in a society with an established moral model to follow, both those 
who have moral understanding and those who do not will be motivated and influenced to 
act in accordance with what they take to be moral requirements. Acknowledging the 
motivational power of moral knowledge, however, does not necessitate that one defaults 
to distrusting moral testimony. I will discuss three possible responses, supported by what 
is said within the Xunzi, that cast doubt on the idea that this second premise of Jones’ 
argument supports her conclusion that the correct default stance towards moral testimony 
is one of distrust. 
 
My first response involves the idea, which I touched on previously and will return 
to later in this paper, that there is a gradient of moral significance of actions. When one 
person tells another that it is not appropriate to shake someone’s hand in a given situation, 
that is a case of moral testimony. However, it seems that a testifier would be no more 
motivated to lie to someone as to whether or not shaking hands is appropriate than to 
deliberately mislead someone who asks for directions or inquires as to the time. There is 
typically very little to be gained from such deception. The consequences of misplaced 
trust are typically so small as to make it unlikely that we would be deceived or that we 
would see ourselves as having good reason to distrust. We may be able to conceive of 
circumstances where a person would have reason to deceive another about something like 
the time – perhaps a person may lie about the time to someone she knows to be a 
                                                 
97 The state of chaos that exists without ritual may motivate some people to act differently – as was 
evidently the case with those who first established ritual. However, it seems that such people are the 




competitor for a particular job in order to ensure that her competitor is late to an 
interview for the position. Similarly, we may imagine a case where the consequences of 
not shaking hands when it is expected that one should do so are more severe – perhaps 
there is a person who is more than usually offended when he does not receive a 
handshake, and will seek some sort of vengeance for the perceived slight. However, it 
also seems that these are not the typical cases and, all things being equal, as Jones points 
out, we have little reason to doubt the veracity of testimony regarding such mundane 
matters.98
Only those parts of morality that are more significant, with greater consequences, 
appear to be motivational in the way Jones mentions. In this way, moral knowledge 
seems similar to other kinds of knowledge – the extent to which it motivates depends 
upon the significance of the issue to which it pertains. It would only be otherwise if all of 




If this is the case, then the idea of building up trust based on testimony regarding 
smaller, less consequential and more easily-tested matters again comes into play.
 Given a gradient of moral significance that ranges from relatively 
inconsequential everyday matters to important matters that, admittedly, may be more 
significant than the most significant of nonmoral matters, some moral knowledge may 
motivate more than nonmoral knowledge, but other moral knowledge may not. 
100
                                                 
98 See Jones, “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge,” 72. 
 If a 
99 This is one of the three assumptions that I will be discussing later, in Section 1.2.2, with the aim of 
demonstrating that it is not warranted. 
100 This tactic of beginning from common ground is probably best thought of as a way to eliminate obvious 
nonexperts or those whose testimony is clearly not trustworthy or useful, rather than a way of ascertaining 
with certainty that a purported expert is trustworthy. Indeed, it may be unreasonable to expect that any non-
expert could ever be certain of another person’s expertise, whatever the subject (I return to this idea later; 




recipient of testimony can begin with the small, less important matters of more common 
moral knowledge and see that what a testifier is trying to convince him of seems morally 
right, given what the recipient does know, the recipient can then build up to the point of 
trusting said testifier with more important matters.101 The testifier’s accuracy with 
regards to the smaller moral matters can lead the recipient to be more confident that even 
when it comes to the most significant things, which the testifier might be more motivated 
to deceive him about, the testifier is more likely to be saying what the recipient would 
agree with if he had reached a similar point in his personal moral development.102
The objection may be raised that the lack of a difference when it comes to 
motivation between moral and nonmoral knowledge does not address the issue of 
whether or not moral knowledge is motivational, and so does not say anything against 
Jones’ premise that the motivational power of moral knowledge gives us reason to 
distrust moral testimony. However, to clarify, I am not saying that moral knowledge is 
not motivational, just that it is not the case that it is motivational in such a way that we 
are more likely to encounter moral testimony aimed at deceiving and manipulating than 
we are to encounter such testimony regarding non-moral matters. Thus, if we do not have 
reason to believe that the appropriate default stance towards nonmoral testimony is one of 
distrust, then we similarly do not have reason to believe that the motivational quality of 
 
                                                 
101 Of course, it is possible that a testifier might be truthful about those things which are common 
knowledge and save deception for those things which are harder to check up on. Checking from common 
knowledge can allow a nonexpert to eliminate obviously unreliable sources of testimony and give some 
small indication of trustworthiness, but it is far from conclusive. Nonetheless, this is not just a problem for 
moral testimony and expertise; purported experts in other fields are equally able to give testimony that is in 
keeping with what is commonly understood and easily checked, but to get those things which cannot be 
easily tested against common knowledge wrong (whether deliberately or as the result of a lack of expertise). 
102 I argue in Section 2 that there is a way that we can be even more confident in our ability to trust moral 
testimony; an institutionalized system of recognizing moral truth and moral expertise can place recipients 
of moral testimony in a situation where they can more easily recognize trustworthy testifiers. In other 
words, the climate (one of the four variables which determine which default stance is justified) for moral 




moral knowledge necessitates a default stance of distrust of moral testimony. As with the 
previous premise, it seems that there is an underlying assumption of a strict division 
between moral and nonmoral knowledge being made by Jones and others here. 
My second response deals with the distinction between motivation and 
implementation. An agent can be motivated to act well, but without a standard or guide 
for action, even with appropriate motivation, she will not necessarily know how to act in 
a way that will lead to the satisfaction of her motives. As introduced previously, ritual 
can be thought of as the common language that allows us to communicate our moral 
commitments to each other in ways that bring about right results. Even if we have the 
best of intentions, if we do not have knowledge of ritual, we may fail to achieve good 
ends; the motivation itself says nothing about what a person will do. Given this, there is 
reason to doubt that because we want people to go along with our interests we will try to 
motivate them with moral reasons – even if we convince someone that something is a 
moral requirement, we cannot be certain that they will act in the way we would want 
them to, unless the requirement is very strictly defined. 
This doubt illustrates a technical point regarding Jones’ argument: there is a gap 
between wanting someone to act or think in a particular way and trying to motivate them 
using moral reasons. We can think that moral knowledge is highly influential and 
necessarily motivating, but still question the connection Jones makes between wanting to 
act or to convince other people to act in a certain way and being more inclined to use 
moral reasons to motivate. I have already mentioned how ritual, for Xunzi, is what allows 
us to know how to act to bring about right results when we hold certain moral 




motivated by it, this does not mean that we will get the resulting actions we want without 
a shared guideline for action. Admittedly, it could be the case that the same testimony 
intended to convince a person that something is a moral requirement provides the 
requisite guideline for action – a testifier need not be vague or theoretical in what he says. 
However, Xunzi is adamant that there are ways of judging whether something is 
appropriate ritual. He presents a system built around distinguishing between proper and 
improper ritual and teachers who guide people in which ritual to follow and how to do so. 
There are two points to make with regards to this system: 
(1) There are two distinct factors working together when testimony conveys 
proper moral action: ritual and teachers. In talking about the issue of testimony, Jones is 
only dealing with teachers – with people who could teach others what to do via testimony. 
However, Xunzi introduces the idea of ritual as moral knowledge. Whereas Jones might 
think that there is a direct connection between teachers and action, according to Xunzi’s 
view, there is an intermediary that is a matter of tradition and what is established in a 
society. It seems that Jones is conflating two different factors that contribute to testimony 
by only discussing the role of the testifier (discounting established ritual), whereas 
Xunzi’s more detailed view takes apart what is involved in the process of testimony, 
breaking it down into both ritual and teaching.103
                                                 
103 One might think that Jones includes the idea of the social norm in her mention of climate as an 
important factor in determining the default stance of trust. However, her discussion of climate is still 
focused on assessing the testifier rather than a means of confirming the content of testimony. In other 
words, she is focused on how the environment might affect the likelihood that a person will be genuine in 
giving testimony rather than on how it provides a way to check up on that testimony. 
 Ritual allows us to communicate the 
shared moral language of society in the proper way, and is shared within a society rather 
than determined on an individual level. Then there are teachers, whom we trust to help 




practice of ritual, and to help us towards greater moral understanding. In summary, it 
seems that Jones is overlooking the complexity of the move from testimony and 
motivation to action. 
Although it is true that a manipulative teacher could still offer moral testimony 
intended to deceive – lying about what is proper ritual or how to correctly apply ritual in 
a given situation – the fact that they are testifying about something which is a socially 
integrated issue mitigates this concern. A recipient of moral testimony can check whether 
what the testifier has said coincides with what she already knows of ritual and basic 
moral principles and with previous moral testimony she has received from other sources. 
A ritual ‘works’ if it appears that, overall, the people an agent interacts with in the 
prescribed manner correctly interpret the intent that she intends to convey. If following 
moral testimony does not bring about intended results and leads to misunderstanding, 
then that moral testimony can be identified as incorrect. Even in the case where a testifier 
does give false moral testimony, and a recipient of that testimony is temporarily led 
astray, the social quality of morality makes it likely that sooner or later the deception will 
be uncovered, and the testifier would face some sort of repercussion. There may still be 
the concern that the risk is not worth it – that a starting position of distrust is warranted. 
However, we need not entirely eliminate any risk of deception in order to have a situation 
where trust or neutrality is the appropriate default position towards testimony. In any case, 
the interworking of teachers and ritual is such that it lessens the risk of false moral 
testimony. 
(2) Given this, the question of what our default stance towards moral testimony 




rituals are trustworthy. Since it is the teachers who inform our understanding of rituals 
and whether or not we are practicing ritual properly, we would want to look at how Xunzi 
says we can trust teachers in order to see how this issue can be resolved. In Section 2, I 
will discuss how Xunzi deals with this issue of identifying trustworthy teachers. For now, 
I will simply indicate that Xunzi resolves the problem via an established system of 
politically-sanctioned moral expertise. So long as we are able to trust the system which 
identifies moral experts for us, then we can trust those identified to be appropriate, 
trustworthy teachers. 
This particular response to Jones’ second premise can also be taken in a different 
direction. The point can be made that it is more dangerous to distrust testimony and lean 
towards one’s own understanding of morality than to risk trusting testimony. Particularly 
given what has been said about ritual and the purpose it serves, we are more likely to 
make errors and not be able to bring about the results we intend if we do not learn from 
others what the expectations of ritual are and how to meet them.104
The appeal to disagreement threatens too much. If there is widespread 
disagreement on a topic, why think one’s own opinion is worth more than 
that of others? True, one can do one’s best in one’s own thinking to 
exclude error, to set aside distorting factors and come to an unprejudiced 
view. But why doubt that one’s informants, especially if carefully chosen, 
will do just as well? To insist that their moral reflection is worth less than 
one’s own is both arrogant and cynical. Without that insistence, the price 
 Further, even if we do 
not think that others are more likely to be able to tell us how to act, it still seems 
problematic to prefer private moral contemplation over heeding the moral testimony of 
others. Robert Hopkins, in discussing whether the existence of moral disagreement 
provides a suitable basis for dismissing moral testimony as problematic, notes: 
                                                 
104 Recall the discussion in Section 1.2.1.1 of how even the best of intentions can lead to poor results if we 




of skepticism about the worth of their moral opinions is doubt about the 
merits of one’s own. If the views of others are like as not vitiated by 
interest of myopia, why think oneself better off? In the absence of an 
answer to this question, widespread disagreement dictates not just 
unwillingness to believe what one is told, but reluctance to form moral 
beliefs by any means at all.105
 
 
It seems, then, that insisting that the concern that others will use moral reasons to 
motivate for their own ends gives reason to distrust testimony also means that we have 
equal reason to distrust any moral beliefs we may form on our own – and may prevent the 
forming of any moral beliefs at all. 
 This last point leads to my third response: Jones has it backwards; she fears that 
our regular emotions and tendencies will lead us to use moral testimony in ways that are 
deceiving or manipulative, whether intentionally so or not. However, it is moral 
testimony that – via teaching ritual – serves to regulate and direct those emotions and 
tendencies towards good. Rather than having the fear that one cannot use or depend on 
moral testimony without first going through a demanding, individual process of proving 
the trustworthiness of the testifier, perhaps – given Xunzi’s view of morality – the fear 
should more appropriately be that refusing to heed moral testimony on the chance that it 
may not be trustworthy will lead to bad results and poor moral understanding. Again, it 
seems that a central assumption is governing what Jones says with regards to moral 
testimony and trust; in thinking that the default stance is one where we trust our own 
moral decisions rather than trusting the moral advice we receive from others, Jones 
appears to be assuming that acquiring moral knowledge is an individual matter. If, 
however, like Xunzi, one thinks that moral knowledge is not available a priori for each 
individual to be able to discover through private rational thought, but is instead 
                                                 




something that must be discovered from extended observation and learning of the 
world,106
Instead, moral knowledge may be more like knowledge of the world. We would 
not think a scientist wise or best served in thinking that she could figure out all of biology, 
chemistry, or (perhaps even more similarly) physics through her own efforts. Instead, it 
seems obvious that she should first learn what others have come to discover and theorize, 
then use that testimony from others as the basis for building her own understanding and 
research. Similarly, with moral knowledge, according to Xunzi’s view, a person is best 
served by heeding the accumulated moral wisdom of those who have come before her – 
particularly in the case where society has an established moral system or model, like 
ritual. As I will discuss in depth in Section 2, in such a situation, there can even be 
institutionalized moral expertise, with an established community of moral experts which 
governs the interactions between testifiers and recipients in such a way as to make it 
better, safer, and more reliable to default to trusting moral testimony rather than being 
hesitant to do so. 
 then it seems that Jones’ conclusion that distrust towards moral testimony is the 
only justifiable default stance is incorrect. 
                                                 
106 Xunzi says: 
In every case, ritual and yi are produced from the deliberate effort of the sage; they are 
not produced from people’s nature. Thus, when the potter mixes up clay and makes 
vessels, the vessels are produced from the deliberate efforts of the craftsman; they are not 
produced from people’s nature. Thus, when the craftsman carves wood and makes 
utensils, the utensils are produced from the deliberate efforts of the craftsman; they are 
not produced from people’s nature. The sage accumulates reflections and thoughts and 
practices deliberate efforts and reasoned activities in order to produce ritual and yi and in 
order to establish proper models and measures. So, ritual and yi and proper models and 
measures are produced from the deliberate efforts of the sage; they are not produced from 
people’s nature. (23.63-72) 
We also read in the Xunzi that ritual is based not just on an understanding of human nature but on an 
understanding of how the world works and of history. One place where Xunzi indicates this is 19.38-43, 
where he states that “Ritual has three roots” – these roots are Heaven and Earth, forefathers and ancestors, 
and lords and teachers. Xunzi says: “Without Heaven and Earth, how would one live? Without forefathers 




In such a case, Jones’ insistence that we default to distrust in the case of moral 
testimony is akin to saying we should default to distrust of scientific publications because 
scientists might be motivated to manipulate facts about the world for selfish purposes. 
The goal of science is to find truth and facts of the world without bias – while there is the 
worry that science might be manipulated or used by scientists in dangerous ways, the 
existence of a community of experts or an institution of science that cross-checks results 
according to an established standard is the very thing that mitigates this concern.107 While 
we glorify those individual geniuses who made outstanding contributions to their fields, 
we should not neglect to remember that they were only able to do so based on the 
gradually-built foundation of their predecessors. When we esteem our individual rational 
faculties, we risk the folly of not giving proper attention to the importance of the 
traditions upon which we base our reasoning. Furthermore, there is the risk that in lacking 
awareness of the origins of our beliefs we are in a worse-off position to assess them.108
                                                 
107 Even acknowledging that the concern of bias or manipulation of facts is not fully mitigated, I would 
emphasize that the problem for moral testimony is no worse than the problem for other testimony, such as 
testimony regarding science; we have no greater reason to distrust moral testimony than any other 
testimony. 
 
Here, we can already begin to see the point that I will be making in Sections 1.2.2 and 2 – 
it is if we hold the three assumptions about moral knowledge that seem to underlie much 
of the extant Western discussion of moral testimony (i.e., that moral knowledge is strictly 
distinct from other knowledge, that all moral matters are equally significant, and that 
acquiring moral knowledge is a matter of individual contemplation) that we see coming 
to trust moral testimony as a significant obstacle; if we do not hold those assumptions, we 




may be able to come up with a way to resolve the problem of trustworthy sources of 
moral experts altogether (i.e., institutionalized moral expertise).109
  
 
1.2.2 Underlying Assumptions 
Having discussed how the two premises Jones relies on when arguing that the 
correct default stance towards moral testimony is one of distrust do not support that 
conclusion and also indicate a reliance on some problematic assumptions about moral 
knowledge, I will now proceed to address those assumptions (giving further evidence that 
they are widespread within the literature on moral testimony). I will draw upon aspects of 
Xunzi’s moral philosophy as support for arguing that these assumptions are not warranted 
and that there are fewer problems for trusting moral testimony if we hold a view of moral 




                                                 
109 A concern may be that, whatever one’s view of moral knowledge, one should distrust moral testimony 
or even avoid it altogether because personal responsibility is so important to morality. We might be hesitant 
to rely on the guidance of others in making moral judgments as we will be the ones responsible for their 
consequences. However, first, if moral knowledge is not that different from other knowledge (as I have 
argued), then it seems that there are cases where acting based on nonmoral testimony raises a similar 
problem of responsibility. For example, I might be a budding chef who trusts a recipe to instruct me as to 
how to make a particular dish. If it turns out that the recipe is not very good and the resulting dish is 
distasteful, I might still be considered responsible for the unpleasant meal. In short, responsibility is not an 
issue isolated to morality. Further, as I have worked to establish just previously, it might actually be more 
dangerous to try to figure out by ourselves what is right rather than turning to others for moral guidance. 
Given how socially entrenched morality is, we are likely to get it wrong if we do not consult others about 
moral issues. If our reason for being distrustful of moral testimony is because we are either afraid to take 
responsibility if the testimony is wrong or because we want to take sole responsibility if we do something 
right, it is still arguably better to turn to moral testimony. We may be more likely to get it right if we do so 
– thus avoiding the heavy responsibility of bad moral outcomes – and if we do get it right, we can at least 
take responsibility for choosing to defer to a moral expert’s testimony. We may not want to turn over any 
part of the responsibility for acquiring moral knowledge and making moral decisions to someone else, but 




 The first assumption that I will be discussing is that there is a strict divide 
between moral knowledge and other (nonmoral) knowledge. As I indicated in the 
previous section, the contrast between moral testimony versus other testimony in the 
literature seems to assume a clear divide between moral knowledge and other 
knowledge;
1.2.2.1 There is a strict division between moral and nonmoral knowledge 
110
It is worth noting that, if you want to maintain a sharp separation between 
moral and nonmoral epistemology and allow testimony to the latter but not 
the former, then you had better be able to draw clear lines between the 
moral and the nonmoral. A view like my own, that postulates no such 
sharp dichotomy at the level of epistemology, need not worry about being 
able to draw this distinction in every case.
 if there is no such divide, then arguing that trust in the case of moral 
testimony is different from trust in the case of other testimony, in that there is a single 
appropriate default stance towards moral testimony, is problematic. It should be noted 




Nonetheless, it seems that Jones’ argument regarding the appropriate default stance 
towards moral testimony is based on at least the idea that, even if there is no sharp divide 
between moral and nonmoral knowledge, moral issues have such significance that 
conclusions regarding moral expertise and testimony can differ drastically from 
conclusions regarding nonmoral expertise and testimony. If there is no such divide 
between moral and nonmoral knowledge, then it is not clear what would make it the case 
that there is one particular stance that is justifiably the default stance towards moral 
testimony whereas the default stance towards other testimony differs in accordance with 
                                                 
110 As Alison Hills points out in “Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology,” it is clear that Bernard 
Williams holds a view according to which there are no moral experts (see Bernard Williams, Making Sense 
of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 205), and “this is a striking difference 
between the epistemology of morality and the epistemology of nonmoral facts” (Hills, “Moral Testimony,” 
96). 




particulars of climate, consequences, and metastance. In other words, if moral knowledge 
is not a separate domain of knowledge, clearly distinct from other domains of knowledge, 
then there is no justification for thinking that the climate, consequences, and metastance 
for moral knowledge are always such as to warrant a default stance of distrust towards 
moral testimony while still thinking that within other domains of knowledge these factors 
can differ in ways that justify various different stances. If moral knowledge is similar to 
other knowledge, then moral testimony is similar to other testimony – so, if in the case of 
other testimony the default position can be one of trust or neutrality, then this should also 
be possible in the case of moral testimony. Although Jones maintains that she does not 
draw a sharp epistemological distinction between what is moral and what is nonmoral, it 
still seems that she relies on there being a definable divide of some kind between moral 
and nonmoral knowledge.112
 This sort of a divide appears to be present throughout the contemporary 
discussion of moral testimony, and is particularly evident in arguments that maintain that 
moral testimony is problematic although other testimony is not, not because of the 
questionable moral worth of using knowledge gained from moral testimony, but because 
there is a particular difficulty associated with obtaining or trusting knowledge that comes 
from moral testimony. If there is no strict divide between moral and nonmoral knowledge, 
then there is no reason to think that there is a particular problem for gaining knowledge 
from and trusting in moral testimony. 
 
 The Xunzi provides both evidence that no such assumption need be made in order 
to have a coherent, plausible view of morality, and that in the absence of such an 
                                                 
112 I return to this idea in Section 1.2.2.2, where I deal with the related assumption that moral knowledge is 




assumption the problems for moral testimony are not as severe as they have been made 
out to be within the contemporary literature on the subject. We began to see in the 
previous section how Xunzi has a view according to which moral knowledge and other 
knowledge about the world is interconnected – indeed, much of what we might think of 
as nonmoral knowledge qualifies as moral knowledge, given Xunzi’s view. As mentioned 
previously, this is evident in Xunzi’s indications that moral knowledge requires learning 
and study of the world. Justin Tiwald, in describing Xunzi’s view of moral expertise, 
notes that – for Xunzi – moral knowledge and expertise involves knowledge of both 
prescriptive and descriptive claims. He states that, in the Xunzi, “the most important 
consideration that makes one an expert on any given moral model . . . is that one have 
enough knowledge to be able to judge reliably how to apply the model in specific cases.” 
Further, “this sort of knowledge depends (usually) on having some sort of personal 
experience with the practice of that model, and understanding how that model 
harmonizes with sound judgments of other morally salient matters.”113
Given the broad scope of ritual, “other morally salient matters” can include a wide 
range of practical knowledge about the world. There is mention throughout the Xunzi of 
the need for learning and knowledge about the workings of the world in order to have 
moral knowledge. For example, in Chapter Thirty-One of the Xunzi, Confucius is 
depicted as explaining: 
 
The one called a great sage is one whose understanding comprehends the 
great Way, who responds to changes appropriately without cease, and who 
correctly distinguishes among the natures and inborn dispositions of the 
myriad things. . . . For this reason, in his works he brings about great 
distinctions over Heaven and earth, he looks keenly into [the movements 
                                                 
113 Tiwald, “Xunzi on Moral Expertise,” 7. What, according to Xunzi, is required for moral expertise is 




of] the sun and the moon, and grasps and masters the myriad things amidst 
the wind and rain.114
 
 
The indication is that we cannot have perfect moral understanding without having an 
understanding of the workings of the world. In fact, Xunzi indicates that moral 
knowledge covers so much we should focus on acquiring the knowledge that is required 
for appropriate moral action. Even in the case of rulers, who are ideally moral experts or 
at least have a high degree of education, he says: 
[T]he greatest cleverness lies in not doing certain things, and the greatest 
wisdom lies in not pondering certain things. With respect to Heaven, focus 
only on those manifest phenomena to which you can align yourself. With 
respect to Earth, focus only on those manifest places which are suitable for 
growing. With respect to the four seasons, focus only on that manifest 
order by which work is to be arranged.115
 
 
Moral understanding requires knowledge of astronomy and weather, agriculture, the 
seasons, etc. We should focus on acquiring the practical knowledge of the world needed 
in order to know how to act rather than being distracted by abstract matters of 
metaphysics and the like. 
This idea comes up in Xunzi’s repeated calls for an appropriate stopping point for 
learning. Xunzi cautions that without such a stopping point we will not meet with success, 
explaining that attempting to “exhaust the inexhaustible or pursue the limitless” wears 
one down and leads to failure, whereas “[i]f you have some stopping point, then even 
though a thousand li is far, whether slow or fast, first or last, how could you not reach it?” 
Applying this to the pursuit of moral knowledge, he says: 
Will those who do not understand how to walk along the Way attempt to 
exhaust the inexhaustible and pursue the limitless? Or will they think to 
have a stopping point? As for investigations into hardness and whiteness, 
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difference and sameness, things with thickness and things without 
thickness, it is not that these are not matters of acute investigation. 




 Given that moral knowledge includes – and requires – knowledge of the world 
such that there is no sharp distinction between moral and nonmoral knowledge, it does 
not make sense to think that it is more difficult to check up on and trust in the veracity of 
moral testimony than to do so in the case of testimony regarding (ostensibly) nonmoral 
matters without some further justification. 
 
The second assumption which I will discuss is that moral knowledge is more 
significant than other knowledge. More specifically, I will deal with the idea that the 
consequences of misplaced trust in moral testimony are more severe than the 
consequences of misplaced trust in other (nonmoral) testimony. This is related to the first 
assumption in that both deal with the idea that moral knowledge is somehow importantly 
different from other knowledge such that moral testimony is problematic in ways that 
other testimony is not. This premise states that, given the importance of moral decisions 
and the severity of the consequences of moral actions, we should be hesitant to trust 
moral testimony. Here, I will aim to show first that this assumption is found throughout 
the literature on moral testimony, and second that moral knowledge and the consequences 
of moral actions are not necessarily as significant as this assumption takes them to be. 
1.2.2.2 Moral knowledge is more significant than other knowledge 
                                                 
116 Xunzi 2.112-120. When Xunzi mentions investigations into hardness and whiteness, etc., he is referring 
to logical and linguistic paradoxes that had been proposed by other Chinese thinkers, such as Gongsun 




Moral knowledge and actions have a broad range of significance; although moral matters 
can be of the highest importance, they can also be relatively trivial. 
 It is not clear that Jones intends this assumption as to the importance and 
consequence of moral matters to support her conclusion that distrust is the correct default 
position towards moral testimony. However, there is reason to think that it does play a 
role in what she has to say on the subject. Jones brings up the importance of moral 
knowledge earlier in her discussion of moral testimony as one consideration that seems to 
present problems for reliance on moral testimony. She says: 
[M]oral matters are important and engage our responsibility in a way that 
nonmoral matters do not. We are responsible for avoiding errors here in a 
way that we are not responsible for avoiding them in other areas. Further, 
moral judgments reflect on our character in ways that other judgments do 
not. The extra importance attached to moral judgments derives both from 




It is likely that this sentiment that moral matters are more important helps to inform 
Jones’ discussion of the appropriate default stance towards moral testimony; if believed, 
it gives further reason to think that one should be cautious in placing trust in moral 
testimony. 
 In making this assumption Jones is sharing a sentiment that is expressed within 
much of the extant literature on moral testimony. For example, we read in Robert 
Hopkins’ article “What is Wrong With Moral Testimony?” that, “Given the importance 
of moral issues, we ought to take care in forming views on them.”118
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 Michael Cholbi 
indicates that he holds this assumption when he speaks of how “moral conduct can have 




momentous personal or social consequences.”119 Alison Hills also seems to be making 
this assumption when she writes, “the stakes are often very high in situations where we 
face moral questions. When your decision is so important, you may well prefer to trust 
your own judgment rather than defer to someone who may or may not be an expert.”120
In general, the more important a topic, the more important it is to be right 
about it. How important it is to be right affects what counts as legitimate 
sources of belief. For the most important topics, one is required to think 
things through for oneself, so as to minimize the risk of error. Since many 
non-moral matters are not particularly important, it is often legitimate to 
learn about them from testimony. Moral matters, in contrast, are always 
sufficiently important to require thinking through for oneself.
 
However, Hopkins considers and rejects the idea that the importance of moral matters 
suffices to explain why one might think moral testimony problematic. He presents a 
possible argument for the conclusion that the importance of moral matters poses a 




Hopkins’ response to such an argument supports the idea, discussed previously, that there 
is a gradient of availability of moral knowledge and of significance of moral issues; 
moral knowledge can range from common to rare, and moral matters can range from 
insignificant and seemingly-inconsequential to matters of the highest importance. 
Hopkins points out, “Moral matters need not always be crucial: there are issues on which 
any moral view has the character of scruple.” He questions whether someone who does 
not think that it is legitimate to acquire one’s moral beliefs on the basis of moral 
testimony (i.e., a pessimist with regards to moral testimony) would “accept that in these 
relatively minor issues it is legitimate to adopt the views of others” – if so, the position of 
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the pessimist “is blurring”; if not, “the account fails to capture the phenomena as she sees 
them.”122
 Even if we consider only moral matters that are significantly important, however, 
Hopkins points out that importance alone does not suffice to cause a problem for 
accepting moral testimony; just as some moral matters are trivial, some nonmoral matters 
are very important. He gives the example of going rock-climbing for the first time – his 
very life is at stake, yet he says, “I take my companion’s word for it that the procedure is 
safe.” He is able to rely on the testimony of others as to the appropriate way to climb, 
where to step, whether or not the rope will break, etc. although the stakes are so high: 
“the question is of vital importance to me, and yet I am not required to exclude what I 
learn from others from my deliberations. I can legitimately form a view even though what 
others say (or do not say) is a key part of my grounds for it.” Further, he adds that this 
case “is far from unique—consider flying, taking medicine, or even trying a new food.” 
The conclusion, he argues, is that “One can legitimately form belief, even on matters of 
great importance, without being obliged to avoid relying on another’s word.”
 
123
 In this, Hopkins’ view is similar to the one presented by Xunzi, and it gains 
further support when considered in light of Xunzi’s view of morality. The idea that ritual, 
which covers even trivial everyday actions, is a significant part of morality – with 
knowledge of ritual qualifying as moral knowledge – supports the view that some moral 
matters are relatively insignificant. Consider the matter of knowing when it is appropriate 
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trust what they say,” notes what Hopkins has to say on the matter, admitting, “So this cannot explain why, 
in general, deferring to experts and trusting testimony is more acceptable for ordinary nonmoral matters 




to shake a person’s hand. As part of ritual, this is a moral matter. However, knowing 
whether or not to shake someone’s hand does not seem importantly consequential – 
particularly not when compared with knowing, say, whether or not a bridge is likely to 
collapse. If one wants to argue that there is a problem with trusting testimony about the 
former but not with trusting testimony about the latter, then it seems clear that an appeal 
to importance will not work. Thus, insofar as any discussion of moral testimony relies on 
the assumption that moral knowledge is more important (with more severe consequences) 
than other knowledge it is problematic. 
 Even if we take morality as a whole and try to argue that, overall, moral 
knowledge tends to be more important than other knowledge – consistently falling at the 
high end of the scale of significance – it seems that such an argument does not hold. For 
example, consider the extreme example of the nonmoral knowledge that if we were to 
collide certain subatomic particles we could annihilate the universe as we know it. Now, 
compare this with the moral knowledge that we ought not to kill or to commit genocide. 
Both are very important – one involves knowing how a significant consequence could be 
brought about (and how to avoid doing so), and the other tells whether or not one should 
bring about such a consequence. Nonetheless, it does not seem that the moral knowledge 
is more significant or consequential. In fact, it may be less so – the consequences of being 
wrong about whether or not something would destroy the universe are arguably much 
more severe than the consequences of being wrong about whether or not one should 
destroy the universe; without the former (nonmoral) knowledge, the universe is not 




that moral knowledge in general – or even usually – lies at one end of an importance 
scale compared to nonmoral knowledge. 
 
 The third, and final, assumption which I will be discussing is the assumption that 
individual deliberation is the most effective way to come to moral knowledge. This 
assumption maintains that acquiring moral knowledge is, or is supposed to be, a private, 
individual matter rather than a community or society-wide one. The idea is that, although 
as children we may require and rely on moral testimony, once we have matured into 
rational adults, we are all able to deliberate and come to moral understanding on our own, 
and so it is no longer necessary or appropriate to depend on others’ moral testimony for 
moral knowledge. This sort of view can be thought of as an egalitarian view of morality; 
moral knowledge is equally available to everyone.
1.2.2.3 Acquiring moral knowledge is a private, individual matter 
124
It is this view that leads Jones to say, “the very idea of moral experts might seem 
deeply problematic. It seems profoundly inegalitarian to claim that some are moral 
experts, since it suggests that others are not. . . . [I]t is often thought that each of us is 
equally capable of being a good moral agent. And there can be no experts where capacity 
 
                                                 
124 It is this view of morality that underlies much of the discussion of the issues of autonomy and 
responsibility with respect to acquiring moral knowledge and making moral judgments. Driver explains: : 
“Moral judgments are thought to be essentially autonomous in Anscombe’s sense – a matter of the 
individual arriving at the correct judgment for herself” (“Autonomy,” 622). One of the reasons reliance on 
moral testimony has been considered problematic – morally unworthy – is because such a reliance appears 
to get in the way of the requirement that moral decisions be autonomous. However, Jones argues that the 
autonomy problem is not as severe as it has been made out to be (see “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge,” 
58-59). Xunzi’s view of morality, with the concept of gradients of moral knowledge and moral worthiness, 
might accept that more autonomous moral decisions are more morally worthy while rejecting the idea that 
moral decisions made based on deference to the authority of a testifier are not morally acceptable. However, 




is equal.”125 She explains this by saying that “everyone, we think, has exposure to moral 
problems of some type or other, and thus everyone will have the sort of experience 
necessary to develop their potential as moral agents, though this development may take 
different forms. ”126
According to what I will call egalitarian responses to the puzzle, the 
reason why pure moral deference seems problematic is that there is some 
crucial respect in which no-one is in a privileged position relative to 
anyone else when it comes to accessing the truths of morality; the kind of 
clear informational asymmetries that tend to make it reasonable for some 
to defer to others with respect to many empirical questions simply do not 
exist in the moral domain.
 Sarah McGrath describes the egalitarian view and explores various 
ways it can be cashed out in “The Puzzle of Pure Moral Deference.” Speaking of how 
although pure deference is acceptable in response to testimony about nonmoral concerns, 




Jones borrows an example from Robert Paul Wolff’s In Defense of Anarchism to help 
illustrate this idea: a responsible person may learn from others about moral obligations 
only in the sense that one mathematician learns from other mathematicians,128 not in the 
sense that a person can rely on the word of a traveler to learn about a foreign land – he 
learns from hearing arguments which he can analyze himself and realize to be valid, 
rather than from accepting testimony.129
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126 Ibid., fn. 14. 
127 Sarah McGrath, “Moral Deference,” 323. 
128 Jones does point out that this example is not quite right. She explains, “John Harding shows how Wolff 
is wrong about contemporary mathematics, given the proliferation of mathematical specialties” (“Second-
Hand Moral Knowledge,” 56), pointing us to his article “The Role of Trust in Knowledge” in The Journal 
of Philosophy LXXXVIII 12 (December 1991), 693-708. 
129 Jones’ initial (“crude”) distinction between testifying that p and arguing that p comes into play here; we 
believe testimony on the basis of the strength of the testifier’s assertion, whereas we believe an argument 
on the basis of the strength of the argument (it is a fallacy – appeal to authority – to believe or disbelieve an 




Hopkins, too, describes the egalitarian position, and how holding that position 
makes the very idea of moral expertise “highly problematic,” saying, “For centuries, 
certainly since the idea was given powerful formulation by Kant, it has been a 
commonplace that every moral agent, once out of childhood and if free from mental or 
moral incapacity of a pathological kind, enjoys the capacity to divine what morality 
demands.” The problem for testimony that comes from this is that, “When you can settle 
a moral issue for yourself, no one is expert on that matter, relative to you.”130 Although 
Hopkins proceeds to point out that this does not fully explain the problem with moral 
testimony – arguing that one can receive and benefit from the testimony of someone who 
does not qualify as an “expert” – this thought informs much of the contemporary Western 
discussion of moral testimony. The idea is that anyone, if told the full circumstances in 
which someone acts, will be able to figure out the morality of the action (whether it was 
right or wrong) just from private contemplation of the matter. McGrath explains, “If no 
particular experiences are required in order to know the moral truths, then there seems to 
be an important respect in which these truths are in principle equally available to all of us: 
specifically, no one is precluded from knowing them in virtue of not having had the 
relevant experiences, or lacking access to relevant empirical information.”131
We can see, then, how an egalitarian view of moral knowledge – whatever the 
particular justification for such a view – involves the assumption that acquiring moral 
knowledge is an individual matter. The point is that every moral agent can figure out 
what is morally required through individual reasoning alone, and that it may even be the 
case that there is a moral obligation to do so. Even if it is thought that experience is 
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required, it is only the experience of an impartial observer gathering empirical evidence 
of the circumstances from which to draw conclusions. Each moral agent must get moral 
knowledge for himself on his own in at least some sense; he has to figure out for himself 
what is right and what is wrong. 
Hopefully, we can also begin to see how it is that such a view might not be 
warranted, particularly in light of a comparison with Xunzi’s view of morality. According 
to Xunzi, acquiring moral knowledge involves learning both from observation of the 
world and from the testimony of teachers. Far from thinking that moral knowledge is 
something that each moral agent comes to via individual, private contemplation, Xunzi 
warns against such – it is only through learning of ritual and heeding appropriate teachers 
that we are able to avoid the chaos and conflict that comes from going along with our 
natural tendencies. For example, he states: 
People do not exchange two for one, because they understand the numbers. 
If one goes forth following the Way, then it is like exchanging one for two 
– what loss would there be? If one departs from the Way and instead, 
looking within, chooses based on oneself alone, then this is like 
exchanging two for one – what gain would there be?132
 
 
Moral knowledge, for Xunzi, requires more than just rational reflection – it also requires 
knowledge of ritual (which can only come from testimony, since ritual is a matter of 
tradition and social custom), knowledge of the epistemic facts of the world necessary in 
order to correctly apply ritual, and personal experience interacting with others using 
ritual.133
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133 Of course, this is not to say that this is the only way to acquire moral knowledge – just that it is the usual 
(and usually recommended) way. The sages who invented the system of ritual Xunzi advocates were not 
taught it by others – arriving at their moral knowledge based upon their own reasoning and observations of 
the world, but that does not mean that everyone should come up with moral knowledge on their own. 




In describing Xunzi’s view of moral expertise, Justin Tiwald notes three 
requirements for the most complete sort of moral knowledge: (1) the ability to apply a 
model reliably (e.g., the ability to reliably apply ritual), (2) personal experience (in 
applying ritual), and (3) “an ability to see how a model coheres with other morally salient 
features of life.”134 The first requirement is a necessary part of having complete moral 
knowledge – we need to know not only moral principles but also how to apply those 
principles efficaciously. The second requirement, that a person have personal experience, 
is not necessary in all cases, but seems to be for most people. Tiwald explains, “On 
Xunzi’s view, first-hand experience is a means to an end . . . The evidence for this is that 
Xunzi thinks that there are some truly exceptional people who need not have the relevant 
personal experience to know a model in the complete sense.”135 As for the third 
requirement, it is clear that, for Xunzi, the sage is able to see how all of ritual and yi work 
together.136 Tiwald argues, “Xunzi does not consider what we should say if 
(hypothetically) someone were able to apply a model reliably, and yet do so without 
seeing how it coheres. At minimum, it seems that he considers it psychologically 
impossible.”137
We might also consider the possibility that a person only thinks he is able to attain 
moral truth through individual contemplation because he fails to recognize the influence 
moral testimony has on him. Throughout our lives, we are inundated by moral testimony 
from others (both explicit and implicit). If an agent has been influenced (possibly 
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than to reinvent it. 
134 Tiwald, “Xunzi on Moral Expertise,” 4. 
135 Ibid., 5. 
136 See, for example, Xunzi 21.81-104. 




subconsciously) by moral testimony in one form or another throughout his most receptive 
times, then even if he intentionally tries his best to eliminate bias and to rely on his 
rational faculties alone, he may still be influenced by the testimony he has received. In 
other words, an individual’s impression that he can obtain moral knowledge through 
individual reasoning alone may be based on self-delusion derived from a lack of 
awareness of the power that moral testimony has had on him.138
Consider the example of Descartes: In his Meditations, he sought to eliminate 
external biases and influences, and rely on pure reason to get at truth. Yet, modern 
readers may be baffled as to why his solution in the end turns so readily to the Divine. To 
someone entrenched in the ideology of Descartes’ time, it might seem that this is the 
obvious solution. However, now such a conclusion might not seem as rational or obvious 
as was previously thought. In our rational undertakings, we should be on guard such that 
we are not repeating the error of Descartes – failing to give enough credit to the effects of 
our environment and how it influences our conclusions when we think we are 
undertaking objective analysis. Rather than ignoring the role of testimony in obtaining 
moral knowledge, it is better to be aware of the power of testimony and to seek the right 
sort of teachers and influences. By denying (or simply failing to acknowledge) the 
importance of moral testimony, an agent may only be fooling himself into thinking that 
 If we are unaware of the 
influence of testimony on our supposed method of acquiring moral knowledge, then we 
are more likely to be led astray by it or, being biased by it, think that we are onto truth 
when in fact we are just repeating the testimony of others. 
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he is coming up with moral knowledge on his own when, in fact, he is more influenced 
than ever by the moral testimony he has received – good or bad. 
In summary, although – as I have established previously – Xunzi does have in 
mind a view of moral knowledge according to which some level of moral knowledge is 
easy to come by, and is common knowledge, he also has a view of morality where 
acquiring moral knowledge requires much more than individual, rational thought. A 
person seeking moral understanding relies on the ritual established within society, the 
guiding influence and testimony of teachers, and personal experience and practice in the 
application of ritual. Even if one does not find Xunzi’s particular view ultimately 
convincing, it does indicate that we need not assume that moral knowledge is best – or 
only – acquired through individual, private thought. 
Recall that Jones, despite indicating that moral expertise may be problematic in 
that it seems inegalitarian, also states that the moral knowledge that would be the subject 
of needed moral testimony must be hard to come by, and that having moral knowledge 
“requires a good character, as well as the right sorts of experiences.”139 Julia Driver 
discusses the idea that experience is required for moral knowledge and expertise, pointing 
out that it seems that we often tend to preference experience when it comes to 
determining whether a person has moral knowledge. Experience, she indicates, “can 
privilege the views of those who make moral judgments.”140
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similar sentiment when he states, “moral expertise seems rare due to the fact that moral 
140 Driver, “Autonomy,” 626. She uses the example of Mill’s discussion of the distinction between higher 
and lower pleasures in making this point, noting that Mill’s argument that the higher are superior depends 




knowledge is itself elusive.”141 There is an indication that, at the same time as there is a 
common sentiment that moral testimony is problematic because we all have equal access 
to moral truth, there is also a sense that there are high requirements for moral knowledge, 
and that it is difficult to come by. This means, in turn, that moral experts are rare; it is 
less likely that someone will have more moral knowledge than another person 
(particularly of the type required for reliable moral testimony),142
There is some tension between these two ideas – the egalitarian view of moral 
knowledge, and the view that moral knowledge is rare. This is not to say that an 
egalitarian view of moral knowledge necessitates that moral knowledge is common and 
easy to come by – after all, although we may consider mathematical truths knowable a 
priori, we need not think that it is easy to come up with mathematical proofs and 
theorems. Nonetheless, there is tension between considering the acquisition of moral 
knowledge something that a moral agent is capable of entirely on his own – via rational 
thought and reflection – and the idea that moral knowledge requires particular 
experiences and character. At least, there is tension so long as you consider the requisite 
experiences and character to be rare enough that moral experts are difficult to come by 
(as Jones and Cholbi indicate). This tension becomes clearer when we consider that, 
particularly in light of Xunzi’s view of morality, a lot of what counts as important 
experience for moral knowledge consists of a posteriori knowledge of facts of the world. 
It seems, then, that it is at least contradictory to think that moral knowledge requires 
 and this, too, gives 
some reason to doubt others’ moral testimony. 
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relevant experience and also think that it is something that is knowable a priori or can 
just be reasoned out on one’s own. 
Further, if at least some part of moral knowledge comes from facts of the world 
which we need to study and observe in order to discover, then some of moral testimony is 
based on facts that can be cross-checked. Even if it is that case that with (some) moral 
knowledge we need to come to agree with the validity of an argument, rather than simply 
defer to testimony, it seems that testimony can still be a useful and even necessary part of 
learning the requisite facts that support said argument. This helps to mitigate the problem 
of trusting moral testimony, giving an explanation for how it can be the case that the 
default stance towards moral testimony could be one of trust or neutrality rather than 
distrust. Moral testimony is not just needed or useful in cases where our abilities or 
sensibilities are lacking in some way, but even in cases where we simply have different 
experiences or are at a lower level of learning (with fewer experiences to draw upon). 
Again, as with the other two assumptions, the Xunzi provides a view of moral 
knowledge that lessens the apparent problems and difficulties for trusting moral 
testimony. 
 
In conclusion, Jones is correct that trust is important to testimony. However, her 
conclusion that the correct default stance towards moral testimony is one of distrust is not 
warranted. Further, the premises she relies on for that conclusion are indicative of several 
underlying assumptions that are present throughout the extant literature on moral 





compares them to Xunzi’s view of moral knowledge demonstrates that the differences 
Jones attributes to the importance of trust between moral and other testimony (with moral 
testimony warranting a default stance of distrust) are based on dubious premises. The 
Xunzi provides a plausible view of morality which supports a default stance of neutrality 
or even trust for moral testimony. 
However, this leaves the problem of moral indolence. Jones depends upon the 
idea that the effort required to move from distrust to trust in moral testimony is enough to 
avoid such a problem;143
Even if we have reason to believe that the default stance towards moral testimony 
might be one of neutrality or trust rather than distrust, wise trusting is still an important 
part of relying on moral testimony. The problem of determining who qualifies as a 
trustworthy, appropriate source of moral testimony remains, and it is this problem that is 
the subject of Section 2.
 how can relying on moral testimony be morally acceptable in 
cases where the default stance towards moral testimony is trust rather than distrust? This 
is a question of the moral acceptability of deferring to another’s moral testimony, and so 
is beyond the scope of this paper. As such, I will not go into it in much detail here. 
However, I will note that Xunzi’s view is valuable with regards to this issue in that it 
does not rely on a specific default stance for trust in order to solve the problem of the 
moral acceptability of moral testimony. Instead, whatever the appropriate default stance 
towards moral testimony may be, the process of learning to follow ritual and cultivating 
one’s understanding of it takes sufficient effort that moral indolence is not a concern. 
                                                 
143 See page 16, footnote 38. 
SECTION 2 
 
THE CREDENTIALS PROBLEM 
 
 When judging whether or not to defer to another person’s testimony on an issue, 
we at least want to be sure that the person knows more than we do about the issue. In the 
case of moral testimony, it seems that we require more than just a relatively greater 
knowledge and understanding; there are certain standards of expertise and reliability that 
should be met in order for a person to qualify as an appropriate source of moral testimony. 
Furthermore, even setting the idea of a required level of expertise aside, the problem of 
determining who has more moral knowledge remains. How do we recognize whether 
someone knows more than we do, even if it is slightly more than we know, let alone 
recognize moral expertise? This brings us to the problem that is the subject of this section 
– the credentials problem for moral expertise. 
 In his paper “Socrates and Moral Expertise,” Scott LaBarge introduces this 
problem, and Sarah McGrath describes this same issue for identifying moral experts in 
her paper “Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise.” Michael Cholbi expands on this 
problem in “Moral Expertise and the Credentials Problem.” I will begin (in Section 2.1) 
by establishing what is required for moral expertise – what we are looking for when we 
seek trustworthy givers of moral testimony. Then, I will discuss the problem for 




what the credentials problem is, I will proceed to explore Cholbi’s expansion upon the 
problem. I will argue that the problem is not insurmountable, as Cholbi argues. Finally, 
(in Section 2.2) I will argue that the Xunzi provides a way to resolve the credentials 
problem via the system of politically sanctioned moral expertise. I will end by arguing 
that Xunzi’s view of politically sanctioned moral expertise suggests two solutions for the 
credentials problem for modern moral philosophy: (1) we might consider a similar system 
of institutionalized moral expertise that is separate from the political realm, or (2) we 
might accept the idea that the connection of moral and political authority is desirable and 
work towards an integration of politics and ethics. 
 
 In order to get at the problem of identifying trustworthy moral experts, we first 
need an understanding of what a moral expert is – what is required for moral expertise? 
In particular, what is required of the sort of moral expertise that would qualify someone 
as a reliable testifier? I will first attempt to explain how the contemporary literature on 
moral testimony has answered these questions. Then, I will consider how Xunzi’s 
conception of moral expertise compares. The common approach to beginning to answer 
these questions is to consider what is required for expertise more generally, and then 
work to determine what – if any – additional requirements there may be for moral 
expertise in particular. It is generally accepted that an expert is someone who has a better-
than-average knowledge of and competency in a given subject area. However, the sort of 
expertise that is called for in the case of testimony has more stringent requirements; at the 




very least, in order for her expertise to be useful for testimony, an expert must be able to 
convey the knowledge she has to someone else. 
Bruce D. Weinstein points to this sort of difference when he argues for a 
distinction between what he terms performative experts and epistemic, or descriptive, 
experts.144 Someone with performative expertise may be able to successfully act with 
expertise, but be unable to articulate or justify how they are successful. For example, 
consider the case of a piano prodigy; such a person may be able to expertly play the piano, 
but yet be unable to explain to another person how to play, or what it takes to play 
well.145 As such, although still qualifying as an expert in playing the piano, a 
performative expert would not be able to teach someone else how to play. If I were to 
want to learn about piano playing or learn how to play the piano myself, then the sort of 
expert I would want would be an epistemic expert – someone whose expertise comes 
from knowledge that she can pass on to others.146 Weinstein is not alone in noticing this 
division between performative and descriptive expertise. Griffin Trotter, for example, 
explains that expert knowledge may be conceptual (“as in knowing the details of 
quantum mechanics”) or practical and performative (“as in knowing how to insert a 
cardiac pacemaker”).147
                                                 
144 Weinstein introduces this distinction in his article “What is an Expert?” Theoretical Medicine and 
Bioethics Vol. 14 No. 1 (1993), 53-73 and returns to it in terms of moral expertise in particular in “The 
Possibility of Ethical Expertise,” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics Vol. 15 No. 1 (1994), 65-71. 
 In the case of morality, there may be moral exemplars who are 
moral experts yet who cannot explain or justify their expertise to others (some sort of 
145 This involves the distinction between “knowledge-that” and “knowledge-how” – a performative expert 
may have “knowledge-how” without having “knowledge-that.” 
146 Of course, an epistemic expert may very well also be a performative expert as well – indeed, as was 
indicated in the previous discussion of the motivating power of moral knowledge, and as will be elaborated 
upon shortly, it is arguably the case that an epistemic moral expert must also be a performative moral 
expert; moral understanding and moral action may be inseparable. 
147 Griffin Trotter, “Pragmatism and Ethical Expertise,” in Ethics Expertise: History, Contemporary 





LaBarge describes six criteria an expert must meet and, although these criteria are 
taken from Plato and are arguably more stringent requirements than would be in keeping 
with a general conception of expertise, it seems that they coincide with what is expected 
of experts within the contemporary literature on moral expertise. At the very least, they 
serve as a useful starting point for establishing what those discussing moral testimony 
have in mind when they speak of moral experts who would serve as reliable testifiers. 
These criteria are as follows: 
), but the sort of moral expert useful for moral testimony would need 
to be able to convey moral knowledge to others. In speaking of testimony, then, the sort 
of expertise that will matter is epistemic expertise; in order to provide useful testimony, 
an expert must be able to articulate and justify her conclusions such that others can 
understand them. As a result, the sort of expert that matters when speaking of testimony 
will have certain qualities and markers of expertise that are not required of a broader 
definition of expertise. 
(1) Experts must have a holistic grasp of a well-defined subject matter. 
(2) Experts will successfully achieve the goals of their expertise. 
(3) Experts can explain why the things they say and do are correct and 
why the mistakes of others were mistakes. 
(4) Experts in a given field will agree with one another concerning 
questions in the domain of their expertise. 
(5) Experts in a given area will recognize each other as such. 
(6) Experts can teach their expertise to others.149
 
 
Some of these criteria appear to be uncontroversial marks of expertise: with 
respect to the first criterion, it seems obvious that people are only considered experts in 
                                                 
148 This possibility is brought up in (Cholbi, “Moral Expertise,” 325) and (Driver, “Autonomy,” 629). 




particular, well-defined subjects.150 As LaBarge notes, “No one is ever simply an expert, 
full stop; an expert is always expert at something.”151
How comprehensive an expert’s grasp of the subject in which she has expertise 
must be depends on our understanding of the subject. In the case of moral expertise, the 
question is whether a person need have full, comprehensive moral understanding or 
whether it is possible to be considered a moral expert in a particular domain of morality. 
The most common sentiment within the contemporary literature is that, assuming that 
moral expertise is possible at all, a person can be a moral expert without having 
comprehensive expertise of all of morality – moral experts “may possess local expertise 
 Further, it does seem that we 
expect that experts have some sort of grasp of the broader context of the subject matter in 
which they have expertise. To return to the example of the expert pianist – although we 
may not expect that she be an expert in building or tuning pianos, or know anything of 
the history of the instrument, we may expect her to be able to recognize a piano when 
hearing or seeing it – to have some sense of how the sound of the piano compares to the 
sound of other instruments. Even if the pianist’s expertise is highly specialized – say, she 
has an expert grasp of Beethoven’s Concerto No. 3 – it seems that we would expect that 
expertise to translate and extend in some way to the more general area of piano or of 
music (recognition of different tones and keys or the ability to play scales, for example – 
or perhaps understanding of musical notation). 
                                                 
150 As Trotter points out, “The object of knowledge may be broad, as in knowledge of species, or it may be 
specialized, as in knowledge of the reproductive system of the common toad,” however, “an expert is any 
person who is recognized to possess extensive and/or specialized knowledge of a given object” 
(“Pragmatism,” 104). 




rather than global expertise.”152 For Xunzi, although the highest level of moral expertise 
requires comprehensive moral understanding, there can be those who have a lesser, more 
specialized area of moral expertise. Tiwald argues that the Xunzi indicates that there is a 
“coherence requirement” for moral knowledge of the sort had by moral experts. What this 
means is that a moral expert must be able to see how a particular piece of moral 
knowledge coheres with other moral knowledge and with knowledge about the world. 
Tiwald explains, “Xunzi often states that the mark of sagehood is a panoramic view of 
rituals and standards of propriety, such that one only understands a ritual in a sagely way 
if one sees how they fit into human relations and the ideal ritual practices as a larger 
whole.”153 Even those with more limited moral expertise – such as those with an expert 
understanding of a particular ritual practice – require some sort of broader understanding 
of how their area of expertise fits in both with the rest of morality and with the world at 
large. For example, someone may be an expert when it comes to the ritual governing 
dining protocols between parents and children; however, in order to have such expertise, 
he would need not only to know how to properly put into practice the ritual according to 
which parents eat first at meals, but also “have enough experience as a child or parent to 
see how dining protocols facilitate smoother relations between them, and understand how 
they make for a more prosperous society.”154
Requiring that experts are able to successfully achieve the goals of their expertise 
seems likewise to be relatively uncontroversial. An expert piano-player must be able to 
 
                                                 
152 Driver, “Autonomy,” 625. Jones argues that it is possible to have expertise with respect to certain 
domains of morality, and also makes a distinction between having expertise and being an expert (“Second-
Hand Moral Knowledge,” 64-65) – for the purposes of determining who may serve as a reliable source of 
moral testimony, I will be considering someone who has expertise in a particular domain of morality to be a 
moral expert in that domain. 
153 Tiwald, “Xunzi on Moral Expertise,” 5. 




play the piano successfully and, likewise, a moral expert must be able to successfully 
bring about morally good results and make right judgments. Further, in the case of moral 
expertise, it seems that a moral expert must be motivated to act in accordance with her 
knowledge.155 Cholbi argues for this motivation requirement for moral expertise, 
proposing the idea that a moral expert must be reliably motivated to act on her own moral 
prescriptions.156 He explains that “we expect moral expertise to be motivationally 
efficacious.”157
First, he points out that moral prescriptions have a certain universality – as Cholbi 
explains, “A morally indifferent ‘expert’ who recommended to another agent that she do 
X but who, in a relevantly similar situation, is not motivated to do X owes us an 
explanation of his indifference. . . . [T]he expert seems vulnerable to the charge that he 
has overlooked the moral requirement that like cases be treated alike.”
 It is incoherent, he argues, for a moral expert to be indifferent towards 
moral claims or to act immorally, giving several reasons to support this conclusion. 
158  Second, “moral 
conduct can have momentous importance, particularly for the morally conscientious” and, 
given this, it would make sense for a recipient of moral testimony to be hesitant to accept 
it if the testifier is not moved to act on her own advice – failure to act on one’s own moral 
prescriptions may indicate that one does not believe those prescriptions.159
                                                 
155 This ties back to the idea, discussed in Section 1.2.1.2, that moral knowledge is particularly motivating. 
 Third, moral 
knowledge is rare – “moral knowledge, far from being natural, is won only with great 
effort and care . . . Genuine moral knowledge, knowledge of what morality asks on more 
intricate occasions, demands sustained concern for, and attention to, moral phenomena, 
along with some measure of practical and worldly  experience” – such that “the sort of 
156 Cholbi, “Moral Expertise,” 327. 






doggedness required to attain moral expertise necessarily accompanies a desire to acquire 
moral knowledge for the purposes of acting upon it.”160
Xunzi appears to be in agreement with the idea that moral experts must be able to 
successfully apply their moral knowledge, and will be motivated to do so. We have 
already seen previously in the discussion of ritual that, for Xunzi, consequences and the 
success of moral actions are extremely significant. He puts great emphasis on being able 
to apply moral knowledge to particular situations so as to bring about the intended moral 
results.
 Thus, coming to have “genuine” 
or comprehensive moral knowledge requires that it be cared about in such a way that it 
motivates action, and once we have such moral knowledge, we are demonstrably 
committed to acting morally and will continue to be so. Given these three things, Cholbi 
concludes, true moral experts will be motivated to follow their own moral prescriptions. 
161
Xunzi thinks we can characterize people as understanding or knowing (shi
識, zhi知) the rituals and standards of rightness under two distinctive 
circumstances, each of which Xunzi recommends that we treat differently, 
suggesting two kinds of moral knowledge. The first kind consists in 
knowing rough but generally accurate descriptions or paradigmatic 
examples of ritually proper or right behavior. The second consists in 
knowing how to apply these descriptions and examples in particular 
instances, usually by drawing on personal experience with them. People 
with the first kind of knowledge lack what we might call “deliberative 
autonomy”: they cannot knowledgeably decide for themselves which 
course of action is correct, without being specifically instructed or at least 
seconded by a moral expert. By contrast, deliberative autonomy is the 
defining feature of the second sort of knowledge.
 In fact, it is the mark of a moral expert to be able to successfully practice ritual 




                                                 
160 Cholbi, “Moral Expertise,” 328-29. 
161 See Xunzi 1.129-132: “The learning of the gentleman enters through his ears, fastens to his heart, 
spreads through his four limbs, and manifests itself in his actions. His slightest word, his most subtle 
movements, all can serve as a model for others. The learning of the petty person enters through his ears and 
passes out his mouth.” 




This second sort of knowledge – the kind in which a person has deliberative autonomy – 
is the sort had by moral experts. The mark of a moral expert is the ability to know how to 
apply ritual in specific situations so as to bring about goodness and order. Further, in 
order to be considered a moral expert, one must not only have the ability to successfully 
bring about right results, but also actually act in such a way as to do so. We read in the 
Xunzi that: “Among all people, no one does not follow that which they approve of and 
abandon that which they do not approve of. For a person to know that there is nothing as 
great as the Way and yet not follow the Way – there are no such cases.”163 A moral 
expert lives in accordance with his level of moral understanding, with the highest level of 
expertise being a sage, distinguished by his wisdom and virtue.164
As for the third criterion, namely, being able to articulate justifications for one’s 
expertise, this may not be required for all types of experts (performative experts may not 
be able to do so), but it is required for the sort of expertise that is required of a reliable 
testifier. From this criterion of being able to explain one’s knowledge follows the sixth 
criterion, that one must be able to teach one’s knowledge to others. Again, although there 
are some views of expertise according to which this is not a necessary element, it is 
nonetheless required for the sort of expertise relevant for moral testimony. If an expert is 
not able to explain her expert knowledge to others, then she is not the sort of expert that 
could give testimony as to her subject of expertise.
 
165
                                                 
163 Xunzi 22.229-231. 
 The ability to pass on the 
164 For example, see Xunzi 8.279-311, where Xunzi describes different categories of people with different 
levels of moral understanding, ranging from the vulgar person to the great Confucian scholar (ru儒). 
165 Further, there are those who would argue that if a person cannot provide justifications for her expertise, 
then she does not qualify as an expert as all. LaBarge falls into this group, saying that even if a person is a 
moral exemplar whose moral success leads others to try to emulate her:  
I do not think we should call such a person a moral expert unless she can speak 




knowledge that forms one’s moral expertise is emphasized within the Xunzi. Xunzi 
repeatedly returns to the concept of the importance of teachers as those who can correct 
one’s practice of ritual and as a necessary part of moral cultivation. It seems that, 
according to Xunzi, not only will moral experts be able to explain and share their 
expertise,166
A person who models himself on the former kings, accords with ritual and 
yi, and befriends men of learning, but nevertheless does not enjoy or 
delight in speaking out, is surely not a true man of good breeding. And so, 
the gentleman’s attitude towards right words is that he enjoys them in his 
thoughts, takes comfort in putting them into practice, and delights in 
speaking them. Hence, the gentleman is sure to engage in argument. No 
one does not like to speak about what they consider good, and the 
gentleman is especially so. . . . Thus, the gentleman never tires of speaking 
out.
 they will be motivated to actually do so. This ties in with the second 





In keeping with this, Xunzi also indicates that moral experts in positions of leadership 
will establish rituals that are based on their moral knowledge and serve to spread it 
throughout society.168
                                                                                                                                                 
expertise in our society typically claim a wisdom that bears not just on their own lives but 
on the lives of people in general. However righteous the person, she cannot simply say 
‘Follow me’ and expect others to acknowledge her moral authority without further 
justification, especially given the full roster of competitors. She must defend her 
commitments in the public forum, and that entails giving explanations. (LaBarge, 
“Socrates and Moral Expertise,” 24) 
 
166 It is important to note that there are different levels of explanation and justification: a sage may be able 
to give a full justification for a moral prescription, but most people – even most moral experts – are not 
sages. A person can still be considered a moral expert even if she can only give a lower, more basic level of 
justification for her moral knowledge. Further, what counts as justification and testimony for Xunzi might 
differ from what those within the Western literature might consider as such – it seems that Xunzi has a 
view which combines testimony and teaching by example, for instance. Also, given Xunzi’s view of moral 
knowledge as social, historical, and based upon facts of the world, it follows that justification (at least at a 
lower level) can be based on something like “because the former sage kings, who perfected ritual, did so.” 
167 Xunzi 5.126-135. 




 The fourth criterion – agreement between experts – may seem simultaneously 
obvious and problematic in the case of moral expertise. What of moral disagreement? Is 
moral expertise impossible so long as there is moral disagreement? Here, it is useful to 
consider a distinction McGrath makes between “controversial” and 
“CONTROVERSIAL.” She explains, “Your belief that P is CONTROVERSIAL if and 
only if it is denied by another person of whom it is true that: you have no more reason to 
think that he or she is in error than you are.”169
This leads into the fifth criterion, that experts will recognize each other as such. 
Given that experts will agree with each other with regards to knowledge of their domain 
of expertise, and given further that experts will be able to successfully apply and explain 
their knowledge, it follows that other experts will be able to recognize them as such. In 
fact, the ability of one moral expert to recognize another – assuming that there are moral 
experts – is generally accepted within the literature on moral expertise. Xunzi, with his 
 It is possible for a belief to be 
controversial in the regular sense of giving rise to disagreement without being 
CONTROVERSIAL. Thus, it is not just any moral disagreement or controversy that may 
pose a challenge for the idea of agreement between moral experts; it is only moral 
disagreement based on CONTROVERSIAL ideas that is problematic. Given this, 
evidence of moral disagreement within society is not evidence that there would not be 
agreement between experts – it is very possible that those who have genuine moral 
knowledge will be in agreement with each other. 
                                                 
169 Sarah McGrath, “Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise,” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol. 3, ed. 




view of moral knowledge as socially-entrenched,170 certainly requires that moral experts 
will agree with each other and recognize other moral experts as such.171
 We can see, then, that Xunzi’s view of what qualifies a moral expert as such 
largely coincides with the common view of moral expertise found within the Western 
literature on the subject. Given how similar Xunzi’s requirements for moral expertise are 
to what is generally taken within the contemporary literature on the subject to be required 
of the sort of moral expertise of the sort useful for moral testimony, it follows that if 
Xunzi resolves the problem of identifying trustworthy moral experts within his system of 
morality, then such a solution will be relevant to the modern discussion of moral 
testimony and expertise. 
 
In the case of recognizing moral experts in order to find reliable sources of moral 
testimony, there are additional requirements beyond an epistemic or descriptive expertise. 
Driver explains: 
[T]he moral expert is one who possesses moral knowledge to a superior 
degree, or at least possesses superior judgment. . . . It doesn’t 
automatically follow that we ought to defer to one with superior 
knowledge. While we might regard such a person as an expert in judgment 
we might also have reason to avoid treating that person as an expert 
because we do not believe he is a reliable transmitter of moral 
knowledge—other conditions would have to be met for that. For example, 
Satan could well be an example of a being with superior moral knowledge, 
but it would be unwise to defer to Satan’s judgment on what to do.172
 
 
What, then, are these additional conditions for trustworthy sources of moral testimony? 
Primarily, what we look for in trustworthy sources of testimony – in addition to expertise 
                                                 
170 A view which is explained in Section 1. 
171 Recall that ritual can differ according to the different needs and situations of different times and cultures; 
it is not clear that Xunzi would necessarily require that a moral expert from one culture be able to recognize 
a moral expert from another culture with significantly different rituals as a moral expert. 




– is reasonableness and impartiality.173 More specifically, what matters is that a testifier 
is impartial and reasonable when it comes to conveying knowledge to us: “Someone may 
possess the disinterest, or impartiality, etc. required to arrive at reliably true moral 
judgments, but lack the impartiality to deliver those judgments, and thus even reliability 
in judgment isn’t enough to generate trust.”174
 Nonetheless, the need for testifiers to both be moral experts and meet any 
additional requirements for trustworthiness is not really a problem for moral testimony. 
As established in Section 1, trusting moral testimony is not necessarily more difficult 
than trusting any other kind of testimony – the default stance towards moral testimony 
need not be one of distrust. We can observe whether moral experts are impartial and 
reasonable in their testimony to others, just as we can ascertain the trustworthiness of any 
other sort of testifier. At the very least, the problem is no worse in the case of trusting a 
giver of moral testimony than it in the case of trusting any testifier: if we accept the 
arguments in Section 1, we have no more inherent reason to distrust a moral expert’s 
testimony than to distrust a plumber’s plumbing advice.
 It is possible to be sure that a person is a 
moral expert but not be sure that he is a reliable source of moral testimony. 
175
 Now that we have an idea of what to look for in trustworthy moral experts, the 
issue of identifying them remains. Even if moral experts can recognize each other, how 
 
                                                 
173 See Driver, “Autonomy,” 630-34. 
174 Ibid., 631-32. Note that what Driver argues here is in accordance with a will-based account of trust.  
175 This is not to say that we do not have any reason to distrust a moral expert’s testimony, just that the 
problem is no worse than in the case of other sorts of testimony. For example, we may have reason to 
distrust a plumber’s plumbing advice – the plumber may be trying to cheat us, perhaps by telling us we 
need to replace several pipes when simply cleaning them out would suffice to fix the problem. However, 
we do not typically take issue with the idea that we can rely on the testimony of a plumber when we need 
plumbing assistance. If the reasons to distrust moral testimony are no worse than the reasons to distrust 
other testimony which we do not have difficulty accepting, then further justification is required in order to 




can someone who is not a moral expert correctly identify moral expertise? In the case of 
other forms of expertise, we can determine whether someone is a genuine expert by 
appealing to “some kind of independent check, one not itself subject to significant 
controversy, by which we can tell who is (and who is not) getting things right.”176 Driver 
points to this when she says, “Experience, reasonableness and impartiality aren’t the only 
markers for reliability. Another good marker is the extent to which prior judgments of the 
putative expert have been confirmed.”177 McGrath gives the example of a weather 
forecaster – we can look to the history of his past forecasts and compare them with the 
actual weather to see how accurate they are: “inductive track record evidence about who 
is more reliable is relatively easy to acquire. Moreover, crucially, such evidence can be 
readily assessed and assimilated by the layperson: one need not be an expert weather 
forecaster in order to reliably identify those who possess genuine expertise with respect 
to weather forecasting.”178
LaBarge gives the example of an auto mechanic – considering the question of 
how an expert auto mechanic might prove his expertise to a possible customer who 
knows nothing about auto care. Even though the mechanic might be recognized as an 
expert by his peers: 
 
[S]ince the non-expert does not share the understanding of automotive 
affairs in which the experts’ expertise consists, he has nothing more than 
the experts’ say-so to show that they are genuinely experts. . . . [T]he fact 
that one group of mechanics agree with each other and testify to each 
others’ expertise is no proof that they are really the experts. A group of 
fake auto experts could achieve the same appearance with a little 
coordination. Similarly, the non-expert will be hard-pressed to make much 
                                                 
176 McGrath, “Moral Disagreement,” 97. 
177 Driver, “Autonomy,” 632. 




of any explanation the expert might give him; understanding automotive 
explanations requires understanding automobiles.179
 
 
Nonetheless, there is a way for the nonexpert to test the mechanic’s expertise: he need 
only have the mechanic try to fix his car and if, although he says he can, after the expert 
tries to fix it the car still does not work, then that is evidence that he is not an expert. If, 
on the other hand, the car does work, then that is evidence that the mechanic is an expert. 
All the nonexpert need be able to recognize are the basics of whether or not his car works 
– “the best bet for the non-expert looking for an expert mechanic is to focus on 
results.”180
 Generally, then, nonexperts can recognize experts by focusing on results that even 
a layperson can recognize. The problem for moral expertise – what LaBarge has termed 
“the credentials problem” – is that nonexperts cannot focus on results to check whether or 
not a putative moral expert is genuine. LaBarge explains: 
 
The focus on results was possible in the case of mechanics because all 
concerned, experts and non-experts, could at least agree on what success 
consists in and recognize success when it is achieved. No such consensus 
is available in the case of moral expertise, because the ultimate goal of 
moral deliberation and action is itself one of the very issues that is at the 
heart of ethical disputes.181
 
 
After all, consider if you take one putative moral expert’s advice and another disagrees 
with what you have been told: “how could you prove her wrong? You could not simply 
reply, ‘But look, I have adopted the right values and so have achieved moral success!’ 
                                                 
179 LaBarge, “Socrates and Moral Expertise,” 24-25. 





because the values they depend as the right ones are likely to be one of the very things the 
claimants to moral expertise argue about.”182
As McGrath puts it, there is no “independent check” for moral expertise: “in the 
moral case . . . it is unclear how to check who is getting things right.”
 
183 Without an 
independent check for moral expertise, we cannot even determine what sort of training or 
experience might qualify someone as an expert. We can tell that a degree from MIT is a 
good indication of a well-trained engineer, because we have independent ways of 
checking the expertise of engineers by focusing on the results of their actions and 
judgments in the field. In contrast, “it is harder to see how one might calibrate the 
accuracy or reliability of one’s moral judgment; one lacks the relevant kind of 
independent access to the moral facts.”184 Instead, it seems that one would have to be an 
expert oneself in order to check the expertise of another: “If one attempted to rank others 
with respect to the reliability of their moral judgments by checking how often they 
answered moral questions correctly, it seems as though one could do so only by engaging 
in first-order moral reasoning and deliberation of one’s own.”185
Cholbi argues that “there are powerful reasons to conclude that the credentials 
problem is effectively insurmountable, so that even if there are moral experts, we fallible 
moral agents cannot turn to experts for moral counsel and must instead have recourse to 
our own imperfect moral judgment.”
 
186
                                                 
182 LaBarge, “Socrates and Moral Expertise,” 25-26. 
 Cholbi narrows down the criteria for moral 
experts given by those such as LaBarge to two basic requirements: (1) moral experts must 
make reliably correct moral judgments, and (2) moral experts must be able to provide 
183 McGrath, “Moral Disagreement,” 97-98. 
184 McGrath, “Moral Deference,” 333-34. 
185 Ibid., 334. 




justification for their moral judgments. To these two he adds the third requirement, 
mentioned above, that (3) moral experts must be motivated to follow their own moral 
prescriptions. He argues that, although this view of moral expertise “would at least permit 
certain individuals to be rejected as moral experts” – narrowing the field by eliminating 
those who cannot offer justification or are not motivated by their own prescriptions – it 
does not lessen the severity of the credentials problem. There is still no “toehold from 
which to appraise the content of putative experts’ advice” – no way for a nonexpert to 
determine if an ostensible moral expert meets the first requirement – and he argues that, 
further, the latter two requirements “act as epistemic proxies for the first.”187
In the case of requirement (2), Cholbi points out that “nearly anyone can give 
some rationale for her moral prescriptions” and adds that a nonexpert attempting to 
determine whether a putative expert’s moral advice is good by assessing the reasons she 
gives for it “is is no better situation than if she attempted to assess the advice for its 
aptness and truthfulness directly.”
 
188 In the case of requirement (3), Cholbi notes that 
there are certainly individuals who are motivated by their own moral judgments but who 
are not moral experts, saying, “That each putative expert tends to act in accordance with 
her prescriptions is some evidence that each expert takes moral reasons seriously and 
understands herself to have powerful reasons to act as her own moral judgments 
recommend, but it is not independent evidence of her expertise.”189
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 In the case of both 
the second and third requirement, the recipient of moral testimony is still left dependent 
upon checking whether or not a testifier’s moral advice is correct – and so we have not 





escaped the credentials problem. Further, Cholbi argues that it is possible for an 
individual to appear to meet the requirements for moral expertise “while being radically 
deceived about moral facts.” He explains, “There could exist a moral expert-in-a-
paradigm, an ostensible moral expert who is able provide seemingly justified moral 
prescriptions (i.e., justified according to his favored moral paradigm) and reliably acts 
consistently with those judgments, but whose moral sensibility is simply warped.”190
 I will argue that the situation for identifying reliable expert sources of moral 
testimony is not as severe as those discussing the issue make it out to be – the credentials 
problem is certainly not insurmountable, as Cholbi thinks. The Xunzi includes a system 
whereby nonexperts can reliably recognize trustworthy moral experts. Given the close 
similarities between Xunzi’s view of the requirements for moral expertise and the view 
given in the contemporary literature on the subject, the solution to the credentials 
problem found in the Xunzi can be usefully applied to the modern philosophical 
discussion of the issue.  
 
Having a coherent set of beliefs, justification for those beliefs, and the motivation to 
follow those beliefs does not prove that one’s beliefs are true. 
 
 Having established that the credentials problem is an issue that would need to be 
addressed in any thorough account of moral testimony, I will now aim to construct what a 
possible solution would look like, given Xunzi's view of how moral testimony should 
function in society. Justin Tiwald, in “Xunzi on Moral Expertise,” argues that Xunzi's 
2.2 Politically Sanctioned Moral Expertise 
                                                 




account of moral testimony contains the unique concept of what he terms “politically 
sanctioned moral expertise,”191
 
 where moral experts are also political leaders and the 
degree of moral expertise should, ideally, correspond with the position in leadership. My 
intent in this section is to take this idea, brought up by Tiwald, and develop it further with 
the intent of showing that once we reject the aforementioned three assumptions in the 
contemporary literature on moral testimony, we can establish an alternative starting point 
with the view presented by Xunzi's view of politically sanctioned moral experts and that, 
when further developed, this view solves the recognition problem when it comes to the 
identification of moral experts in society. At minimum, an institutional view of moral 
expertise – even if it is not of the specific politically entrenched sort that Xunzi has in 
mind – would still serve to resolve the identification problem by focusing on the social 
nature of morality. 
2.2.1 Introducing the Idea of Politically Sanctioned Moral Expertise 
 Tiwald indicates that Xunzi describes a type of moral expert who is followed 
partly because of moral expertise and partly because of political authority. Such 
politically sanctioned moral experts are distinct from other (civil) moral experts in that 
they have an institutionalized position of moral authority; their moral authority is partly 
imparted by their own moral understanding and virtue, and partly by the state (which 
sanctions them as moral experts). I will argue that the role of politically sanctioned moral 
expertise in Xunzi’s philosophy provides a way for people who do not yet have full moral 
understanding to recognize reliable moral experts to follow. In discussing politically 
                                                 




sanctioned moral expertise, one needs to explain how it is that it is a category distinct 
from both political authority and moral expertise more generally. In delineating what 
separates politically sanctioned moral experts from other (civil) moral experts and from 
other political authorities, we can also come to a better understanding of what politically 
sanctioned moral expertise is and how, according to Xunzi, politically sanctioned moral 
experts are necessary for the good of society (i.e., for sustaining ritual and order). 
 In explaining politically sanctioned moral expertise, Tiwald begins by noting that 
civil moral experts have limits on their autonomy; although they are distinguished from 
nonexperts by their ability to apply moral models (their deliberative autonomy), Xunzi 
“denies them the discretion to revise the models themselves.”192 In other words, civil 
moral experts are able to determine how best to apply rituals – what actually needs to be 
done in particular situations in order to correctly follow rituals and bring about right 
results – but they are not able to create/establish the rituals and the standards of rightness. 
Tiwald explains, “They are free to act on their own judgment about how best to apply a 
model of ritual propriety or righteousness, but they are not allowed to act on their own 
judgment about the correctness or appropriateness of the model itself.”193 However, 
Tiwald points out, this is not the case for politically sanctioned moral experts; moral 
experts in positions of political authority are able to revise and establish moral models. 
As evidence of this, Tiwald notes, “Before the models were perfected, sage rulers rightly 
used their prerogatives to create and revise the models themselves.”194
                                                 
192 Tiwald, “Xunzi on Moral Expertise,” 13. 
 
193 Ibid., 13-14. 




 The reason for limiting the ability to determine what models to follow to those 
who have both moral expertise and political authority is based on an idea introduced in 
Section 1.2.1.1: namely, the importance of “consistency of understanding or 
interpretation.”195 If different people are following different models of proper action, then 
this would be something like speaking different languages: the meaning of what people 
say and do might be mistaken even if the intention is the same. A single constant standard 
is needed in order for people to accurately interpret each other’s actions and know what is 
required of them.196
Xunzi reserves for rulers the right to construct or revise rituals for roughly 
the same reasons that he reserves for rulers the right to legislate the proper 
use of terms and linguistic conventions. As he sees it, when people 
understand terms differently, it gives rise to confusion and 
miscommunication. Moreover, the popular understanding of terms sets 
forth the expectations that they will have of others . . . Similarly, when 
rituals are inconsistent, people in complementary roles will work at cross 
purposes, their ritual acts or gestures will be taken in unintended ways, 
and people will have the wrong expectations of one another.




The importance of constancy in ritual makes politically sanctioned moral experts a 
necessary part of society – the existence of politically sanctioned moral experts limits the 
autonomy of other (civil) moral experts in a way that supports mutual understanding and 
order. 
 An illustrative comparison may help to clarify the role of politically sanctioned 
moral experts: A moral expert is like a manager of a company; he functions on the level 
of theory and organization, and he does not need to be an expert in each of the skills 
                                                 
195 Tiwald, “Xunzi on Moral Expertise,” 14. 
196 Xunzi’s expression of this need for a single standard deals not only with a society-wide level, but also 
with the level of the individual. Even setting aside the issue of interacting effectively with others, it is the 
case that an individual is best served by adhering to “one exalted standard” (Xunzi 8.397); Xunzi explains 
that “the gentleman [is] bound to one thing” (1.107) – trying to follow two standards would only result in 
failure to truly follow either one (see 1.87-105). 




needed to perform the different jobs within the company. Instead, just as what is required 
of a good manager is that he knows how to lead and direct people to get the desired result, 
the moral expert knows enough about the world to see what will result from different 
actions and is also able to determine which results are desirable (i.e., which will bring 
order).198 There may be different management styles and decisions which will work to 
bring about good results; however, having multiple managers with different management 
styles, making different decisions (however slight the differences) will not be good for a 
company – it will result in confusion and disunity, and results will be unreliable. 
Managers can debate with each other as to what the best management style is – trying to 
reach agreement as to what would be optimal – but still be unified in their 
implementation in the meantime, even with the understanding that their current 
management style could be better. It is better to consistently follow one management 
style, even if it is not the optimal one, than it is to have multiple managers making their 
own determinations of what management guidelines to follow.199 Similarly, it is better for 
society to follow one system of ritual consistently than to have separate moral experts 
determining what is morally appropriate. Clarity and consistency are essential for unity 
and order.200
                                                 
198 See Xunzi 21.170-175: “The farmer is expert in regard to the fields, but cannot be made Overseer of 
Fields. The merchant is expert in regard to the markets, but cannot be made Overseer of Merchants. The 
craftsman is expert in regard to vessels, but cannot be made Overseer of Vessels. There is a person who is 
incapable of any of their three skills, but who can be put in charge of any of these offices, namely the one 
who is expert in regard to the Way, not the one who is expert in regard to things.” 
 
199 Even if it might be thought that different management styles might be conducive to dealing with 
different problems, without an overall set of guidelines that apply to all managers the resulting confusion 
and disorganization within a company would arguably outweigh any potential benefits of embracing a 
variety of management styles. 




 What political moral experts do is set up and regulate the single model which all 
of society should follow. Other moral experts may determine how to apply the model and 
may even criticize the model, but they do not have authority to alter the model – only the 
politically sanctioned moral expert can do that. Politically sanctioned moral experts are 
like the head of a company – setting up the rules and standards that the managers (civil 
moral experts) then implement. Just as a corporation needs different roles in order to 
function effectively, so is there a need for different roles within society in order to avoid 
chaos – Xunzi maintains that if there is no political moral authority, then there will be no 
unity and order, explaining that divisions are necessary for order, and that “total equality 
is not order.”201
If divisions of goods are all even, then they cannot be made ample enough. 
If people’s authority is all equal, then they cannot be unified. If all the 
masses are equal in status, then they cannot be put to use. However, just as 
there is Heaven and Earth, above and below do have a difference. An 
enlightened king must first arise and then he can arrange the state so that it 
has established order. . . . If people’s authority and position are equal and 
their desires and dislikes the same, then goods cannot be made sufficient 
for them, and they will certainly struggle. If they struggle then there will 
certainly be chaos, and if there is chaos then they will be impoverished. 
The former kings hated this chaos, and so they established ritual and yi in 
order to divide up mankind, so as to cause ranking of poor and rich and 
noble and base, so that they might take charge of them. This is the basis 
for nourishing all under Heaven.




The ideal is to have the leader in the highest position of authority also be a moral expert 
(as with the sage kings). However, a leader who is not himself a moral expert can put 
those who are experts in positions of political power, and have them fulfill the role of 
politically sanctioned moral experts. In making this point, Tiwald explains that when it is 
not possible for the ruler himself to take on the role of a politically sanctioned moral 
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expert, “the sovereign has the power to sanction or approve the expertise of others.”203
 An analogy between moral expertise in the Xunzi and the legal system of the 
United States is similarly useful. As with ritual and morality, laws are dependent upon a 
social context. Legislators, who create and amend laws, are like politically sanctioned 
moral experts. They are concerned with how the laws bring order to and work across all 
of society. Lawyers provide counsel with regard to practical application and 
interpretation of the law in specific situations, and helping people who are not legal 
experts to understand and follow the laws of the land. In this, they are comparable to civil 
moral experts, who provide guidance with regard to the proper application of ritual and 
teach others how to adhere to and understand right moral models. 
 To 
return to the illustration of the moral expert as manager: the head of a company may not 
have the necessary expertise to establish effective regulations that will direct his workers 
to achieve proper results. However, he can hire and promote directors who do have the 
requisite skills, and so still have a successful company. Nonetheless, the company would 
be even better off (more reliably and effectively run) if its head is himself a business 
expert. 
Having established what politically sanctioned moral expertise is, we can begin to 
see how it can serve to resolve the problem of identification of moral experts. With 
Tiwald’s initial description of Xunzi’s politically sanctioned moral experts in mind, I will 
                                                 
203 Tiwald, “Xunzi on Moral Expertise,” 15. We see evidence of this in Xunzi’s discussion of how King 
Cheng relied on the advice of the Duke of Zhou as a moral counselor and Duke Huan similarly promoted 
Guan Zhong; each leader knowing enough to value worthy, virtuous men even though they were not 
themselves moral experts (Xunzi 24.78-89). See also Xunzi 24.96-106, and Xunzi’s explanation in Chapter 
11 of the importance of employing and promoting virtuous men, e.g., “if the lord of men establishes a lofty 
standard of correctness in setting the fundamentals for his court and does so rightly, and if the person whom 
he employs to direct the hundred tasks is truly a man of ren, then the lord will be at ease and the state will 





now develop the view further with the intent of drawing out its explicit implications for 
the issues with moral testimony that we have been discussing in order to show that it 
resolves the credentials problem for identification of moral experts. 
 
2.2.2 Solving the Credentials Problem 
 Given Tiwald’s account of politically sanctioned moral expertise, one means of 
identifying moral experts would be due to their political position. A nonexpert might 
follow a politically sanctioned moral expert’s moral testimony on the basis of that 
expert’s political authority rather than a recognition of her level of moral understanding. 
In other words, a nonexpert might have a nonepistemic reason to defer to the moral 
testimony of a politically sanctioned moral expert. Whether nonexperts are seeking moral 
advice or not, and whether or not they are even aware that they need moral advice, simply 
as a matter of being participating citizens in a society where moral expertise is tied in 
with political authority, the average person will be able to receive expert moral advice. 
Similarly to how children have caretakers and teachers simply as a result of the existence 
of the institution of parenthood, so, under Xunzi’s view, do citizens of a society have 
access to moral teachers. Just as a child receives care and guidance from her parents, so 
does a moral novice within a society receive moral guidance from politically sanctioned 
moral experts. Further, if they choose to devote the time and effort to it, non-experts can 
receive help from moral experts along the established path of moral development to 
further advance their moral knowledge. 
 We do not think that whether or not a child is raised well is dependent upon the 




Xunzi’s view, moral novices need not be able to recognize moral experts in order to 
benefit from expert moral testimony. A child might follow her parents, deferring to their 
authority, without being expected to know whether or not they are right – similarly, the 
average citizen of a society which includes a system of institutionalized moral expertise 
can defer to the authority of politically sanctioned moral experts without being certain 
that they truly have moral expertise.204
                                                 
204 Of course, this brings up the question of whether we should defer to a moral expert in a position of 
political authority – just as a child might have a parent who gives bad moral direction, so might a 
politically-sanctioned moral expert be an unreliable source of moral guidance. I spend much of this section 
addressing this issue (see pages 113-128). 
 The responsibility for ensuring that the source of 
     Related to this issue is the question of legitimate political authority. It is one thing to associate moral 
expertise with political authority and another to associate it with legitimate political authority (I thank 
Cynthia Stark for bringing this issue to my attention). This issue is one which deserves a deeper treatment 
than I could give it in this paper. However, as a preliminary response and explanation, I would begin by 
noting that it seems likely that Xunzi would not be satisfied with the distinction in Western philosophy 
between legitimate and illegitimate authority, or whether political authority is de facto or morally legitimate. 
Instead, the test of whether a political authority or system is “legitimate” is whether it fulfills the needs of 
(and is accordingly accepted by) the people. The Xunzi makes it clear that during times of poor (illegitimate) 
governance (such as the rule of tyrant kings), there is disorder and suffering, whereas during times of good 
(legitimate) governance (such as the rule of the sage kings) there is order and prosperity. So, ultimately, 
there is a test constrained by human needs, desires and nature. Though there may be a range of political 
environments which humans would find acceptable (or in which humans can flourish), there are extremes 
wherein humans will in general suffer and not find fulfillment of their desires. Recall that Xunzi’s 
explanation of ritual is one according to which it helps us to prioritize and understand our desires in such a 
way that we fulfill them in nondestructive and moderated ways. Given this, there will be some governments 
or institutions that will be illegitimate by virtue of their not being able to satisfy their constituents. This 
harkens to the idea of the Mandate of Heaven (Tianming天命) that was prevalent throughout Chinese 
history: when the needs of the people are not being provided for and there is widespread discontent and 
suffering, it means that the government is unfit to rule (has lost the Mandate of Heaven). In such situations, 
there are indications that the early Confucians would allow for revolutionary means to reorganize society. 
However, this is moderated by the need in average situations to prioritize stability and order by instituting 
changes through a process of first coming to understand how the institution functions and the rules, 
standards, and language according to which it function, and then working within those constraints to 
improve upon it. 
     We might be concerned about the possibility that a bad (illegitimate) leader or governing system will 
retain power. However, Xunzi indicates that a person who does not rule according to proper ritual and 
righteousness will not be able to remain in a position of power: 
Even if he wanted to live without danger, how could he succeed? Thus, if his position is 
elevated, he is sure to be endangered. If his responsibilities are heavy, he is sure to be 
removed from office. If he holds favor, he is sure to be disgraced. These are things one 
can simply stand by and wait for, things that will be over in the space of a breath. Why is 
this? It is simply that those who would cast him down will be many, while those who 
would support him will be few. (Xunzi 7.99-103) 
Although there may be periods of bad leadership or corrupt governance, these will not endure or find 




testimony is reliable is not placed on those in need of guidance, but on those who are 
providing that guidance. In the case of children’s education, emphasis is placed on how 
better to prepare parents to be caregivers and how to construct a school system that will 
be able to cater to the children’s needs. Similarly, Xunzi expects that the central issue of 
importance when it comes to the reliable transmission of moral knowledge through 
testimony is whether the expert/teacher is qualified to give such testimony, and whether 
the institution that sanctions and trains experts is appropriately meeting the needs of those 
in need of moral advice. In both cases, it is not expected that the agent in the position of 
needing guidance must have epistemic reasons for trusting in a testifier’s expertise. 
 In addition to this, Xunzi’s system of institutionalized moral expertise does 
provide a way in which a nonexpert might have epistemic reasons to trust politically 
sanctioned moral experts’ moral advice. In Section 1.2.2, I have given arguments for how 
three assumptions that seem to underlie much of the literature on moral testimony are not 
                                                                                                                                                 
(perhaps due to circumstances) is not able to perform and is misunderstood as being a bad (illegitimate) 
leader, or where the populace is “evil” or morally bankrupt such that a good leader would be seen as a bad 
one who is not fulfilling the desires of the general populace (or a bad leader be seen as good) do not present 
significant problems for Xunzi’s overall theory. Instead, the view is that such simply would not happen. In 
the first case, a person cannot be thought of as a good leader (or an institution as a good institution) if he 
does not know how to bring about good results; bringing about order and prosperity are defining features of 
good leadership. Although it is possible for a person of sage-like virtue and understanding to remain 
without political power, if he is in a position of leadership, then he will retain power and be an efficacious 
leader (see Xunzi 11.26-32 and 8.259-266). In the second case, human nature is such that any populace 
would be dissatisfied with any (long-lasting) situation in which their natural desires were impoverished. 
People within a society lacking good governance would not have a way of moderating and allowing for 
orderly expression and satisfaction of natural desires; they would be self-destructive to the extent that with 
or without a leader the society would collapse. No one wants to exist in a society of chaos where the 
satisfaction of their desires is constantly in jeopardy. Xunzi says: 
[T]here is nothing that people value more than life, and there is nothing that they delight 
in more than security. Of the means to nurture one’s life and secure one’s delights, none 
is greater than ritual and yi. If people know to value life and delight in security, but reject 
ritual and yi, then to draw analogy for it, this is like desiring longevity but then cutting 
one’s own throat – there is no greater stupidity than this. (Xunzi 16.160-164) 
Simply put, a society composed of morally bankrupt individuals is self-destructive such that it will not exist 
for extended periods. (See, for example, Xunzi 9.317-367.) Overall, people tend to gravitate towards 
morally-worthy (virtuous) leaders; as a result, a truly virtuous leader will have more power and more 




warranted, and indicated that different starting assumptions would lessen the problem of 
trust and moral testimony. Now, I will aim to show that Xunzi’s developed view of how 
moral experts function in society offers an alternative that resolves the credentials 
problem for moral expertise. I will discuss how Xunzi’s view of politically sanctioned 
moral expertise differs from a view based on the aforementioned assumptions, and 
conclude that Xunzi’s view eliminates the credentials problem for moral expertise – thus 
allowing for nonexperts to identify reliable sources of moral testimony. 
First, I will briefly go over the three assumptions as a reminder of what they are 
and how they impact moral testimony and expertise. As discussed in Section 1.2.2.1, the 
first assumption that seems to underlie the contemporary discussion of moral testimony 
says that there is a strict division between moral knowledge and other knowledge; moral 
testimony and moral expertise are more problematic than other types of testimony and 
expertise at least in part because moral knowledge is significantly different from other 
knowledge. The second assumption (discussed in 1.2.2.2) maintains that moral 
knowledge is more significant than other knowledge – more specifically, that moral 
knowledge has more significant consequences. Given this assumption, the thought is that 
we must take more care in how we go about obtaining moral knowledge than other sorts 
of knowledge, and so be less willing to trust moral testimony. The third assumption 
(discussed in 1.2.2.3) is that acquiring moral knowledge is an individual matter rather 
than a social one; each individual can and should obtain moral knowledge via private 
deliberation. This assumption makes moral testimony and moral expertise seem 




then relying on the testimony of others is questionable, and we do not need moral experts 
(even if we admit that there is such a thing as moral expertise). 
In Section 1, I have established that the appropriate default stance towards moral 
testimony need not be one of distrust; a starting position of neutrality or even trust might 
be appropriate instead. If one does not hold the previously mentioned three assumptions 
regarding moral knowledge, then the factors of climate, domain, consequences, and 
metastance are all such that each of the default stances is possible, depending on the 
situation. In particular, given a view such as Xunzi’s where moral knowledge is a social 
rather than an individual matter – gained from study of the world and perfected within 
society over time – the appropriate default stance towards moral testimony could be one 
of trust. This is especially true given an institutionalized system that identifies and 
promotes moral experts. The institution which gives them political authority in addition 
to their moral expertise identifies them as moral experts – in effect accrediting them as 
such. Further, since (as discussed in Section 2.1) moral experts are able to recognize each 
other, the moral testimony of those who are identified as moral experts by politically 
sanctioned moral experts can also be trusted. At worst, the default stance towards moral 
testimony would be neutral – neither trusting nor distrusting until a person has 
ascertained whether the testifier has been identified within society as a moral expert. 
Of course, as mentioned above, this leaves the problem of trusting the authority 
which identifies and accredits moral experts. In other words, the burden of correctly 
identifying moral experts falls upon the institution. It is only if the institution can be 
identified as reliable by nonexperts that the credentials problem for moral expertise 




it can serve as a shortcut for identifying trustworthy, reliable moral experts. However, if 
recipients of moral testimony do not have good reason to trust in the institution that 
identifies and places moral experts in positions of authority, then the problems of trust 
and identification are just displaced from the level of individual testifiers to the institution. 
I will argue that if one does not hold the three assumptions that much of the literature on 
moral testimony and expertise has been founded upon, and instead views moral 
knowledge as Xunzi does – as a socially-entrenched knowledge that comes from studying 
the world much like other sorts of knowledge – then one can have good reason to trust in 
a system of institutionalized moral expertise. 
First, it is worth noting that, as mentioned in Section 2.1, according to Xunzi, 
having moral expertise and sharing moral testimony go hand in hand. Part of having 
moral understanding, for Xunzi, is having a desire to teach that understanding to others. 
Since it is good for everyone to understand and act in accordance with the appropriate 
moral model, it is good for those who have understanding (moral experts) to work to 
promote and nurture the understanding of others. Further, recall that, according to Xunzi, 
those with moral expertise are motivated to share their moral knowledge and delight in 
doing so.205
Additionally, for Xunzi, under an ideal political system, those in positions of 
political power will either be moral experts or those who know enough to think to 
promote moral experts to positions of leadership. An important component of Xunzi’s 
 As such, those who are moral experts will seek out positions of authority 
within society, e.g., as teachers (civil moral experts) and political leaders (politically 
sanctioned moral experts). 
                                                 




moral and political philosophy is the idea that espousing and prioritizing the following of 
ritual (proper moral practices) leads to order, and doing otherwise leads to chaos. It is 
thus in the best interests of even a nonvirtuous leader to promote virtuous persons into 
positions of political authority. We find a representative statement of this point in “The 
Rule of a True King” (Chapter Nine of the Xunzi), where in giving advice as to how to 
conduct government, Xunzi states: 
Promote the worthy and the capable without waiting for them to rise 
through the ranks. . . . Even the sons and grandsons of kings, dukes, gentry, 
and grand ministers, if they cannot submit to ritual and yi, should be 
relegated to the ranks of commoners. Even the sons and grandsons of 
commoners, if they accumulate culture and learning, correct their person 
and conduct, and can submit to ritual and yi, should be relegated to the 
status of prime minister, gentry, or grand ministers.206
 
 
Xunzi repeatedly emphasizes this point: it is best (and even necessary) for society to have 
moral experts as political leaders.207
Furthermore, Xunzi explains adherence to and promotion of the correct moral 
views by appealing to the initial establishment by rulers with moral expertise (the sage 
kings) of guides for proper moral behavior (ritual) that become engrained within society. 
A strict control over who is allowed to adjust moral norms means that tying guidelines 
for acceptable moral behavior to a political system would, ideally, serve to strengthen the 
position of accurate moral judgment, and mitigate the chances of the rise of a morally 
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207 See also Xunzi 12.256-289. Indeed, Chapters 9, 11, 12, and 13 of the Xunzi all strongly emphasize this 
point. This may appear to displace rather than eliminate the problem of identifying moral experts, in that 
those identifying moral experts and putting them in positions of political authority must first have moral 
expertise in order to do so. However, this concern is alleviated when we consider that, given human nature, 
at least in the long-term, those who retain political power will tend (overall) to be those who have at least 
some degree of moral expertise (or who rely on and defer to the advice of advisors with such expertise). 
Indeed, it may even be the case that leaders and institutions can be recognized as having moral expertise on 
the basis of their continued success and their ability to bring order and prosperity to (and hence gain 




dubious authoritarian state (although this is obviously not always going to be the case). It 
makes sense to think that not just anyone should be able to change rituals and moral 
standards, given a view of moral knowledge as being a social rather than private matter, 
gained from study of the world and of human nature. Given how difficult it is to acquire 
all of the requisite knowledge, it is not likely that any individual alone would be able to 
do all of the work of establishing a correct moral model for society. So, clarifying and 
revising the moral model for society is best left to those who have the greatest 
understanding of the model as it has already been developed, i.e., it is best left to moral 
experts. Additionally, since moral knowledge is socially-entrenched – with ritual, much 
like language, dependent upon a shared usage and understanding – it follows that any 
revision of or addition to the established moral model should only be made by those who 
are in some way in charge of how society coheres; only a person in a position of authority 
within a society would be able to direct and enact such revision in such a way as to 
effectively establish it within that society as a whole. 
This brings us back to the previously mentioned idea that, according to Xunzi, 
appropriate social divisions are necessary for order. Just as a society needs different 
people to fulfill different roles in order to function properly, so does a society need 
different people to fulfill different moral roles. In other words, just as a successful society 
will consist of farmers, craftsmen, merchants, doctors, leaders, etc., with different people 
having different specializations and fulfilling different needs for the society, so will those 
within a successful society fulfill different moral roles – some (politically sanctioned 
moral experts) serving to establish appropriate models for society to follow, others (civil 




(nonexperts) doing their best to act in accordance with the moral guidance they receive 
from those moral authorities. It is important to remember that there are roles that are 
suited for certain types of moral deliberation that are not fitting for everyone within 
society, and that even among moral experts there is still a stratification between those 
who have more authority and autonomy versus those with less authority and limited 
autonomy (albeit still more than the nonexpert).208
Further, given how morality is reliant on a social setting, a view such as Xunzi’s 
is more plausible than one that relegates morality to individuals acting independently. 
Morality governs interactions between people. In a sense, morality is meaningless if there 
is only one agent and no other subjects or even objects to which morality applies. The 
idea that morality needs to function in a way that befits this context of society, wherein 
different people necessarily have different capabilities and roles, is one that Xunzi’s view 
accounts for and which the contemporary literature on moral testimony does not (at least, 
not to a degree as detailed as Xunzi’s). 
 
Even accepting that politically sanctioned moral expertise is plausible, the 
question remains of how those without moral expertise can recognize that the system that 
accredits individuals as moral experts and gives them the requisite political authority to 
establish appropriate moral models is itself trustworthy and reliable. How can a non-
expert be sure that those the institution accredits actually are moral experts who will be 
impartial in giving moral testimony? Here, again, we can see that we benefit from 
                                                 
208 Indeed, we can see that institutionalized forms of moral expertise already exist for various social groups 
and societies – and are perhaps an inescapable part of human existence. Different groups defer to different 
institutionally-sanctioned moral authorities which enforce and support social norms, whether they be 
religious leaders, political leaders, or the elders of a society. A view of morality like Xunzi’s, where moral 
knowledge is based on discoverable facts of the world, allows for the establishment of a more coherent 





throwing out the three assumptions that moral knowledge is importantly different from 
other knowledge, more significant, and an individual matter. If we instead understand 
moral knowledge as Xunzi does, then an institution that gives credentials and authority to 
moral experts would be akin to an institution of science. Much like how those who do not 
have expertise in a scientific field trust as scientific experts those who have a degree on 
the subject from a recognized institution, so can those who do not have moral expertise 
trust as moral experts those who have authority given them as politically sanctioned 
moral experts. In both cases, the institution provides a system whereby experts are 
accredited as such, and which is self-correcting as the resulting community of experts 
work to correct and improve each other’s knowledge and understanding. 
Here, one possible objection is that this still does not solve the credentials 
problem – consensus among putative moral experts does not necessarily indicate actual 
expertise. As Jones points out, “Agreement is by no means a sure indicator of truth.” She 
explains, “Sometimes it counts against the trustworthiness of testifiers, signaling that they 
are in cahoots, rather than independently correct. And sometimes, especially in political 
contexts, it counts against the trustworthiness of testifiers by signaling that some voices 
have yet to be heard.”209 Cholbi also hints at this problem when he discusses the 
possibility of an “expert-in-a-paradigm.”210
                                                 
209 Jones, “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge,” 74. 
 If we extend this to a group of putative 
experts who share the same (incorrect) moral paradigm, we can see how consensus does 
not prove accuracy. The problem of needing independent verification of moral expertise 
remains. 




In response to this objection, I argue that, given Xunzi’s view of moral knowledge, 
it seems that there would be no more fear of such agreement based on an incorrect 
paradigm in the case of institutionalized moral expertise than there is in the case of 
institutionalized scientific expertise. I will make several points in support of this 
argument. First, even accepting that moral knowledge is such that there will not be any 
independent checks for moral expertise (as argued by LaBarge, McGrath, and Cholbi), it 
seems that this trait is not unique to moral knowledge; certain areas of science are not that 
different. Consider, for example, theoretical physics: this is a scientific domain which 
works by extrapolating from what little we do know of the world to try to create theories 
that explain how everything fits together and functions. Theoretical physics is a 
speculative science – there is (at least for the most part) no way for nonexperts to check 
whether or not a physics expert’s theory is correct. Yet, we do think of physics as science, 
and accept that certain people with degrees in the field are physics experts. Further, there 
are communities of physicists who work towards more accurate and better theories – 
working to improve upon each other in order to reach the right theory to explain 
everything. In summary, we have institutions that we think are fairly reliable that are not 
more rigorous or independently verifiable than what we would expect from a moral 
institution. 
This point is strengthened when we consider the view that moral knowledge is not 
best arrived at independently, as some in the literature have thought. I have previously 
discussed the idea that moral knowledge – in particular, knowledge of ritual – is built up 
over time within a society. So long as we accept a view according to which knowledge of 




social and historical, and dependent upon knowledge about the world – it follows that it is 
unrealistic to expect the average individual to be able to independently arrive at moral 
understanding.211
Not every domain in which we typically accept that nonexperts can identify 
expertise is as straightforwardly verifiable as automotive repair or meteorology. Some, 
like physics, are such that we depend upon an institutionalized system of accreditation in 
order to identify experts. Given this, we could or should expect that there are other ways 
of identifying experts than through each individual being able to figure out that they are 
experts by recognizing results.
 We should not expect people to be able to recognize experts through 
confirming the actual accuracy or truth of the issue at hand. 
212
                                                 
211 As previously mentioned (see page 35), individuals with the required genius to do so, such as the 
original sage kings, are rare exceptions. 
 Consider the many institutions we have in 
contemporary society where the subject takes time, effort and specialization in order to 
even understand what the appropriate results should be – as has been argued to be the 
case with morality. We do not expect that an average (nonexpert) person will be able to 
listen to a chemist explain how he is creating different compounds in a particular way and 
to verify that is indeed the way that he brought about the creation of some chemical 
substance. Although we can sometimes verify that said substance does, indeed, have 
some effect that the putative chemical expert says that it should, this is not always the 
case. There are some things that only other chemists could verify. 
212 Further, even in the case of fields with seemingly-straightforward results, it remains the case that non-
experts can never be certain of the expertise of a purported expert. This is true even for those fields which 
LaBarge and McGrath use as examples of cases where identifying trustworthy experts is nonproblematic. 
For example, a car mechanic may tell me that my vehicle’s engine needs to be replaced altogether in order 
to repair it. I may think that the results indicate that he was correct if my car runs well after the engine is 
replaced, but he may have deceived me or only accidentally stumbled upon a solution without having real 
expertise; perhaps a simple and inexpensive tune-up would have fixed my vehicle just as well. Only 




Further, even if we accept that the credentials problem is worse for moral 
expertise than it is for other domains of expertise – since moral knowledge more clearly 
includes knowledge of appropriate ends – it still seems that there is a plausible way to 
identify moral experts that would support the idea that institutionalized moral expertise 
provides a shortcut to identifying reliable moral experts without simply displacing the 
problems of trust and identification. I have established that there is a significant portion 
of morality that is tied in with how the world works. This means that, even if it is 
arguably more difficult to do so, it is possible for a nonexpert to observe whether what an 
alleged moral expert says coincides with what he or she does know. A recipient of moral 
testimony can at least check for whether or not an alleged moral expert’s testimony 
conflicts with what she knows about the world. 
Add to this the idea, which I have also worked to establish, that most people share 
certain fundamental ideas about morality, and we are able to have a basis for identifying 
the results of morality. For example, if a moral institution says that it is good to torture 
and murder indiscriminately, then it would be obvious to nearly everyone that said 
institution is not based on a correct system of morality. So, to return to a point made in 
Section 1, there are fundamental starting places upon which we can all agree and from 
which we can work to accurately identify moral experts; we can use how well a supposed 
moral expert can bring about those things that we do agree on as a measure of their 
degree of expertise.213
                                                 
213 This is comparable to Aristotle’s dialectical method that begins from endoxa (common beliefs). Carrie-
Ann Biondi Khan argues that via this dialectical method a nonexpert “can be offered some kind of 
argument for trusting an alleged moral expert, even if he does not have the same understanding that the 
moral expert has” (Carrie-Ann Biondi Khan, “Aristotle’s Moral Expert: The Phronimos,” in Ethics 
Expertise: History, Contemporary Perspectives, and Applications, ed. Lisa M. Rasmussen (Springer, 2005), 





analyze the advice of alleged moral experts, we might be able, over an extended time of 
observation and study, to tell whether a particular person is a moral expert. If all of the 
moral prescriptions the supposed expert gives and adheres to are in keeping with what 
one already knows, then one has some justification for recognizing her as a moral 
expert.214
If there is institutionalized moral expertise, this only serves to facilitate such a 
process – it provides a shortcut that makes finding trustworthy sources of moral 
testimony more viable since if one builds trust in the institution, then one will be able to 
trust those it identifies as moral experts without having to go through the process of 
analyzing each one individually. The idea that we can build up to recognition of expertise 
from the little things that we hold in common, when combined with the ideas that 
morality is a shared system that relies on some basis in society and that at least some 
portion of moral facts is observable even to the nonexpert, provides an explanation for 
how we can establish that an institution of moral expertise is reliable. We can see that 
morality is grounded in enough confirmable facts that it is not completely unidentifiable 
to a nonexpert. 
 
Finally, even if the system of morality supported by institutionalized moral 
expertise is not really what is good (whether this is because it does not match up with the 
normative facts or because there is no normative fact of the matter), and so any system 
purporting to be based on such is not accurate, then it is still arguably better than not 
                                                 
214 As I have indicated previously, the rituals that we follow every day would be an important part of the 
common ground we can use to assess the testimony of purported moral experts. Furthermore, since moral 
experts will be motivated to give moral testimony (see page 94), the burden is not entirely upon nonmoral 
experts to seek out and identify appropriate sources of moral testimony – it seems likely that, in the interest 
of sharing their moral knowledge, moral experts will be inclined to give moral testimony of the sort that 




having such an institutionalized system of moral expertise. Such a system provides the 
commonly understood, shared framework necessary for members of a society or societies 
to communicate what they value to each other. So, at the very least, there will be order, 
even if Xunzi is wrong in considering order to be morally good. Also, Xunzi maintains 
that with proper order both our basic needs and our capabilities for flourishing will be 
provided for, so – coming back to the idea that there are shared goods that all (normal) 
humans value – at the very least, those basic needs will likely be fulfilled with an 
institutionalized system of morality governed by moral authorities. Xunzi states that “if 
the methods of the ru are truly put into practice, then all under Heaven will be peaceful 
and prosperous”215
will surely cultivate ritual in order to set straight his court. He will rectify 
his models for conduct in order to set straight his officials. He will make 
his government even-handed in order to set straight the common people. 
Only then will the regulations be set straight in his court, the hundred tasks 
set straight among his officials, and the masses set straight below.




Further, as has been established, Xunzi does make allowances for changes to ritual over 
time. So, even if the moral system on which institutionalized moral expertise is based is 
not accurate or it is not best able to provide for the members of the society or societies in 
which it functions, there is room for it to improve. 
Moreover, given a view of moral knowledge like the one found in the Xunzi, a 
moral system is more likely to improve in a setting where educated members of society 
who have devoted much time and effort to thinking about the issue of what is good can 
contribute and share their ideas with each other in an effort to make moral standards and 
                                                 
215 Xunzi 10.219-220. 
216 Xunzi 10.413-416. The rest of Xunzi Chapter Ten, “Enriching the State,” supports this, as well. See also 




practices (e.g., ritual) better able to do what it is that they are intended to do (and to 
identify what it is that they should be intended to do). Such a setting is surely better than 
relying on a number of uneducated people who have not thought about the issues, do not 
understand them, and are more likely to have uninhibited selfish motives (with no 
community of like minds or social and political expectations to constrain them). As Peter 
Singer points out in his paper “Moral Experts,” reasoning about moral matters is not easy 
– a person must gather information, determine which information is relevant and how it 
fits with a basic moral position, and eliminate bias – and so can be better done by those 
who are trained to be able to do so.217
The objection may be raised that it seems that it is not the case that those with 
more moral training (as it were) make better moral decisions.
 
218 For example, Eric 
Schwitzgebel points out that “Ethics professors, despite what seems like ample 
opportunity for moral reflection, seem to behave no better than other members of their 
social class – Rousseau himself famously abandoned his children . . .”219
                                                 
217 Singer, “Moral Experts,” 116-117. In facilitating the process of perfecting social norms, institutionalized 
moral expertise also provides a way for those who are not trained or educated in the way moral experts 
must be to be able to do what is right. Those without moral understanding can simply follow social norms, 
such as ritual, in order to bring about good results. As Singer points out, “If the moral code of one’s society 
were perfect and undisputed, both in general principles and in their application to particular cases, there 
would be no need for the morally good man to be a thinking man. Then he could just live by the code, 
unreflectively” (“Moral Experts,” 116). 
 However, those 
such as the ethics professors Schwitzgebel mentions might not truly be moral experts in 
the relevant sense. It is important to remember that, for the purposes of determining 
reliable sources of moral testimony, moral experts must not only understand what should 
be done in the abstract, but also be able to effectively bring about correct consequences 
218 I thank Eric Hutton for bringing this point to my attention, and for directing me to Schwitzgebel’s 
treatment of it. 




and be motivated to do so. Schwitzgebel actually hints at this when, speaking of such 
ethics professors, he adds, “perhaps their reflection is too intellectual, too clever, and too 
far removed from local particulars to foster their own moral development.”220
The idea of socially or politically sanctioned moral experts has raised the fear that 
such experts would use their authority to advance self-serving or morally dubious 
views.
 “Local 
particulars” – such as ritual – are an indispensable part of moral understanding; moral 
reflection removed from such particulars will not bring about right results. 
221 This leads to a concern that pairing social power and moral authority would 
lead to a totalitarian or authoritarian state. Griffin Trotter explains that “there is fear that 
anointed ethical experts will wield inordinate political power.” He argues that this fear 
presupposes the idea that “the knowledge base in ethics seems underdeveloped,” arguing 
that “if ethics sported a highly developed, comprehensive, well-differentiated and widely 
acknowledged set of principles, like physics, there would be little hesitance about 
following the counsel of ethical experts,” adding that in such a case, “People endeavoring 
to make a good decision or live a good life would seek the advice of ethical experts, with 
no more concerns about ‘moral imperialism’ than bridge builders have about ‘mechanical 
imperialism’ when they seek the advice of engineers.”222
                                                 
220 Schwitzgebel, “Human Nature and Moral Education,” 163. 
 Since Xunzi’s system of 
politically sanctioned moral expertise functions in such a way as to work towards 
unifying and perfecting moral models within society, it would serve to mitigate the fear 
of abuse of power by politically sanctioned moral experts. Any fears of corruption of the 
institution of politically sanctioned moral expertise would be no worse than the fears that 
221 Jones, “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge,” 64. 




we would have for corruption within any institution and better than many unregulated 
institutions – being on par with highly regulated institutions such as those within the 
fields of science and medicine with standardized methods, boundaries, and criteria for the 
accreditation of experts. 
Politically sanctioned moral experts are authorities who dictate the correct moral 
model to follow even if others do not understand it. However, such a model avoids being 
a morality based solely on authority in that – as I have shown – it is still based on facts 
about the world and basic moral principles that are held in common. It is worth noting, as 
well, that it is not clear how a developed view of Xunzi’s politically sanctioned moral 
expertise would pan out in a modern society. It could even be the case that, given our 
understanding of human nature and how societies diverge and are diverse throughout the 
world, what would actually be required would be something like tolerance of a great 
many differing ritual practices. Politically sanctioned moral experts may espouse the 
mutual understanding of rituals across cultures, governed by some fundamental shared 
morals (like the prevention of killing of innocents and protection of certain basic values). 
The fear of Xunzi’s view being authoritarian may be completely unwarranted if the 
ethical experts, who are knowledgeable and study the subject matter, come to agree that 
some sort of ideal of tolerance is the best way to bring about right results. In other words, 
even if what morality dictates is a specific thing for everyone, determined by 
knowledgeable people who have been given social authority, this does not necessarily 




tolerance and freedom are upheld by an institutionalized system of moral expertise, this 
may well be a force against authoritarianism.223
Further, even with the fear of corruption and abuse of power, it seems that having 
an institutionalized system of moral expertise is better – and makes relying on moral 
testimony less risky – than a system of individual, disconnected moral experts. Even if 
we think that it is too risky to endow an institutionalized system of moral expertise with 
political power, there is still value in having such a system. The presence of an 
institutionalized system whereby experts are trained and accredited places checks upon 
those who are tempted to give poor moral guidance. Within an institutionalized system of 
expertise, there is less of a chance for manipulation to take place or remain undiscovered 
while the perpetrator continues without any negative consequence for giving false 
testimony. While it is true that – as with any institution – an institution of moral expertise 
might not be entirely reliable, it is also the case that without any such institution it is even 
more difficult to find trustworthy sources of testimony. Individual purported experts with 
no institution to watch over or support them have less keeping them from being dishonest 
with their testimony. When a scientist succumbs to corporate pressures and falsifies data, 
she is more likely to face negative consequences (which can serve as a deterrent to such 
negative behavior) if there is scientific institution in place within which other scientists 
will repeat her experiments, check her data and call attention to any error or deception on 
her part. If there were no regulated system of institutionalized scientific expertise, then it 
would be even more difficult for non-experts affected by her falsehood to ever know that 
 
                                                 
223 If one thinks that instituting a model for all of society according to which freedom and tolerance are 
enforced qualifies as an authoritarian government, then it seems that any government or ideology would be 




they had been deceived. The case with moral experts is similar – the likelihood of 
receiving untrustworthy moral testimony is higher when there is no institutionalized 
system that recognizes and sanctions moral experts. 
 It seems, then, that Xunzi’s system of politically sanctioned moral expertise can 
solve the credentials problem for moral expertise without creating significant new 
problems. However, the question remains of how – or whether – such a system could be 
implemented in a modern society. This is what I will address in the following section. 
 
 Having established that Xunzi’s view of moral expertise and testimony includes a 
solution for the problem of identifying trustworthy moral experts in the form of the 
system of politically sanctioned moral expertise, there remains the consideration of 
whether or not Xunzi’s system would be relevant to or useful for modern society. At first 
glance, it might seem that it would not be. Xunzi’s emphasis on the established ritual of 
the Zhou dynasty may seem off-putting to a modern person. After all, the rituals Xunzi 
describes include details for how and when one must bow to the emperor, specific ritual 
sacrifices and ceremonies, what clothing one should wear according to one’s station, how 
ornate one’s chariot should be, etc. Also, as I mentioned in Section 1.2.1.1, many details 
of the rituals are specific to a particular place and level of technological development and 
resources.
2.3 Institutionalized Moral Expertise in Modern Society 
224
                                                 
224 See page 35. 
 One might question how a system of morality based on rituals that seem so 
outdated and culturally specific might have anything to offer in a modern setting. Worse, 




very little to address the role of women in society, and where he does do so he hints at 
their having a subservient role that may not be agreeable to modern society.225
 However, we do not have to subscribe to the particulars of the rituals described in 
the Xunzi in order to find Xunzi’s view applicable in our time. As previously indicated, 
Xunzi’s view allows for adaptability and changes in accordance with different times. The 
main strength of Xunzi’s view is not the particulars of what he takes to be rituals – which 
may be constrained by time or place – but rather his view of the importance of rituals, 
society, and moral institutions in the development, continuation and transmission of 
morals. That is what is significant for the present issue of moral testimony. Given this, 
what I will first do is briefly give evidence to suggest that Xunzi’s view is adaptable and 
that the development of a Xunzian form of institutionalized moral expertise for modern 
society would not be antithetical to Xunzi’s project. I will then proceed to offer two 
possibilities for how Xunzi’s view can be applied to modern society, drawing on the 
existing literature on institutionalized moral expertise and the position of moral experts 
within society for support. 
 Given all 
of this, one might question how useful Xunzi’s moral system, which emphasizes ritual, 
society, and particular moral roles, is when the rituals he specifies are so foreign to a 
modern setting. 
 Xunzi’s view accommodates the idea that rituals can – and possibly even should – 
change over time. The beginnings of this idea are found in the consideration of how ritual 
comes to be established for a society. As previously explained, the moral model espoused 
by Confucian philosophers was developed deliberately by the sage kings of the past. 
                                                 




Xunzi explains, “In every case, ritual and yi are produced from the deliberate effort of the 
sage . . . The sage accumulates reflections and thoughts and practices deliberate effort 
and reasoned activities in order to produce ritual and yi and in order to establish proper 
models and measures.”226 Philip J. Ivanhoe describes a common reading of the Xunzi 
when he states, “The Confucian scheme was worked out over long periods of time by a 
series of gifted sages, through a process of trial and error.”227
But there are a hundred sage kings – which of them shall one take as one’s 
model? And so I say: culture persists for a long time and then expires, 
regulations persist for a long time and then cease. The authorities in 
charge of preserving models and arrangements do their utmost in carrying 
out ritual but lose their grasp. And so I say: if you wish to observe the 
tracks of the sage kings, then look to the most clear among them. Such are 
the later kings. The later kings were lords of the whole world. To reject the 
later kings and take one’s way from furthest antiquity is like rejecting 
one’s own lord and serving another’s lord. And so I say: If you wish to 
observe a thousand years’ time, then reckon upon today’s events. If you 
wish to understand ten thousand or one-hundred thousand, then examine 
one or two. If you wish to understand the ancient ages, then examine the 
way of the Zhou. If you wish to understand the way of the Zhou, then 
examine the gentlemen whom their people valued. Thus it is said: Use the 
near to know the far; use the one to know the ten thousand; use the subtle 
to know the brilliant. This expresses my meaning.
 Further, Xunzi also 
indicates that a more recent model is to be preferred to an older one; culture and 
regulations may have changed, and one can be surer to get a clear picture of what rituals 




The principles and standards of morality may be enduring and immutable, but that does 
not mean that the specifics of ritual are likewise unchanging. 
 Xunzi says, “There is one measure for ancient times and the present. So long as 
one does not contravene the proper classes of things, even though a long time has passed 
                                                 
226 Xunzi 23.63-72. 
227 Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self Cultivation, 32. 




the same order obtains.”229
 Here, again, the comparison of ritual with language is useful. In Chapter Twenty-
Two of the Xunzi (“On Correct Naming”), he addresses the issue of the importance of 
having a clear understanding of what names refer to as a way to preserve mutual 
understanding and order. He explains that sage kings established names for things in 
order to make their intentions understood, and then “carefully led the people to adhere to 
these things single-mindedly. . . . Hence, none of their people dared rely on making up 
strange names so as to disorder the correct names, and so the people were honest . . . they 
were unified in following the proper model of the Way.”
 In this passage, Xunzi indicates that there is a way for moral 
experts to gauge how people use ritual and how it reflects moral principles. Some might 
be led to think that morality changes over time, but that is because they do not have a 
“measure.” A sage is able to look at human nature (look at himself and the behavior of 
others) and identify the constant underlying moral principles that give rise to our rituals 
for expressing them. As long as a moral expert is able to ensure that rituals map onto the 
underlying persisting facts about our human behavior and the values we hold, and create 
distinctions that adhere to, correct and regulate these facts about us, order can be obtained. 
We need not think that the principles of morality are what is changing – only the rituals. 
230
                                                 
229 Xunzi 5.108-110. 
 However, he indicates that 
since the time of those sage kings things have changed such that a new leader with both 
the expertise and authority required in order to do so would adjust, change, and re-clarify 
them as needed; it is the intention behind the names that matters, not strictly the specific 
names themselves: “If there arose a true king, he would surely follow the old names in 
some cases and create new names in other cases. Thus, one must examine the reason for 




having names, the proper names for distinguishing like and unlike, and the essential 
points in establishing names.”231
What matters for rituals are their intended moral consequences and their ability to 
serve as a way to effectively communicate moral principles; if times have changed such 
that a particular ritual no longer serves these purposes (perhaps what it is has become 
confused with the passage of time, perhaps it has become outdated with the advancement 
of knowledge), then it should be changed or a new one introduced – and (as indicated in 
the previous section) it is the job of the politically sanctioned moral expert to do so. What 
matters for ritual is not just the keeping of tradition, but that it is suitably effective. We 
see this idea reinforced when Xunzi says, “[T]hose who are good at speaking of ancient 
times, are sure to have some measure from the present. Those who are good at speaking 
of Heaven, are sure to have some evidence from among mankind. For any discourse, one 
 
                                                 
231 Xunzi 22.36-39. Here, I should note that there has been some disagreement over the appropriate 
translation of this passage. As Hutton has pointed out, a respected commentator on Xunzi, Wang Xianqian, 
interprets this line in a way that runs counter to the reading of it I present here (Hutton, “Review of The 
Philosophy of Xunzi: A Reconstruction” in Dao 6 (2007), 419). He reads the line as stating that, far from 
creating new names, a true king would change new names back to their old (correct) forms. The main point 
of difference is that where many take the term zuo (作) as meaning “to create” or “to invent,” Wang 
Xianqian here takes it as meaning “to change [back].” Although, as Kurtis Hagen has noted, this is not the 
typical understanding of zuo (Hagen, “A Response to Eric Hutton’s Review,” in Dao 6, 442), it is not 
without basis. Hutton explains, “Wang’s view is based on the phrase作色 zuo se in the Li Ji禮記” (Hutton, 
“A Further Response to Kurtis Hagen,” in Dao 6 (2007), 446).  This phrase means to adopt a facial 
expression or “to make a face.” Hutton notes that we do not invent a new expression when we “make a 
face”; instead we remake or change our expression. So, zuo can mean something more like “change” than 
“invent.” My purpose here is to point out that some have attempted to undertake a reading of the Xunzi 
which would allow for the possibility of differing sets of rituals being most appropriate for different times, 
depending on the different situations of those times. However, a significant portion of the textual evidence 
in the Xunzi does indicate that he might have a view that ritual was perfected during the Zhou dynasty and 
that those rituals would need no alteration for different times or places. Putting aside the possibility that 
Xunzi was overstating his position for polemical purposes, even if we take Xunzi as indicating that there is 
only one correct set of rituals for all times, we can still usefully draw upon his view of moral knowledge as 
being based on facts of the world and of human nature, and his emphasis on the importance of ritual and of 
learning from teachers whose moral understanding is greater than our own. As I have noted previously, we 
need not think that the ritual of the Zhou dynasty was (or is) perfect in order to benefit from a consideration 




values it if things conform to its distinctions, and if it matches the test of experience.”232
 Given the adaptability of ritual, even if we do not think that the particulars of 
Xunzian ritual are appealing, we can still find Xunzi’s view of morality to be both useful 
and effective when applied to modern society. I will argue that Xunzi’s view of 
politically sanctioned moral expertise suggests two possibilities for modern ethical 
philosophy. First, we might accept the idea that the connection of moral and political 
authority is desirable. Perhaps, in light of the state of our politics now where we cannot 
rely on politicians to be moral exemplars, we might consider that we should have a 
system where political authorities have to meet certain criteria of moral knowledge. The 
ideal of having morally-worthy political leaders outweighs the risk of an authoritarian 
state which enforces a dubious “morality.” To return to the analogy of sanctioned moral 
experts being like legislators: it seems that we might reasonably want our legislators to be 
both moral and legal experts, and so work towards establishing a system which promotes 
having such qualifications be met. 
 
We might accept that the standards ritual is based on are enduring, but think that ritual 
itself can – and is expected to – change according to the times. 
 Second, and more significantly, given a society like ours where we do not 
necessarily trust in the moral compass of our politicians, recognizable positions of moral 
expertise could be tied in with some other system. In other words, we might abandon the 
political association for moral expertise, but retain the concept of sanctioned positions for 
moral experts. We can already see a move in this direction in the philosophical discussion 
                                                 




of the position of ethicists as experts in various professional fields, including medicine.233
 Although the political aspect of politically sanctioned moral expertise is very 
much emphasized in the Xunzi, Xunzi’s view has much to offer (and still solves the 
credentials problem) even if we set aside the idea that an institutionalized moral expertise 
would be tied to government and instead consider the idea of sanctioned moral expertise 
separate from political power. Rather than being political, the institutional system which 
accredits and gives authority to sanctioned moral experts might be more like a scientific 
institution. Just as universities and the degree-giving programs within them can function 
largely separate from the state, so can a system of institutionalized moral expertise. 
Sanctioned moral experts can still fulfill the role Xunzi assigns them, even if they do not 
directly wield political power. They might instead advise those who do on what would be 
the best moral choices, and also work to advise and educate the populace via non-
political means. 
 
Xunzi’s philosophy can provide valuable insights for the discussion of what might be an 
acceptable role for such experts. It is this possibility, of a scientific-like institution of 
morality and moral experts that need not be political, which I will explore in more depth. 
 If we move away from an idea of morality as something which every individual 
must acquire knowledge of independently towards a view more like Xunzi’s, then we will 
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be more willing to accept the premise that those who have devoted more time and effort 
to studying ethics will be better qualified to say what is right and what is wrong. Further, 
even if any program by which moral experts are accredited might begin by 
acknowledging the current state of moral disagreement within society, we could expect 
that such apparent disagreement would lessen as the knowledge base for ethics solidifies 
and is clarified by the resulting community of sanctioned moral experts as they worked to 
study and discuss moral matters together – as mentioned previously, a moral institution 
would be self-correcting in much the way scientific institutions are. The various sciences 
may have started from what would now be considered poor beginnings, but over time 
they have become more accurate and moved towards consensus within each field. For 
example, consider the field of biology and the theory of natural selection and evolution. 
When Darwin first proposed these ideas, they were extremely controversial – the science 
of biology was still so tied up in a religious tradition as to be biased against such a view. 
However, as time has passed, the situation has changed such that now no one who 
dismisses evolution and natural selection would rightly be considered an expert in 
biology. Further, although it is still the case that (at least within the United States) many 
non-experts in the population do not accept evolution and natural selection, the number 
who do is increasing as biological experts continue to support, accept, and teach them as 
scientific fact.  
Similarly, we might accept that, although there is some disagreement among 
sanctioned moral experts initially, such disagreement will lessen as they work together to 
better the state of moral knowledge. Even when there is a state of moral disagreement, 




both possible and a way to help improve the state of moral understanding. Disagreement 
and debate does not necessitate a division into separate, conflicting institutions and 
qualifications for expertise. Consider how academic and scientific communities work: It 
is difficult to think of any field where debate is not welcomed, and that debate is 
informed by what has already been established within the field in such a way as to 
promote increasing understanding and development of knowledge. 
Further, although an institutionalized moral system might begin with experts who 
do not share the same educational background and qualifications, these are things which 
may be standardized such that what began as a general standard can turn into something 
more like the degree-awarding programs we see within academia. Ana Smith Iltis, in 
discussing ethics expertise as it applies specifically to the case of bioethics, poses the 
possibility of accreditation of such expertise. She points out that there are several 
obstacles when it comes to accrediting ethical experts: (1) Ethical expertise requires 
interdisciplinary knowledge. This is a point that we have seen is in agreement with Xunzi 
– moral understanding requires knowledge of a wide range of facts about the world. In 
order to be an expert in bioethics, for example, one must have knowledge of biology and 
medicine in addition to ethical theory and reasoning. (2) The current state of morality in 
our society is one where there are numerous, often conflicting, views. Iltis explains, “The 
interdisciplinary nature of the field raises numerous difficulties with the prospect of 
accreditation, especially because there is no single educational background that we can 




moral pluralism and the multiple models of consultation that follow from it add an 
additional layer of difficulties for accreditation.”234
Although, as I have argued, these are problems which will lessen as an institution 
of moral expertise is built up and strengthened over time, it nonetheless remains true that 
we need to consider what the qualifications for moral expertise should be, even with an 
imperfect understanding of moral knowledge, in order to set up a system whereby 
accredited moral experts can work to study and establish moral models as a community 
of experts. As Iltis points out in the case of bioethics (which seems applicable to ethics 
more broadly), we need to ask: 
  
What would be the nature of the accreditation given this legitimately 
broad conception of bioethics expertise? Would accreditation be 
accomplished by an exam? If so, who would write the exam and what 
would the exam test? Where would we draw the line between general 
knowledge and skills all bioethicists should have, regardless of their area 
of focus, and knowledge only those working in particular areas need, and 
which would thus not be part of general accreditation standards?235
 
 
These questions may seem difficult to answer. However – as Iltis points out – it need not 
be considered more difficult than in the case of any other field of study. She states: 
By raising these questions I do not mean to suggest that accreditation is 
impossible. These are questions any profession faces in determining what 
will be on its boards or exams. . . . Determining the exact nature of an 
exam would be difficult, but it could be done just as other professions 
have done. The fact that in bioethics, unlike in law and medicine, there is 
no standard educational background complicates matters somewhat 
because not everyone studies a particular kind of curriculum to become a 
bioethicist. Nevertheless, the absence of a uniform educational 
background does not make it impossible to develop general standards.236
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In addition to this, remember that even fields such as medicine and law did not begin 
with a set standard for education and a state of general agreement – these are things 
which were instead developed over time as doctors and lawyers were able to agree on 
what sort of training would qualify a person as a medical or legal expert. 
 Iltis adds the argument that accreditation would not indicate expertise. This claim 
is based on the premises that there is moral pluralism in our society such that different 
institutions would have different requirements for expertise, and that accreditation 
standards would have to be broad such that they “would measure only baseline 
knowledge.”237
Even if there are different requirements for different sorts of moral experts, such 
differences would be based on specialization and localized expertise such that there may 
simply be different accreditation requirements for them. There is nothing to say that 
accreditation must be done only on a global level. Morality may be thought of as like 
science – people can be scientists, but they can also be chemists, physicists, biologists, 
etc. Similarly, people can be moral experts, but have a specific area of moral knowledge 
in which they have accredited, sanctioned moral expertise. Iltis brings up the example of 
 However, it does not seem that Iltis’ conclusion is warranted. For one 
thing, as I have indicated above, the current apparent state of moral pluralism within 
society need not indicate that such moral pluralism is correct. As such, it need not be the 
case that the requirements for moral experts will differ in accordance with what current 
groups within society would expect – in fact, expecting such may only serve to reinforce 
and prolong an existing state of moral confusion that could be cleared up if there were 
instead a single institution working towards a single moral model for society. 
                                                 




a bioethicist hired by a Roman Catholic hospital being asked to ground his moral 
reasoning in Roman Catholic moral doctrine; as she herself notes, in such a case the 
hospital should seek to hire someone who is an expert in Roman Catholic bioethics.238
An expert in Roman Catholic bioethics may not agree with a secular bioethics 
expert, but this is not necessarily problematic. The experts of different scientific fields do 
not need to agree with each other on method or approach to problems – it is the 
established method and approach within each field that matters for determining expertise, 
and which is measured when a person acquires a scientific degree. Furthermore, even 
within specific areas of a certain science there can be disagreement over what is correct 
without the expertise of those disagreeing with each other being called into question – as 
mentioned previously, such disagreement is a central part of both academia and science, 
promoting self-correction within the system and the working together of experts to come 
to better understandings. If morality relies on facts of the world, and is based on the idea 
that the rituals that govern society can change and improve, then disagreement and debate 
among moral experts might even be a good thing – an indication of movement towards 
improved moral understanding and the perfection of moral models. 
 
 There are those who argue that any sort of sanctioned moral expertise poses a 
threat to democracy, and is thus unacceptable for modern society. As Lisa S. Parker 
explains, there are those who think that we must either all have equal moral authority “or 
we must sacrifice democratic ideals and process to appoint ethics experts as our 
                                                 





However, this concern does not seem to be justified. Corinna Delkeskamp-Hayes 
addresses this issue from the perspective of the philosopher considering whether or not to 
take the position of a moral expert. She says: 
 Trotter has pointed out that it seems that we only avoid this sort of 
concern in societies or groups where there is a central, unquestionable moral authority, 
such as in religious communities (for example, within a community of Hasidic Jews there 
is no perceived problem with deferring to the moral expertise and authority of their rabbi). 
The thought is that either we have to all be equal (no moral experts) or we have to hold 
an authoritarian view of morality that conflicts with modern, secular values. 
If a society’s normative consensus results from merely tactical alliances, 
securing electoral support for merely private aspirations, then the 
provision of ethics expertise would indeed present a threat to 
philosophers’ professional integrity. If their willingness to cooperate in 
such endeavors is to be plausible, democracy must be understood (at the 
very least) in a republican manner: The public’s voting behavior must be 
driven by an encompassing vision of a common good. In pluralist societies, 
such visions must rest on (real or virtual) discursive processes. Through 
these, the divergent normative commitments are brought together for 
mutual enrichment and differentiation, suggested policies are reflected in 
terms of divergent perspectives, and solutions are designed so as 




This points back to what was said earlier in response to the fear of authoritarianism as the 
result of sanctioned moral expertise. So long as we think that there are certain commonly 
shared values and principles on which to build (as I have argued seems to be the case for 
Xunzi), it again follows that apparent disagreement can serve to support improvement 
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and coherence rather than necessitating the imposition of a view upon those who would 
find it morally disagreeable. Further, as previously discussed, any risk of corruption or 
abuse of power is no worse than in the case of any nonmoral institution. 
 Thus, it seems that Xunzi’s view of moral testimony and expertise can be usefully 
applied within a modern context. It is a view which resolves the problems of 
identification of moral experts, and which in doing so allows for individuals who do not 




Whatever epistemological, moral, or practical conclusions might be made about 
moral testimony, it is clear that the giving and receiving of such testimony is an 
inescapable fact of life. People will always be telling each other what they should or 
should not do (and how), and societies will always have those who set themselves up as 
moral authorities. Given this, it is important to consider the issues related to the giving 
and receiving of testimony about moral matters. The focus of the literature on moral 
testimony thus far has been on elucidating its perceived problems. In trying to address the 
seemingly-problematic nature of moral testimony and argue both that the problems for 
moral testimony have been exaggerated and are resolvable, I have constrained my focus 
to the single problem of identifying appropriate sources of moral testimony. This leaves 
unexplored many other issues that would need to be addressed when considering moral 
testimony more broadly. Even setting aside the epistemological issues of moral 
knowledge and testimonial knowledge, there remains the question of the moral 
worthiness of reliance on moral testimony, and of the responsibilities and moral status of 
givers of moral testimony. Additionally, further work is needed to resolve the metaethical 
question of moral expertise. 
Further, what I offer here is simply an overview of the identification problem and 
an indication of how Chinese philosophy, particularly the Xunzi, provides a perspective 




more detail the application of an institutionalized system of moral expertise within 
modern society – e.g., what such an institution would look like, how it would be 
established and regulated, what the credentialing process for sanctioned moral experts 
might consist of, etc. Such a project would benefit from a more detailed analysis of 
Xunzi’s system of politically sanctioned moral expertise, as well as his views on moral 
education and cultivation. The project may not be so large as it first appears, as there is 
much to learn from the rituals and experts in the past rather than trying to figure it out 
ourselves when it comes to trying to construct a moral, virtuous institution (we need not 
reinvent the wheel). There is a rich tradition in Chinese philosophy to draw upon with 
regards to establishing a moral institution. Much of the Chinese philosophical tradition 
has focused on what is required of a society and its members in order to bring about 
moral ends. In particular, it seems that Xunzi’s philosophy has much to offer to the 
discussion of the issues of moral testimony, moral expertise, and moral education more 
generally. 
 Although the idea of institutionalized moral expertise found in the Xunzi may 
seem novel – and even dangerous – from the perspective of a Western philosopher, I 
would argue that the greater danger would be to try to deny the prevalence and the 
usefulness of moral testimony rather than to risk bias or abuse of moral authority with a 
system of sanctioned moral experts. Institutions for the transmission of moral knowledge 
are deeply entrenched in our society, and have been throughout human history; religion, 
ideology, cultural values, and social norms all have significant impact on human life. As I 
have previously mentioned, if we look at even the supposedly-rational, skeptical, and 




influenced by the beliefs of their times and biased towards them.241
 As aforementioned, the established literature on moral testimony thus far has 
focused largely on the problems perceived with it. In the arguments of those who would 
say that it is not appropriate (or even possible) to rely on moral testimony,  there seems to 
be the thought that the problems associated with moral testimony are such that the risks 
of using it outweigh the benefits, and so we should not use it. I think Xunzi’s view 
presents an alternative, which is to work to improve the imperfect system rather than to 
abandon it altogether. We could see this in the idea of building a house. If we want 
shelter and have a decrepit house, perhaps the best solution is not to tear down the house 
 To think that we can 
detach ourselves from institutionalized moral norms (in favor of an individual, rational 
pursuit of moral understanding) is foolhardy; we may only think we have successfully 
engaged in unbiased moral reasoning when in actuality we are still being influenced by 
the established social norms of our time and culture. Rather than fooling ourselves into 
thinking that we have freed ourselves from the influence of such norms, we should make 
the best of the situation and look to work within the present institutionalized moral 
system to better it. It seems that Western philosophy is still largely entrenched in the 
attempt to deny the power institutionalized moral norms have on us. Chinese philosophy, 
in particular that of the Xunzi, offers a different perspective and approach that, in 
acknowledging the power and importance of social norms, and focusing on learning and 
on working to achieve virtue and cultivate good ends from within the established system, 
might help us to come to a more educated, informed view of the transmission and 
cultivation of moral understanding. 
                                                 




and convince ourselves that, until we can have what we would consider to be the best 
possible home, living out in the open is the right thing to do (perhaps while we draft plans 
for a grand mansion or search for a suitable natural dwelling). Rather than going without 
needed shelter, what is preferable is to try to make use of the house that we have while 
attempting to improve upon it – renovating the house, even if it is a slow and difficult 
process. Even if we still think that it would be preferable to demolish the house and 
rebuild one from the foundations (perhaps considering the house to be in danger of 
collapse and finding it necessary to condemn it as uninhabitable), this would not suggest 
that we should abandon the idea of a shelter altogether – or that we will not need a shelter 
in the meantime. To suggest that, because there are problems with accepting and 
identifying reliable sources of moral testimony, we should abandon it altogether and rely 
on our own abilities is akin to abandoning the idea of a house altogether or resigning to 
live without any shelter until we have, on our own, constructed a better home. Even to 
accept that it is possible to build up to trust in moral testimony, but argue that the burden 
of identifying trustworthy testifiers lies upon the individual is to insist that each 
individual must remain exposed and vulnerable when even a temporary shelter may be 
preferable. 
There are, of course, risks to be weighed: the question is one of whether it is more 
dangerous to trust moral testimony even when our inherited moral views may be 
misguided (to make use of a shelter that may collapse) or to depend on our own abilities 
until we are more certain of the reliability of the moral guidance we receive from others 
(to remain indefinitely exposed to the elements). However, just as we do not think that 




parents until they have reached a suitable level of maturity and understanding, so might 
we think that it is unreasonable to expect the moral novice to assess the moral guidance 
she receives from her society’s moral authorities until she has reached a sufficient level 
of moral understanding. To return to the example of the house: we might think that if we 
do not have the requisite knowledge to determine whether or not the house is safe, it is 
better to stay in the house than to decide to abandon its shelter. Overall, the benefits of 
encouraging children and adolescents to heed and obey their parents outweigh the risks 
that individual children may have bad parents. Similarly, the benefits of adhering to 
existing social norms and heeding the guidance of sanctioned moral experts may 
(especially from a long-term, community-wide perspective) outweigh the risk that in 
particular societies, at particular times, those norms and experts may be wrong. 
 Acknowledging the important role moral testimony has in society is an important 
first step to better understanding that role and improving upon it. At worst, an established 
system of ritual (with teachers to help us correctly apply it) allows society to function on 
a practical level – allowing for a basic level of moral communication and interaction that 
serves to avoid the chaos of a Hobbesian or Xunzian state-of-nature by providing orderly 
ways to achieve our basic desires. At best, such a system of ritual and moral testimony 
reaches to the ideal of complete moral understanding and harmony via individual 
sagehood and society-wide perfection of ritual. Between these two extremes, we have a 
system that has the ultimate goal and ideal of a full moral understanding (sagehood) in 
mind while still admitting the need for and value of society’s functioning on a practical 
level in the meantime. Most people might still follow the system without understanding – 




expertise for guidance when in doubt as to how to appropriately apply them – but others 
(moral experts) would cultivate understanding and work to improve the system in order 
to achieve a higher level of understanding and virtue – much like scientists work to build 
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